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GREEK AND ROMAN REFLECTIONS
ON IMPOSSIBLE LAWS*.
David Daube

Introduction.
I. Varia.
1. Antinomy.
2. An Athenian wit.
3. Caligula's horse and Nero's weddings.
4. The undeposable augur.
II. Interference with natural rights.
5. Pomponius on the claims of cognates to an inheritance.
6. Justinian's Institutes on the claims of children to an inheritance.
7. Gaius on agnates and cognates in connection with statutory tutorship.
8. Justinian's Institutes on agnates and cognates in connection with statutory tutorship.
9. Gaius on natural obligations.
10. Justinian's Institutes on natural laws.
III. Interference with facts and concepts.
11. Paul on possession.
12. Gaius on manifest theft extended.
13. Gais on theft, adultery and homicide extended.
14. Gaius on usufruct extended.
15. Justinian's Institutes on usufruct extended.
16. Paul and Ulpian on usufruct extended.
17. Gaus on adoptive relations and Ulpian on conventional infamy; an excursus on
in-laws.
18. Extensions by interpreters and moralists; the praetor.
IV. Interference with the past.
19. Nineteen-eighty-four.
20. "And his place shall know him no more."
21. Recognition of a freeborn citizen wrongfully kept down.
22. Creation of a freeborn citizen by the Emperor.
23. Creation of a freeborn citizen and the natural law of the beginning.
24. Creation of a freeborn citizen and legitimation by rescript.
25. Creation of a freeborn citizen and rehabilitation of an actress by rescript.
26. The rehabilitation of Theodora: Eros and Agape.
ANCIENT

JURISPRUDENCE,

like modern, displays much interest in unjust,

immoral, unreasonable laws, but very little in impossible ones. Yet the sources
contain a certain amount of material about the latter, and it may be worthwhile to present some of it.

My selection is highly subjective; I am choosing topics to which I can
make some contribution within the compass of one paper. Hence I shall leave
on one side the great question which has occupied Roman lawyers for the
past forty years: whether, whereas the Greeks put their trust in legislation,
* This article is a revised version of an address given at the ninth annual meeting of
the Board of Editors of the NATURAL LAw FoRUM.
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in the Rome of the Republic and constitutional monarchy law was essentially
id entified with custom, which legislation was not at liberty to overthrow.
Roman statutes often end with a clause to the effect that there is no intention to abolish established law, ius, that ought not to be abolished. For
Mommen, the legislature was sovereign, so this clause was a voluntary selfliritation? For Rotondi and Arangio-Ruiz, the legislature might only either
define custom or order peripheral matters, so the clause was a necessary reservation, one which would operate even without it.2 For Mommsen, Cicero's
contention that no statute could deprive a citizen of his freedom 3 was an
advocate's exploitation of that clause; for Rotondi and Arangio-Ruiz it was
absolutely correct, indeed, freedom was only one of innumerable things no
statute could touch. While Mommsen was perhaps too radical in one direction, the opposite view has its own difficulties. It is, for example, hard to
reconcile with the system of legis actio as it prevailed at some stage at least
during the Republic, when any claim to be tried had first to be pleaded
before a magistrate in words exactly following those of a statute. There are,
of course, scholars holding positions intermediate between the extremes.
I propose to begin with some desultory remarks, chiefly designed to convey an impression of the manifold guises the problem of impossible laws may
assume. The cases offered are not, however, devoid of intrinsic interest. The
exchange between Antisthenes and his fellow citizens whose legs he pulled
is to my knowledge the earliest extant discussion of the problem anywhere.
Next I shall examine the assertion made by a number of Roman jurists
that the civil law has no power over the rights of blood relations. No practical consequences were drawn from this doctrine; it is an illustration of a
rather rare phenomenon in classical law, philosophical embellishment. Blood
relationship - as opposed to the agnatic relationship between those who are
in the same patria potestas or would be if the common ancestor were still
alive '- did not become important in private law till the late Republic. The
regulations having regard to it were inevitably laxer than those having regard
to agnatic relationship. Moreover, in Greek speculation, taken over by the
Romans, the ties of blood were prominent among the sources of obligations
no human lawgiver might invalidate: Antigone cannot leave "her mother's
son" unburied; 4 it is her case which Aristotle in his Rhetoric quotes first to
2 RbMIscmEs STAATSRECHT vol. 3, pt. 1, 42f. (1887).
2 Rotondi, Problemi di Diritto Publico Romano, 1 SCRITTI Giusmici 370ff. (ed. by

Arangio-Ruiz, 1922). [44 RIVISTA rrALIANA PER LZ SCIENZE GIURMICHE 147ff. (1920)].
The article appeared posthumously. Arangio-Ruiz, La Rfgle de Droit et la Loi dats
L'AntiquitJ Classique, 29 L'EGYPT. CONTEMPORAINE 30ff. (1938), reprinted in RAmioRA

252ff. (1946).
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illustrate what is naturally just though prohibited ;5 and Cicero defines piety,
which is a sector of the law of nature, as the duty owed to one's country,
one's parents, and one's other relations by blood. 6 When we consider, in
addition, that even at Rome, in religion, fas, and in personal life, blood relationship had always been of the greatest moment, the pronouncements in
question will not appear too surprising.
I shall go on to the denial by a school of Roman jurists of a lawgiver's
power to extend to new situations a concept like theft, homicide, usufruct.
In this case, the debate no doubt did involve practical considerations, at
least in respect of the earlier instances; it is possible that in course of time
the academic-linguistic side took over. What is remarkable is how the
jurists- both those who object to the transfer and those who, up to a
point, accept it- treat these terms of theirs in their traditional application
as in accordance with nature, like, say, silence, noise, a house, a horse. To
widen them is to misrepresent reality (thus those who decline the extension),
unless the widened term is looked on as a different, additional one (thus
those who admit the extension).
Finally I shall introduce a variety of impossibility which has so far re-.
ceived scant attention: laws intended to change the past. I shall say something about the so-called damnatio memoriae, which might go as far as to
make a hated ruler not to have ruled. Above all, I shall investigate the rectification of servile birth. Even today, in societies less keen on the self-made
man than in America, humble antecedents are apt to be covered up. At Rome,
there were several ways in which a freedman might conceal his origin. From
the formalistic-legal point of view, from the early Empire onwards, there was
less need for it since, as far as public, political life was concerned, the Emperor

could grant him most of the privileges of a freeborn citizen. But that was
still not good enough, and from the second half of the second century the
Emperor could make him freeborn. In a statute enacted by Justin, the uncle
of Justinian, this idea of the conferment of free birth combines with the religious idea of the restoration of sinners to form the basis for a grant by which
the Emperor may rehabilitate penitent actresses and cleanse them of their
7
tainted past. By this statute Justinian was enabled to marry Theodora.
5 ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 1.13.2.

e CscERo, DE INVENTIONE 2.22.66, 53.161.
7 Recently Lon L. Fuller, in his book THE MoRALrrY op LAw 70-79 (1964), has
devoted a valuable chapter to "Laws Requiring the Impossible." On the whole, however,
the area he has in mind is not the same as that considered in this article. For instance, he
deals with strict civil and criminal liability, which may (though, surely, it need not) be
understood as implying a command of the impossible. Moreover, he seems to include relative impossibility. If my material lends itself to a different approach, this does not mean
that his treatment is not perfectly appropriate to the problems with which he is concerned.
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I. VAIA
1. Antinomy.- Perhaps at the outset attention should be drawn to the
fact that a considerable sector of the art and rules of interpretation of statutes
is designed to get rid of "logical" impossibility, the existence of which jurists
are unwilling to admit. Suppose there are two laws, one which forbids a
man convicted of extortion to speak in the assembly and another which
orders an augur to designate in the assembly the successor to a deceased colleague; now an augur convicted of extortion makes a nomination in the
assembly - a case recorded in Ad Herennium.8 Somehow the two leges
contrariae must be reconciled so as to allow a decision about the case. As a
rule, the premise that such a conflict is not real, can be only apparent, is
tacitly assumed - but not always. Quintilian, for example, formulates it in
so many words: "It is obvious to all that one statute can never contradict
another as to the law as such since, if the law as such were different, the one
would cancel the other."
One can see that in a well-working legal system this consequence- that
one would cancel the other - would be most awkward. We ought to be
clear, however, that it would not be intrinsically untenable. With regard to
two contradictory testamentary dispositions, the Roman ruling was indeed
that neither of them was valid. 10 Strangely, most philosophers believe that
there cannot be several quite inconsistent moral duties binding at the same
time. If they were right, there would be no genuine moral drama; a little
more analysis and everything will be in order. True life is less simple.
At any rate, it is partly due to the role of interpretation that we hear so
are other reasons too): defects
little about impossible laws (partly -there
of the kind indicated, logical discrepancies and the like, are construed away.
As for laws requiring the practically impossible, they are far rarer than,
say, contracts of this description; nor do they easily lead to litigation. (Among
things practically impossible the Romans reckoned the touching of the sky
with one's finger, 1 as did whoever coined the phrase "to cry for the moon":
tempora mutantur.) They do play a certain part in fairy tales and nightmares, and, indeed, in theology. But I shall omit the entire complex referred
to by the apostle Peter as "the yoke which neither our fathers nor we were
able to bear,"' 2 except to say that the long and rich jurisprudential history
behind it is virtually unexplored. That the impossible order of a judge is
A RHsTOimcA

AD HERENNIUM

1.11.20.

9 QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA 7.7.2.
10 DIGEST 50.17.188 pr., Celsus XVII digestorum.
11 INSTITUTES 3.19.11.
12 ACTS 15.10.
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void, and that a judgment which by the nature of things, rerum natura, cannot be obeyed is so lacking in force that there is no point in an appeal, is
noted by the jurists. 13
2. An Athenian Wit.- Now for a few cases outside the more familiar
legal literature.
Antisthenes, an older contemporary of Plato, recommended to the Athenians
to vote that asses were horses. To the objection that that was absurd he
retorted: "Yet there are generals in your city who have no experience but
14
are merely elected."
It is clearly the agreed basis between the parties that there can be no
legislation for the absolutely impossible: asses are horses. At this juncture
it is immaterial for us whether the accent lies on the flaw in perception, i.e.,
the error in declaring something to be something that it is not, or -what is
more probable from the context - on the practical impossibility of turning
one natural tpecies, a useless one, into another which is of use. 15 I leave aside
(since it is not ventilated by the text) the case where such a statute might
make sense, namely, if it decrees that something, hitherto falling under suchand-such rules, equals something else, falling under other rules. We shall
have to deal with this case below in connection with extensions of furtum
manifestum and usufruct. 16 One is reminded, of course, of Parliament, which
can do anything except make a man into a woman, yet in a sense can do
even this.
Antisthenes's conclusion, however, is reached by a sleight-of-hand. He
was a precursor of the Stoics and - as this anecdote illustrates - shared
features with the Sophists. He steps from the impossible to the unreasonable,
same reasoning it is also like an ass."

to the conferment of a status and function on someone unworthy. The trick
is cleverly obscured by focusing on the common element, i.e., the contrast
between the inferior, stupid, untrained, and the superior, valiant, disciplined.
This contrast is the same whether we think of asses and horses, or of people
who have never learnt the art of soldiering and proper militaries; and the
emphasis on it is designed to make us overlook the difference - that while it
is impossible to turn asses into horses, it is merely foolish to appoint an inSDIGEST 49.8.3, Paul XVI responsorum.
14 DIobNEs LAaRTiuS, LIvzs AND OPINIONS OF EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS 6.8.
15 Horse and ass were apparently a favorite illustration of the efficient and the inefficient.
IN PLATO, PHAEDRUs 260b, the accent lies on the ignorance as to which is which, leading to
harmful consequences. The ass can be relied on to deflate solemnity. In DiGEST 15.1.40 at
the beginning, Marcian V regularum, we are told that a peculium "is born, declines, dies"
and that, therefore, Papirius Fronto "elegantly remarked that it resembled a man." Stein
points out (Elegance in Law, 77 LAw QUARTERLY REVIEW 249 [1961]) that Accursius in
his Gloss shows scant respect for such elegance: he notes eadem ratione et asino, "by the
16 Infra, pp. 25ff.
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adequate leader. Any two natural species would not have done for the joke.
It would not have done to recommend to vote that lions were tigers or that

asses were mules: as lions and tigers are both splendid and as asses and mules
are both despised, these proposals would have lacked that tertium comparationis with the election of the generals (to wit, the contrast between the inferior and the superior) which gave the analogy its convincing look.

It is noteworthy that the term used in the objection to Antisthenes's proposal is alogon, "absurd." It is a good choice: it is general enough to cover
the whole field, the unreasonable as well as the impossible.'1 Which again
facilitates the translation from the latter to the former.
3. Caligula's Horse and Nero's Weddings. - Caligula, when he consecrated himself priest in his own service, made his favorite horse a fellow
priest, 18 and, had his reign not taken a premature end, he would have made
him consul as well.19 (In the recent play The Horse, by the Hungarian
author Julius Hay, he is enabled to execute his design, with amusing results)
This horse should figure prominently in any history of legal personality: he
was given a furnished house and slaves, for the entertainment of guests invited
to the races in his name. Suetonius writes that "besides a marble stall and
an ivory manger, and besides purple blankets and a collar of jewels, Caligula
gave him also a house, his own slaves and furniture." The structure of the
sentence indicates a clear distinction between gifts which, however extravagant, imply no serious assimilation to a free man's status, and house, slaves
and furniture which do. 20
The elevation of a horse to the priesthood or consulate no doubt goes
further than the appointment of bad generals. To the ordinary onlooker at
least it seems to trample on the offices in question, to empty them of any
content. Nevertheless it is possible in that the law; sacred or secular, can
lay down what an office is to mean and who is able to hold it.
The Roman historians from whom we get our information are equally
outraged by the gifts to the horse and its promotion to or destination for
office. For them, Caligula constantly overstepped the bounds of decent or
even sane conduct; he posed as Jupiter, Neptune and so forth. 2 1 It is chiefly
17 See Daube, Le raisonnement par l'absurde chez les jurisconsultes romains, lecture
delivered at the Institut de Droit Romain, Paris, 1958 (mimeographed). In the passage
from the Phaedrus quoted above, the exposition of an orator who does not know what is a
horse and what an ass is called geloion, "ridiculous"-practically synonymous with alogon,
"absurd."
18 Dro, RoMAN HISTORY 59.28.6.
19 SUE'ONIUS, CALIGULA 55.3; Dxo 59.14.7.
20 SUETONIUS, CALIGULA 55.3. Dxo 59.14.7 does not mention this particular wildness, but
here Caligula invites the horse to dinner and drinks his health.
21 Seneca, Dio, Philo, Josephus, and probably also Statius regard him as lunatic; Tacitus
and Suetonius use slightly weaker language, though the latter speaks of insania (55.1) in
describing Caligula's excessive devotion to his actor friends.
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Caligula whom the German word Caesarenwahnsinn calls to mind; it was
coined by Gustav Freytag s2 and achieved wide currency through Wiedemeister, who wrote as a medical. To judge fairly, however, we must remember the wider background of deification of rulers, such old stories as Xerxes
having the sea lashed for insubordination, 23 ideas which, long prevalent in
the East, were now rapidly gaining ground in the West. After all, the Jews
were the only nation not to acknowledge Caligula as god. ("Are you the
god-haters," he greeted Philo and his fellow ambassaxors, 24 "who do not
believe me to be a god, though I am acknowledged as such by all the other
nations, and you refuse me the name?") From that - supernatural - angle,
much that otherwise appears insensate is less so, and even the turning of one
natural species into another would not be quite impossible. It is hardly accidental that the horse's career started with a religious honor; the consulate
would have come second.
The Emperor sensed that the jurists, an unimaginative lot, did not like
his doings. He threatened that he would abolish their art and at any rate
2 5
make sure no opinion contrary to his wishes could be given.
Nero took Pythagoras to "husband" and Sporus to "wife" 2 6 - transactions
on about the same level as the conferment of priesthood or consulate on a horse.
Our historical sources are enraged, it is all wicked, monstrous. Of course the
sober ones among the Romans saw precisely how the traditionally accepted
csence of matrimony was thereby infringed: a bon mot went round that
it would have been a good thing if Nero's father had contracted such a
marriage - a sterile one. But again, there is more to it. Admittedly, despite
dowry, ceremonies, etc., these marriages were not meant quite seriously, were

not looked on as of full legal validity-

not even in the sense of a noncivil

marriage a matrimonium non iustum. But neither were they simply mad

pranks. Various religions, especially sects based in the East, provided models:
nature could be overcome. We are told that, in uniting as "wife" with
Pythagoras, Nero behaved like a deflowered maiden, cried and so forth.
Sporus looked like the deceased Poppaea Sabina (whose death Nero had
28
caused by a kick2 7 ); was perhaps regarded as a kind of Sabina rediviva.
22 G. FRRYTAO, DIE
Tiberius and Claudius.

VERLOENE HANDSCHRIFT.

Freytag refers to Tacitus's chapters on

23 For Caligula's emulation of Xerxes, see SUErTONIUS,

59.25.3.
24 PHIo,
19.5.284.
25

LEGATIO AD GAiUM

SUETOmUS,

44.353; cp. 45.367, and

CALIGULA

19.3; DIG 59.17.7ff.,

JOSEPHUS, ANTIQUITIES

18.8.258,

CALIoULA 34.2. Hitler's TABLE TALK, by the way, evinces an obsessive

hatred of lawyers.
26 TAcrrus, ANNALS

15.37;

SUETONiUS,

NERO

28f.; DIo 68.28.3, 62.13.1, 63.22.4.

2

TATcrrus, ANNALS 16.6; SuamNius, NERO 35.3; Dxo 62.27.4.

25

Compare DIo 63.9.5: women's masks in plays were sometimes given the features of
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At any rate Nero had him castrated "and even tried to transfigure his nature
into that of a woman." 2 9 In Greece people prayed for progeny from this
union.
Martial, after Nero, satirizes a ceremonious "marriage" between two
perverts 8 0 The torches, the veil, the wedding songs, the dowry - nothing
was omitted. He adds: "Is this not enough for you, Romans? Or are you
now waiting for an accouchement?" Back of this verse there is not only the
old bon mot about Nero, but also the more serious expectations enthusiasts
had entertained.
4. The Undeposable Augur. - Before going on to the jurists, I would
mention one of Plutarch's Roman Questions:3' why is an augur absolutely
undeposable - even should he be exiled as a criminal? One answer supplied
is that "augur" denotes not the office but the skill. To depose an augur
would therefore be like voting that a musician is not a musician, a physician
not a physician.
There is no need to dwell on the unsatisfactoriness of this solution, which
would clearly create quite a few augurs over and above those properly appointed: anyone with the requisite knowledge would be an augur. What is,
however, neatly brought out is the distinction deliberately blurred, we saw,
by Antisthenes: the factual belonging to a species (ass, horse, musician, expert
in augury) is not subject to a decree; the belonging to a rank (general, priest
-if we mean just the rank of priest, not the skill) is.
II.

INTERFERENCE

wrrH

NATURAL RIGHTS

5. Pomponiuson the Claims of Cognates to an Inheritance.- Pomponius,
in his discussion of bonorum possessio, the praetorian scheme of succession,
explains that where capitis deminutio minima - such as emancipation from
patria potestas, the head of the family's power - prevents a claim unde
legitimi, based on civil, statutory law, there may still remain a claim unde
cognati, based on blood relationship: "the rights of blood," he adds, "can
through no civil law be destroyed." 8 2 The statement is one of many concerned
with the effect, or lack of effect, of positive or civil law on natural law or
facts. 38
Sabina "in

order that, though dead, she might still take part in the spectacle."

On the

other hand, he kept a courtesan resembling his mother Agrippina while the latter was yet
alive. SUETONiUS, NERO 28.2; DIG 62.11.4.
29 SUETONIUS, NERO 28.1: "etiam in muliebrem naturam transjigurareconatus."
S0 MARTIAL, EPIGRAMMATA 12.42.
a PLUTARCH, ROMAN QUESTIONS 99.287E.
82 DIoEST 50.17.8, IV ad Sabinum: "Jura sanguinis nullo iure civili dirimi possunt." For

the original context, see LENEL, 2 PALINGENESIA IURIS CIVILIS 93 (1889).
83 Voigt's extensive inquiry into the history of the problem is still indispensable: DAs
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The statement is not correct. If the civil law so wishes, it can destroy the
rights of blood; and, in fact, in some cases it does so. The claim unde cognati
does not, for example, survive capitis deminutio maxima, loss of liberty, or
even media, loss of citizenship, say, through exile or deportation. True, the
law cannot turn a relation into a nonrelation, an ass into a horse. But, pace
Pomponius, it can deprive a relation of all a relation's rights. Even capitis
deminutio maxima does not turn a relation into a nonrelation, though before
the law the former is now like the latter- his rights are gone.
It might perhaps be argued that capitis deminutio maxima and media
are closer to natural law, of which Pomponius would not deny that it can
destroy the rights of blood. But this is a lame excuse. Moreover, there are
other cases which should have given him pause. An incestuous begetter of
offspring does not count as father, the offspring not as his child; and, remember, it is incest for a man to "marry" his adoptive daughter - indeed, it
makes no difference if the adoptive tie is dissolved.3 4 The offspring of such
a union, being a bastard, has no claim unde cognati to his begetter's estate.
So here the civil law prevents the rights of blood from even coming into existence. Again, prior to the lex Minicia, the child of a Roman mother and an
alien father was a Roman; a child born from such a marriage after that
statute was an alien-entirely outside the praetorian scheme which was
confined to citizens, unable to invoke either unde legitimi or unde cognati.3 5
One might try an entirely different defense of the jurist. The remark in
question is preserved in title 50.17 of the Digest, De diversis regulis iuris
antiqui. We know that many texts in it have been slightly adjusted by Justinian with a view to obtaining a general regula.3 6 One might ask, therefore,
whether the inexactitude is not due to Justinian, Pomponius having expressed
himself more circumspectly. But this is most unlikely in view of the fact
that, as we shall see,s 7 his contemporary Gaius repeatedly commits a similar
blunder, at least once in his Institutes, untouched by Justinian, and that it
is indeed Justinian who on this occasion tries to put it right.3 8
It is easy to guess what Pomponius is driving at. The actual presence of
cognation, blood relationship, cannot be abolished by any law; no law can
NATURALE, 4 vols. (1856-75),
especially vol. 1 (1856), pp. 303ff. See also Ernst
Levy's great lecture, Natural Law in Roman Thought, 15 STUDIA ET DOCUMENTA HISJUS

TORIAE ET JURIS

1-10 (1949).

84 G~ius 1.59, 64;

INSTITUTES

1.10.1, 12;

DIGEST

23.2.55 pr., Gaius XI ad edictum

provinciale.
s5 Gmius 1.78; ULPIANI REOULAE 5.8.
88 See Daube, Zur Palingenesie einiger Klassikerfragmente,76 ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIGNY-

198ff. (Roman section) (1959).
37 Infra, pp. 13ff.
as GAIus 1.158; INSTITUTES 1.15.3, 1.16.6. See especially pp. 17f.

STIFTUNO
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turn a relation into a nonrelation.3 9 Further, though the rights flowing from
cognation, the rights of blood, can be abolished, that does not in fact happen
as a result of capitis deminutio minima, a mere civil law change of family
status. The distinctively Roman, civil law relationship of agnation, the relationship between those who are in the same patria potestas, or would be if
the common paterfamiliaswere still alive, is indeed dissolved by such a change;
it is of its very essence that it should be. At one time, private law took little
notice of cognation. Now, however, that the praetor does recognize it as a

source of rights, natural rights as opposed to the old civil law ones, he is only
consistent in not admitting grounds of extinction peculiarly connected with,
the old civil law relationships. That would vitiate the main purpose of his
innovation. Something like this is the - considerable - grain of truth in

Pomponius's remark.
It would be a mistake, incidentally, to think that, by Pomponius's time,
capitis deminutio minima has become a technicality with negligible practical
consequences. It has not. A son emancipated, for instance, can own property
of his own; the seriousness of which consequence is underlined by the praetor's

request, on according him a claim unde liberi together with a son still in
potestas, to make collatio bonorum, to bring in his possessions. The reason
capitis deminutio minima is discounted when it comes to unde cognati is not
that it is unimportant in itself, but that, however important, it is the kind
of transaction which, where cognation is the decisive tie, it is appropriate to
discount, and which, unlike, for example, deportation, one can afford to
discount.

. Little damage was done by a statement like that here reviewed. The
classical jurists on the whole refrained from enunciating philosophical maxims.
The few we do find tend to be commonplaces, repeated again and again.
Their function is to justify (after a fashion) an existing state of law. Beyond
that, they are merely decorative; no real inferences were drawn.
6. Justinian'sInstitutes on the Claims of Children to an Inheritance.
Institutes 3.1.11, according to Ferrini,40 comes from the Res Cottidianae
rightly or wrongly attributed to Gaius.4 1 We learn that true children emancipated, while the emancipation costs them their civil law claim to their father's
39 In reality, even cognation by the time of Pomponius was no longer as simply factual
as that: it covered adoptive relatives so long as the agnatic tie lasted. DiGEST 38.8.3,
Julian XXVII digestorum, 38.8.1.4, Ulpian XLVI ad edictutm I disregard this complication.
40 Ferrini, Sulle fonti delle Istituzioni di Giustiniano, 2 OPEE 379 (ed. by Albertario,
1929). (This reference is the same as 13 BULLETTINO DELL' ISTITUTO Di DIRITTO ROMANO
166 [1900].)
41 JOLOWICZ, for example, inclines to regard the attribution as wrong or, shall we say,
exaggerated (HSTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 398 [2nd ed., 1952]). HoNoRk

argues that it is right (Gmus 113ff. [1962]).

I am not convinced by the latter.
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estate, are given a claim unde liberi by the praetor; adoptive children emancipated are not only without a civil law claim to their adoptive father's estate

but also get no praetorian claim unde liberi. The text goes on: et recte, "and
rightly." Why? Because "a civil law reason cannot destroy natural rights,
and true children or grandchildren cannot cease to be children or grandchildren by ceasing to be sui heredes.' '42 By contrast, "adoptive children, as
they obtain the right and name of a child by the civil law reason of adoption,
'43
so they lose them by another civil law reason, emancipation."
This is the same mix-up as in Pomponius, except that the natural tie in
question is not cognation in general, but the more specific one between father
and child. Moreover, as in Pomponius, it occurs in the context of the effect
of capitis deminutio minima on bonorum possessio.
The author of the passage is right in saying that a true child does not
lose this quality by ceasing to be a suus heres. But he is slipping when he says
that a true child's natural rights - the claim unde liberi- cannot be destroyed by a civil law transaction. It is indeed astonishing he should be so
enamored of his theory as not to realize its brittleness. There is the glaring
fact that an adoptive child, while in his adoptive father's potestas, has no
claim unde liberi to his natural father's goods.4 4 Moreover, though a child
emancipated by his adoptive father regains unde liberi in his old family, or
as Paul puts it, regains the ius naturale liberorum, "the natural right of children,"'4 5 in the very paragraph preceding that under discussion, in Institutes
3.1.10 - equally, according to Ferrini, from the Res Cottidianae- an exception even to this right is noted. For a sound reason of expediency, even
a child emancipated by his adoptive father and thus no longer under his
potestas, if the emancipation takes place after the natural father's death, is
refused a claim unde liberi to the latter's estate. The reason is that it should
not be within the adoptive father's discretion, on the natural father's death,
to place or not to place a liber ahead of the legitimi, the agnates. Plainly,
if it were, he could make some unscrupulous deals.46 Yet this rule is followed
by the statement that the natural rights of liberi are unabolishable by the
civil law.
42 Naturalia enim iura civilis ratio peremere non potest nec, quia desinunt sui heredes
esse, desinere possunt filii filiaeve nepotes neptesve esse.
43 Ius nomenque fdii filiaeve, quod per adoptionem consecuti sunt, alia civili ratione, id
est emancipatione, perdunt.
44 ULPIANi REGULAE 28.8.
5 DIGEST 38.6.4, Paul II ad Sabinum. For the probable scope of Paul's statement, see
infra note 46.
46 In INSTITUTES 3.1.10 as it stands, the exclusion from unde liberi in the old family
is confined to adrogatio,more precisely, to a child first emancipated by his true father, then
giving himself in adoption - adrogatio- and finally emancipated by his adoptive father.
In the Res Cottidianae, the exclusion cannot have been so confined. It must have covered
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It may be added that the remark at the end of the quotation, about
adoptive children, is also far too simple: emancipation of an adoptive child,
it is affirmed, deprives him of unde liberi in the adoptive family because what
is gained by a civil law transaction is lost by a civil law transaction. There is
no inevitability about this; but there were good grounds for attaching unde
liberi in such a case to the original family. I shall not, however, pursue this
matter.

Let me call attention to the interesting phrase ius nomenque, "right and
name," where nomen has the connotation of something artificial, superimposed, "mere name," by contrast with the genuine, natural: adoptive children
are children "by mere title of law." We shall come across two more instances
of this use of nomen, Gaius 3.21 and Institutes 1.15.3.47 To be exact, Gaius
3.21 speaks of nomen agnationis, "the name of agnation." The combination
with ius occurs only in Justinian. Between ius nomenque in 3.1.11, descriptive
of an adoptive child's position, and iuris nomen in 1.15.3, descriptive of
agnation (nam adgnatio iuris est nomen), there seems to be little difference;
the meaning is "a mere name, title, conferred by the law." Institutes 3.1.11,
as mentioned above, probably comes from the Res Cottidianae, Institutes
1.15.3 in the main reproduces Gaius 1.158, but the relevant clause is an addition, be it by Justinian, be it by a pre-Justinianian reviser of Gaius. 48 In
any event, as far as the extant textual evidence goes, the combination of
nomen and ius in this area is later than Gaius's Institutes.49
One reservation is called for. After observing that the praetor discriminates between true and adoptive children, Institutes 3.1.11 continues: et
recte, "and rightly." The opposite of what is done recte, I feel, is wrong,
also a child given in adoption (in the narrow sense, not adrogatio) by his true father and
then emancipated by his adoptive one. For Justinian, as a result of his great reform of
adoption (in the narrow sense), INSTITUTES 1.11.2, CODEX 8.47.10 of A.D. 530, this case
no longer falls within the area of the rule at all: adoption (in the narrow sense) now leaves
the rights of succession in the old family quite unaffected. Hence the curious restriction
of the rule to adrogatio. Doubtless DIGEST 38.6.4, Paul II ad Sabinum, too, has been
brought into harmony. with his legislation; in the classical version, the portion sed si naturales
. . . , now restricted to adrogatio, was certainly wider. My comments on INSTITUTES
3.1.11 do not, however, depend on the exact scope of 3.1.10.
47 Infra, pp. 14, 17.
48 FERRINI, 2 OPERE 344 (13 BULLETTINO DELL' ISTITUTO DI DIRITTO ROMANO

135)

takes the latter view: it is a gloss that got into GAIUS 1.158 prior to Justinian.
49 Theophilus, incidentally, simplifies ius nomenque in 3.1.11 by omitting iuS; he translates to onoma. In 1.15.3 he translates nomimon onoma, agnation is "a legal name."
Strangely, Ferrini in his Latin version of Theophilus, INSTITUTIONUM GRAECA PARAPHRASIS
THzOPHILO ANTECESSORI VULGO TRIBUTA, Pt. 1 (1884), 70, retains a gross vulgarization

introduced by previous modem editors, namely, the insertion of civills. He renders iuris
enim eivilis nomen adgnatio est, "for agnation is a title of the civil law." This gets rid
of the not very easy concept of iuris nomen and, in the process, robs the clause of any
interest, makes it state the excessively obvious. (As a matter of fact, in his version as it
stands the word nomen does not appear at all; we read iuris enim civilis adgnatio est. I
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incorret, improper rather than impossible. Accordingly, this kind of approval
seems to imply that the praetor could have treated the two classes of children
alike though, had he done so, he would have made a mistake; still, it would
have been valid if objectionable law. It is, then, only when the et recte is
being expanded, substantiated by a slogan, that confusion sets in. That the
confusion did no harm, since no attempt was made to lift it from the sphere
of theory, I have already pointed out in discussing Pomponius.
7. Gaius on Agnates and Cognates in Connection with Statutory Tutorship. - In Gaius's time a boy under age (normally, under 14) who was sui
iuris - without a paterfamilias- had a guardian, often one appointed in
the dead paterfamilias'stestament; in default of such a one, the nearest agnate
was his guardian. In expounding this tutela legitima, which goes back to the
XII Tables, Gaius in his Institutes writes that "the right of agnation, though
not that of cognation, is destroyed by capitis deminutio."50 He is thinking of
capitis deminutio minima (media or maxima would wipe out the right of
cognation as well). From the destruction of agnation by this it would follow, for example, that a person otherwise the nearest agnate, if he got himself
adopted by another family, would no longer become guardian or, supposing
the adoption took place after he had become guardian, would cease to be
guardian. 5 1 Gaius continues by explaining why cognation survives capitis
deminutio: "whereas civil law rights can be extinguished by a civil law rea52
son, natural rights cannot."
Basically, this is again the same muddle, this time in the context of the
effect of capitis deminutio minima on tutela legitima. The natural tie in
question is cognation, as in Pomponius; in Institutes 3.1.11 it is the tie between
father and child. However, we shall see that, in several respects, Gaius's
presentation is worse than that of the other two texts.
Basically, then, it is the same muddle: the misconception that natural rights
are indestructible by the civil law. In reality, they are destroyed by capitis
deminutio maxima or media and could be destroyed whenever the legal order

so decreed.

(This has, of course, been seen.)

53

Gaius himself mentions the

assume, however, that it has dropped out through a slip on his or the printer's part. The
edition is notorious for its misprints: ZachariA von Lingenthal, review of Institutionum
etc., 5 ZEITSCHRIPT DEn SAVIONY-STIFTUNO 276 [1884] [Roman section]).
5o G~.us 1.158.
51 ULPIAM REOULAE 11.9.

52 Sed agnationis quidem ius capitis deminutione perimitur, cognationis vero ius eo
modo non commutatur, quia civilis ratio civilia quidem iura corrumpere potest, naturalia
vero non potest. BESELER, 5 BErTEXO

2 (1931),

in a general attack on ratio, brackets

the relevant passage from quia, "whereas civil law rights.. ." This is unacceptable. Compare, infra, pp. 19ff. on DIoEsT 4.5.8, Gaius IV ad edictum provinciale, and pp. 34ff. on
DIGEST 7.5.2.1, Gaius VII ad edictum provinciale.
53 See, e.g., Voror, op. cit. supra note 33, at 306; PosTE, GAz INSTITtTIONES 92f.
(4th ed., 1904).
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incestuous nature of a union with an adoptive daughter, with the result that
any offspring would be a bastard 54 not tied to his begetter even by cognation.
As for the provision of the lex Minicia making the child of a Roman mother
and alien father an alien, Gaius himself points out 5 5 that this overturned
the ius gentium, which he regards as resting on naturalis ratio;5 6 and a little

further on he observes more generally that the principle of the ius gentium
that a child follows the mother is subject to legislative modification. The
example he cites is interesting: a senatusconsult -

Claudianum -

had decreed

that if a free woman has the owner's consent to cohabit with his slave, she
herself would remain free but the offspring would be slaves; Hadrian found
this "inelegant" -

though by no means impossible

-

and restored the ius

gentium, a child would share the mother's status.5 ' I agree with Levy against
the prevalent opinion, that in classical times ius gentium and ius naturale were
not synonymous: "The one stated the fact of universal usage, the other its
motivation. Moreover, while ius gentium was a hard and fast category indispensable to the technique of the jurists, naturalis ratio never obtained an
organic status in their reasoning." 58 It is partly because of this vagueness of
the latter notion that a misconception like that presented could come about.
The misconception recurs in two passages in Gaius's chapter on succession,
though it is here less fully formulated. Commenting on the law of the XII
Tables he observes that, under that code, an agnate having undergone capitis
deminutio -

again, the reference is to minima -

is not admitted to the

succession, "since the name of agnation is destroyed by capitis deminutio."59
The contrast with cognation is not expressly drawn, but it clearly underlies
the description of agnation as a nomen, "name." As in Institutes 3.1.11 just
discussed, where we hear of the ius nomenque of an adoptive child, so in
this passage "name" means "mere name," "mere civil law title," as opposed
to the real, natural thing, in this case cognation. 60 The implication, then,
is that the position of a cognate could not be affected by capitis deminutio.
Further on, dealing with the praetorian improvements, Gaius does contrast agnation and cognation expressly. The praetor reserves a place in his
scheme for cognates (though they still rank below agnates). Agnates having
undergone capitis deminutio may still have a chance in this class since, Gaius
explains, "though they have lost their statutory right, assuredly they retain
54 1.59, 64.
55 1.78.
58 1.1, 189.

57 1.83f.; see Stein, op. cit. supra note 15, at 248.
58 Levy, op. cit. supra n. 33 at p. 11.

GAius 3.21, quia nomen agnationis capitis deminutione perimitur.
6o Compare also INSTITUTES 1.15.3, to be considered presently.

59
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the rights of cognation."

61

He does not say merely that they retain the

rights of cognation. They do so certe, "assuredly," "obviously." Once more,
what is implied is that these are rights which cannot be touched by a civil
law transaction.
To return to his remark on tutela legitima, the muddle is less tolerable
than in Pomponius and Institutes 3.1.11 in two respects. First, prima facie,

from his presentation it looks as if the rights flowing from cognation survived
even capitis deminutio maxima and media. He declares these rights to be
unaffected by capitis deminutio-he does not specify, he does not put
minima. Ordinarily, to be sure, it might be left to the reader, even a student
reader, to notice that minima alone is intended. But in the present case, this
is very slipshod, considering that, in the very next paragraph, he defines capitis
deminutio as a change of civic condition, adding that it can be maxima,
media, or minima.62

Secondly, the remark, correct or incorrect, is rather out of place. In the
case of succession, the subject of Pomponius and Institutes 3.1.11, a person
having dropped out of agnation, unde legitimi, may sometimes nevertheless
have a claim based on cognation, unde cognati, or more narrowly, on his
quality as child, unde liberi. But there is no tutela of cognates. Accordingly,
whereas it is useful to point out the contrast between agnation and cognation,
and stress the possible retention of the latter when the former has gone, in
a discussion of succession-as also, perhaps, in one of capitis deminutio in
general or of capitis deminutio minima6 3 - it is not very relevant here. Certainly, where, in the absence of both a testamentary guardian and a legitimate
one, an appointment is made by the magistrate, he will often in fact appoint
a cognate. This may safely be assumed - from general considerations, from
the ever-increasing part played by cognation, from the obligation of cognates
(at least some of them) if necessary to request an appointment, from their
role in nominatio potioris which came in soon after Gaius. But all this in no
way brings in cognates as a technical class. The financial suitability of a
cognate, for instance, would be more important than his nearness in degree.
Moreover, friends of the family, too, would come into consideration.
What makes the remark particularly inapposite is the fact that, by the
second century A.D., it is no pleasure to get the appointment. Indeed, the
trouble and risks are enormous. A legitimate guardian, an agnate, is perhaps
still relatively free from duties. (Namely, if we reject as spurious the texts
61 3.27, Licet enim capitis daminutione ius legitimum perdiderint, carte cognationis iura
retinent.
62 1.159.
6 But we do not really find it even in DIGEST 4.5.7 pr., Paul XI ad edictum, and 4.5.8,
Gaius IV ad edictum provinciale: see infra, pp. 19ff.
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assimilating him to the guardian appointed by the magistrate. The matter
is controversial.) For a guardian appointed by the magistrate-a cognate,
a friend of the family -the
office is definitely a burden. In a sketch of
guardianship, therefore, to speak of "a right of cognation" - "though the
right of agnation is destroyed by capitis deminutio, the right of cognation is
not because a civil law transaction cannot destroy natural law rights" -is
schief, thoughtless.
Below I shall quote a text from the Digest deriving from a section of
Gaius's commentary on the provincial edict which deals with capitis deminutio
minima.6 4 Here he again proclaims the doctrine of the resistance of natural
rights to civil law transactions, and though the doctrine is wrong, at least it
is not misplaced. 65 In the Institutes Gaius, first-rate teacher, second-rate jurist,
enlivens his r~sum6 by a commonplace maxim though it does not fit. Perhaps in
the older work which he follows, 66 to be guardian still appeared as an advantage rather than a bother - which would make his talk of ius cognationis
more pardonable. After all, right to the last we can spot traces of the original
character of guardianship, if only in vocabulary. 67 Or he may have at the
4.5.8, Gajus IV ad edictum provinciale; for the original context, see LENEL,
(1889).
that the paragraph from the Institutes here analyzed
should be read, not together with what precedes it, as part of the discussion of tutela
legitima, but together with what immediately follows, that is to say, as opening the excursus
on capitis deminutio which Gaius inserts in the chapter on guardianship. In an account of
capitis deminutio, as already observed, the contrast between agnation and cognation does
make sense.
Unfortunately this is not tenable. For one thing, the paragraph in ULPIANI REGULAE
corresponding to that under review unmistakably belongs to tutela legitima. It reads:
legitima tutela capitis deminutione amittitur, "tutela legitima is lost by capitis deminutio."
ULPIANI RGOULAE 11.9. We need not go into the precise relationship between ULPIANI
REOULAE and Galus's INSTITUTES. Unquestionably the former work (which prevalent opinion
assigns to the first half of the fourth century A.D.) uses either the latter or a precursor of
the latter or a revised edition of the latter. The way it understands the paragraph in question is of considerable weight. (It is, of course, simpler and more direct; nothing is said
about agnation or cognation, nothing about civil law transactions and natural rights. We
are offered a straightforward statement of the effect of capitis deminutio on tutela legitima.
The qualification minima is missing, as in the INSTITUTES.) Equally, in the INSTITUTES Of
Justinian, principally relying on Gaius's exposition, the paragraph forms the close of the
title De legitima adgnatorum tutela (1.15.3) while the excursus De capitis minutione occupies title 1.16. (I shall presently say something about the modifications 1.15.3 shows compared with GAsus 1.158.) For another thing, if we treated the paragraph here inspected
as opening the excursus on capitis deminutio, the omission of minima would be far more
serious. In the opening sentence of an ex professo account, Gaius could not expect the reservation to be supplied by the reader. If this paragraph opened the law regarding capitis
deminutio, he would really be representing the rights based on cognation as untouched even
by capitis deminutio media or maxima. Of such nonsense he cannot possibly be guilty.
66 Compare infra, pp. 31f.
67 The very notion of amittere tutelam, "losing the guardianship," which occurs in
ULPIANI R.EOULA. supra n. 65, is an anachronism in the era of the composition of that
e4

1

DIGEST
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65 It might perhaps be argued

book.

ULPIANI

REGULAE

11.9

concerns

tutela legitima; even

this

is

a

burden

by

the fourth century. In 11.7 amittere is used in connection with tutela testamentaria.
Three more texts are to be added: GAxus 1.182, which if it does not exclusively contemplate tutela testamentariaat least includes it. DIGEST 4.5.7 pr., Paul XI ad edictum, where
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back of his mind a passage like that from Sabinus which is adduced by Gellius:
"Our forefathers held that a man's obligations were in this order - first to
his ward, then to his guest, then to his client, next to his blood relation, finally
8
to his relation by marriage."
8. Justinian's Institutes on Agnates and Cognates in Connection with
Statutory Tutorship.-Institutes
1.15.3 more or less copies Gaius 1.158. I
put the deviations in brackets. 69 Sed agnationis quidem ius [omnibus modis]
capitis deminutione [plerumque] perimitur. [nam adgnatio iuris est nomen.]
cognationisvero ius non [omnibus modis] commutatur, quia civilis ratio civilia
quidem iura corrumpere potest, naturalia vero non [utique].
Four points are noteworthy. First, Justinian inserts an explanation of the
vulnerability of agnation by capitis deminutio: agnation is "a name of law,"
"a mere tide of law." It will be remembered that he makes use of the notion
in Institutes 3.1.11, probably drawing on the Res Cottidianae, and that he
would also have found it in Gaius 3.21. Ferrini thinks that the explanation
70
is a gloss that got into Gaius 1.158 prior to Justinian: quite possible.
Secondly, whereas according to Gaius 1.158 agnation is always destroyed
by capitis deminutio minima, Justinian puts plerumque, "generally." This is
71
necessitated by postclassical and Justinianian reforms.

Thirdly, he improves Gaius's presentation by making it quite clear that
even cognation does not survive capitis deminutio maxima or media. Whereas
Gaius 1.158 says that "agnation, though not cognation, is destroyed by capitis
deminutio" (leaving it to the reader to supply minima), Justinian says that
"agnation, though not cognation, is destroyed - in general - by all modes
of capitis deminutio": by all modes, that is to say, even by minima. Morethe object of amittere is all classes of guardianship (but the verb is strangely used, signifying "to effect loss," as in 4.5.6, Ulpian LI ad Sabinurn, which, in the DIGEST, comes
immediately before). DGEST 26.4.2, Ulpian XXXVII ad Sabinum, which concerns tutela
legitima, not yet too bad in Sabinus's time.
68 5.13.5, quoting Sabinus III iuris civilis: in oficiis apud maiores ita observandum est,
primum tutelae, deinde hospiti, deinde clienti, turn cognato, postea adlini.
I ought to add that, should the Veronese palimpsest have the correct reading, quaedam
instead of quidem, Gaius would be more complicated: "some civil law rights can be extinguished by a civil law reason." Some only- so there are even civil law rights defying the
civil law. Kniep maintains (GMA

INSTITUTIONUM COMMENTARIUS

PRIMus

67 [1911])

that

Gaius means just this. Unfortunately he does not say what particular rights might be in
point. Still, an interpretation on this basis is just possible: Gaius might, for example, be
alluding to the argument he advances in 3.194-that a statute cannot turn a nonmanifest
thief into a manifest one (see infra, pp. 26ff). It would be queer, however, to look upon this
as a case of indestructibility of "civil law rights." Moreover, "some" makes too many
inviolate. Again, it is not like Gaius to bring in a major qualification in such an offhandish,
distracting fashion. Finally, the sentence, if taken in this way, would be rather inelegant.
I incline to accept the orthodox emendation quidem. It is quidem which we find in INSTITUTES 1.15.3, which text now falls to be examined.
69 As far as quidem is concerned, see my comments supra n. 68.
70 See supra n. 48.
71 See, e.g., INSTITUTES 3.5 pr.
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over, as in Gaius (and no doubt in the Res Cottidianae), there follows an
excursus on capitis deminutio (Institutes 1.16), and here a special paragraph
(1.16.6) is devoted to the distinction between the effect on the right of cogna-

tion of capitis deminutio minima and the other kinds of capitis deminutio. The
paragraph begins by expressly restricting the survival of cognation to minima;
it goes on to note and illustrate its extinction by maxima and ends by noting
72
its extinction by media.
Fourthly (and most importantly for us), Justinian does realize that the
slogan of the indestructibility of natural rights exaggerates. Instead of proclaiming, with Gaius, that a civil law transaction cannot annihilate them, he
says that it cannot annihilate them utique, "simply," "without ado," "totally"I shall not attempt to decide between the various nuances.
The special paragraph contrasting minima with the other kinds (1.16.6)
shows, incidentally, a curious wording in its first portion: "As regards the
statement above, that cognation survives capitis deminutio, this applies to
minima only." The curious thing is that, in Justinian's exposition, "the statement above" (1.15.3) is no longer so careless as its source, Gaius 1.158. It
already, by means of a twofold insertion of omnibus modis, "by all modes,"
as well as the reservation utique, "simply," corrects the slipshod original (which
took the restriction to minima for granted). It is not true that it says that
cognation survives capitis deminutio, period. So why does 1.16.6 represent
it as saying that? This paragraph, according to Ferrini, comes from the Res

Cottidianae,73 and herein may lie the explanation. In the Res Cottidianae,

we may suppose, Gaius 1.158 was still left unaltered; there were not yet, as in
Institutes 1.15.3, the qualifications omnibus modis and utique. At that stage,

"the statement above" was still carelessly wide, and what is 1.16.6 in Justinian
was added to put it right. The rectifications in 1.15.3 are attributable to Justinian himself, desirous to have the law outlined in an accurate manner from
74
the outset; only he did not trouble to adjust the first portion of 1.16.6.
No reason to overrate Justinian's analytical powers. The terms cognatio,
"blood relationship," and ius cognationis, "the right of blood relationship,"
are still employed indiscriminately. There is still no precise separation be72 Quod autem dictum est manere cogrurtionis ius et post capitis deminutionem, hoc
ita est, si minima capitis deminutio interveniat: manet enim cognatio. nam si maxima
capitis deminutio incurrat, ius quoque cognationis perit, ut puta servitute alicuius cognati,
et ne quldem, si manumissus fuerit, recipit cognationem. sed et si in insulam deportatus
quis sit, cognatio solvitur.
73 FERIUMN, 20PER-E 344 [13 BULLETrINO 135].

7, Support for my suggestion is furnished by the two awkward successive ablatives omnibus modis capitis deminutione, "by all modes by capitis deminutio," in 1.15.3. That is not
the style of the Res Cottidianae; it is the kind of thing resulting from an interpolation in
the course of codification.
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tween the factual and legal position. 75 After all, in Institutes 3.1.11, we have
seen, the commonplace about natural rights occurs (is taken over, it would
appear, from the Res Cottidianae) without the qualifying utique. Its addition
in Institutes 1.15.3 is surely due to the existence of 1.16.6, dwelling on the
destruction of cognation by capitis deminutio maxima or media, and reflected
in the insertion of omnibus modis in 1.15.3. With the legal result of capitis
deminutio maxima and media highlighted in such a degree, it is not surprising
that, on this occasion, the defectiveness of the commonplace obtrudes itself,
can no longer be overlooked.
9. Gaius on Natural Obligations.-Digest 4.5.8, Gaius IV ad edictum
provinciale, lays down that "those obligations the fulfillment of which is considered to be of a natural kind obviously do not end by capitis deminutio,
since a civil law reason cannot destroy natural rights." It follows, we are
told, that the action for restoration of a dowry, being equitable, conceived
76

in bonum et aequum, survives capitis.deminutio.

The following brief fragment, 4.5.9, Paul XI ad edictum, syntactically
part of 4.5.8, adds "so that when the time comes the emancipated woman
may sue," ut quandoque emancipata agat.
The jurists have in mind capitis deminutio minima only. The omission
of the adjective is no problem: the edict they are commenting on 77 applied
only to this type.78 Hence the restriction is taken for granted.
The obligation referred to in the first part of 4.5.8 may be naturales
obligationes in a technical sense; this is indeed the prevalent view. On this
basis, however, one would expect the topic to be capitis deminutio minima
of the debtor, whereas the example of actio de dote envisages capitis deminutio
minima of the creditor, the woman. Still, the technical sense of naturalis
obligatiois so different in different periods (and maybe with different writers of
the same period) that we should not be too surprised. On the other hand, there
is the possibility that the very elaborate phrase obligationes quae naturalem
75 1 also in this paper am lax in my usage and, for the sake of brevity, sometimes speak
of "cognation" where I mean the rights. But I can afford it because I know, or trust, my
readers will make the requisite adjustments.
76 Eas obligationes, quae naturalem praestationem habere intealeguntur, palam est capitis
deminutione non perire, quia civilis ratio naturalia iura corrumpere non potest; itaque

de dote actio, quia in bonum et aaquum concepta est, nihilo minus durat etiam post capits
deminutionam. BESELER, 5 BErraXoE 17, branding ratio as postclassical, brackets the
relevant bit from quia to potest, "since a civil law reason cannot destroy natural law
rights." This is unwarranted; ef. supra, p. 13, on GAIUS 1.158, and infra, p. 34, on
DIGEST 7.5.2.1, Gaius VII ad edictum provinciale. In Romanistiche Studien, 8 TijDSCHRIFT
VOOR RzCHTSOESCHrDgNiS

321 (1928),

he reconstructs the text in too imaginative a

fashion.
77 For the original context see LENEL, op. cit. supra note 64, at 197, 986.
78 See DIGEST 4.5.2 pr., Ulpian XII ad edictum. As for the wording of the Edict, see
LUNEL,

DAs EDICTUM PERPETJUM 117 '(3rd ed., 1927).
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praestationem habere intelleguntur is not synonymous with naturales obligationes; and that it means obligations to be performed to a person defined by

his natural position, irrespective of agnatic or even cognatic relationship. That
would clearly include an obligation to be performed to a wife irrespective of
a capitis deminutio she may have undergone. I shall presently adduce Digest
4.5.7pr. where, in an interpolated section, naturaliter designari does denote
"to be defined by one's natural relationship"-though, to be sure, that text
speaks of cognates, not of husband and wife.
At any rate, the resistance to capitis deminutio minima of obligations with
a naturalispraestatiois explained by means of the slogan we know from Gaius
1.158 (and Institutes 1.15.3), except that it is shortened: we are spared the
positive part, that a civil law transaction can extinguish civil law rights, and
are given only the really significant negative one, "it cannot extinguish natural
rights." I need not repeat the objections to this doctrine.
79
It has been alleged that these words are interpolated by the compilers.
This is difficult to accept; it would be too much of a coincidence for a bit from
one work of Gaius, the Institutes, to be stuck into an extract from another,
his commentary on the provincial edict. Surely he resorted to the commonplace in the latter as well as the former; and quite likely it is because the
compilers found it there that they used this piece from Gaius instead of contenting themselves with Paul, who supplies 4.5.7 and 4.5.9. The latter is so
precisely on the topic of 4.5.8 as to be introducible as, syntactically, a subsidiary clause of this fragment. It does look as if the compilers had had a
special reason for preferring 4.5.8 to what was in Paul-that reason being
the slogan.
Less immediately unconvincing is the proposition that what now surrounds
this slogan in 4.5.8 is spurious. In the classical version, there may have been
no talk of dowry. (If there was, the action must have been called rei uxoriae.
Justinian commonly prefers de dote.) Indeed, there may have been no talk
of "natural performance." Siber, for instance, holds that the slogan was attached to a distinction between ius agnationis and ius cognationis, just as in
Gaius 1.158.80 (It is futile to speculate whether, if he is right, Gaius here associated the slogan with bonorum possessio only or also, stupidly, with tutela.)
To Siber's own arguments should be added this, that in classical writings the

concept of the indestructibility of natural rights may well have been confined
79 E.g., by BURDESE, LA NOZIONE CLASSICA

DI

OBLIOATIO"
MITTEIS 16 (1925).

"NATURALIS

SO Siber, Naturals Obligatio, GEDENKSCHRIFT Fih

113f. (1955).
This work of

Siber's is so well argued that on occasion initial rejection has been followed by conversion:
contrast Albertario's review in 3 STUD

Di DIRITTO RoMAEo 55ff. (1936)

[102 ARcivO

GwuRumco 230ff. (1929)] with his article La critica del fr. 8 D. De capite minutis IV,
4 STUDIA ET DOcUMENTA

HiSTORIAE ET JuaRs 529ff. (1938).
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to succession, tutorship, and the like. It sounds rather pompous when applied
to restoration of dowry, at least for classical law, where this is primarily a commercial affair; in Justinian's eyes it is indeed far more. It is demonstrable
that Gaius did not think of extending the slogan to partnership. This is de-

scribed by him as belonging to the ius gentium and therefore a universal phenomenon by natural reason; 8 ' yet it is dissolved if a partner incurs capitis deminutio minima since, he says, "by civil law reason capitis deminutio is equated
to death." 8 2 However, there is no need- for me to come to a decision about the
original context of 4.5.8. I shall leave this question open, as also countless
others arising out of this puzzling text.
Let me just note four points, though even these are not relevant to my
main thesis. First, 4.5.9 may well be concerned with emancipation of a wife
by her paterfamilias while she is married. The result would be that, should it
come to divorce, she herself would sue for the dowry, instead of the paterfamilias with her merely in a supporting role (adiuncta fdiae persona). My
translation proceeds from this case. Other cases, however, are conceivable;
for example, emancipation between divorce and litis contestatio-if we proceed from this situation, it would be better to translate "so that henceforth
(in future) the emancipated woman may sue." 83
Secondly, if the ending of 4.5.8 contemplates such situations, the formulation is curious. The action, we learn, durat, "remains," "goes on," after
capitis deminutio. What happens is that as a result of capitis deminutio, the
woman, up to now merely entitled to support or frustrate the action of her
paterfamilias (being adiunctato him), is entitled to bring it alone, and indeed,
she alone is entitled to bring it.
Thirdly, Digest 4 .5. 7 pr., Paul XI ad edictum--same provenance as 4.5.9,
capitis deminutio minima-in its first half states that, except for tutela legitima,
guardianship is not affected by capitis deminutio minima; and that tutela
81 Gius 3.153f: iuris gentium est, itaque inter omnes homines naturali ratione consistit.
82 Quia civili ratione capitis deminutio morti coaequatur.
85 DioEsr 24.3.22.5, Ulpian XXXIII ad edictum. The decision that the paterfamilias in

this case cannot bring the action is certainly correct. But the text as it stands pairs it off
with the decision that he cannot bring the action if the daughter, having at first consented
to it, changes her mind before litis contestatio: both decisions are represented as
following from the rule that it is at the moment of litis contestatio that her
consent is required. As a matter of fact, only the decision concerning her change of mind
follows from this rule. We have the choice between two solutions. Either Ulpian discussed
emancipation separately from change of mind, and the compilers, in order to abbreviate,
threw the two cases together, inserting vel etiarn si emancipata sit into the paragraph about
change of mind. Or secundum haec, describing the two decisions as both of them consequences of the rule, should be excised: Ulpian would have made a fresh start with si filia.
BESELER, 3 BEITRXGE ZUR KRITIK DER ROMISCHEN RECHTSQUELLEN 154ff. (1913), comdemns secundum hoc or haec in general. Whether right or wrong in this, he goes too far, p.
159, when he simply dismisses everything in DIOEST 24.3.22.5 from secundum haec as "postclassical illustration."
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legitima, deriving from the XII Tables, is affected on the same ground as the
agnatic succession of that statute, unde legitimi in the praetor's edict. (The
present text is somewhat doctored. I am summarizing what Paul seems to
have said.) The muddleheaded principle of the indestructibility of natural
rights does not figure: no doubt that is why the compilers, 4.5.8, had to get
it from Gaius. Nor do we find any allusion to ius cognationis in connection
with guardianship, Gaius's particular blunder. Paul's comparison of the two
cases of tutela legitima and unde legitimi is perfectly sound; it may well have
been a traditional way, among the great classics, of presenting the matter in a
survey of capitis deminutio minima.
The second half, ex novis and so on, is due to the compilers.8 4 We are
informed that new legislation frames the destination of both succession and
guardianship in such a manner that "the persons are defined by their natural
position," ut personae naturaliter designentur. As illustration the compilers
mention the senatusconsults (Tertullianum and Orfitianum) establishing succession between mother and child. In respect of guardianship, they are probably thinking of laws like C. 5.30.4, by Anastasius, A.D. 498, and 6.58.15.4,
by Justinian himself, A.D. 534. The latter ordains: "but those persons
whom on the strength of the right of blood relationship we have transferred
to the legitimate successions, we also subject to the burden of guardianship
over one another." 8 5 It might perhaps be argued that already Paul had in
his discussion something about natural position or rights as opposed to civil
law, which provided the stimulus for ex novis and so on. But there is no
evidence to support this, and the remark of the compilers is, for them, so
naheliegend, so easy to hit on, they needed no help.
Fourthly, what is the relation of the doctrine in Pomponius (Digest
50.17.8) on the one hand and Gaius's Institutes (1.158, 3.21, 27, also Institutes
1.15.3) and the Res Cottidianae (represented in Institutes 3.1.11) ontheother?
Gaius may be indebted to Pomponius: this is perhaps still the current thinking.8 6
87
According to Honor6, the borrowing is more likely the other way round. It is
also, I suppose, arguable that they independently drew on a common source
or floating material. That this is the relation between Gaius and Gellius I shall
suggest below with regard to a theory concerning the discovery of stolen goods
inthe course of a ceremonious search.88 It would lead too far afield to go into
EMBLEMATA TRmONIANI 21 (1736).
Quas autem personas ex iure cognationis in legitimas successiones transveximus, eas
et tutelae gravamini vicissim supponimus.
86 E.g., KRUGER, GESCHICHTE DER QUELLEN UND LrrTERATUR DER RMISCHEN RzCnTS
201 (2nd ed., 1912).
87 HONOR, op. cit. supra note 41, at 57ff.
88 See infra, p. 29.
84 WISSENBACH,
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the problem at length. Insofar as a passage from Paul quoted above8 9 can
be regarded as alluding to the doctrine, the most plausible assumption is that
he got it from Pomponius, whom he used a great deal.
10. Justinian'sInstitutes on NaturalLaws.-Institutes 1.2.11 reads: "But
natural laws, which are observed in all nations everywhere, being established
by some divine providence, remain always firm and immutable; whereas those
which each State establishes for itself are apt to be often changed, either by
the tacit consensus of the people or by another statute subsequently passed." 90
I shall not linger on this pronouncement which, in its present context at all
events, is so general that what it aims at and within what limits cannot be
determined. Nor, as Ferrini points out, 9 ' is it possible to specify its provenance. It may be the work of Justinian (this is the prevalent view) ;92 it may
be taken from a classical manual; it may be partly the former and partly
the latter.
Curiously, Theophilus omits the mention of natural laws. He says: "But
the laws of nations are administered in all nations, found from divine providence, whence they are firm and immutable ... ." What significance, if any,
is to be attributed to this deviation I am unable to determine. Perhaps he was
put off by the discrepancy between this use of the plural naturaliaJura in the
sense of "natural laws" and its normal use in the sense of "natural rights":
it means "natural rights' in all the three remaining places in Justinian's
Institutes.9"
There have been relatively few studies in depth of Justinian's ideas
on law. The proclamation by which he published the Digest in 533 is preserved in Greek and Latin; only the latter states that while the divine is most
perfect, there is nothing of eternal duration in human law. 94 The Latin is
generally more devotional than the Greek. 9 5
DhoST 38.6.4, II ad Sabinum; see supra, pp. 21f.
90 Sd naturalia quidem Jura, quae apud omnes gentes peraeque servantur, divina
quadam prouidentia constituta sem per firma atque immutabilia permanent; ea vero, quae
89

ipsa sibi quaequa civitas constituit, saepe mutari solent vel tacito consensu populi vel alia
postea lege lata.
91 FmtNz, 2 OPERE 334 [13 BULLETTINO 126].
9 MAscm, LA CONCEZIONE NATURALISTICA DEL DIRITTO E DROLI ISTITUT Giuwixcx

RoMAmr 221ff. (1937).
1.15.3 and 3.1.11, which I have discussed, as well as 1.11.12. Ferrini in his Latin
rendering of Theophilus adheres too closely to the Latin text of INSTTUTEs 1.2.11 (INSTITUTIONUM etc. at 17). He puts eonstituta, "established" by providence. But heurethenta means
"found," "discovered," possibly "devised," "invented" - not "established." He also retains
peracque, "everywhere," and quadam, "some" ("by some divine providence") though
ThoOphilus drops both.
94 Constitutio Dedoken 18; Constitutio Tanta 18, CODEX 1.17.2.18.
95 See Ebrard, Das zeitlithe Rangverhdltnis der Konstitutionen De conflrmatione
Digestorum "Tanta" und "Dedoken." 40 ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIONY-STIFTUNG 135 (Roman
section) (1919).
An assertion by Gaius as to the immutability of naturalis ratio in DGEST 7.5.2.1, VII
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III. INTERFERENCE WITH FACTS AND CONCEPTS

11.

Paul on Possession.-Naturalrights are one thing, facts another: the

latter, we may agree, the law is powerless to overturn. But what is a fact?
In the area of this inquiry, impossible laws, the question poses itself in several ways.
One of them is illustrated by a text on possession, Digest 41.2.1.4, Paul LIV
ad edictum. A husband yields possession of an object (probably land, in Paul)
to his wife, with intent to make her a present: most authorities, we learn,
hold that she does now possess, quoniam res facti infirmari iure civili non
potest, "since a point of fact cannot be invalidated by the civil law."
I shall not inquire whether Paul is primarily thinking of interdict posses-

sion 9 6 or usucapion possession (in the sense that, if the gift were confirmed
by the husband's death, the period she had held the object would count for
her). His point is that the ius civile, more especially the rule excluding gifts
between spouses, cannot alter facts, and the wife's possession is a fact. Needless
to say, he is not implying that the ius naturale or gentium could do what the
ius civile cannot. It so happens that the difficulty of the case is created by the
ius civile, hence the reference to it. Indeed, for the Romans, the ius naturale
is so essentially in line with the real world that the statement that it cannot
interfere with a fact would be superfluous, even queer.
What about the minority who, we are given to understand, do not regard
the wife as in possession? They would hardly claim that the law, or the civil
law, can alter facts; rather that possession is not a mere fact or that, though
it is, the wife's holding does not amount to it.
Higerstr6m declares the reason quoniam

. . .

interpolated. 9 7 Every clas-

sical jurist, he says, knew that the ius civile did determine whether or not a
man possessed in the legal sense: a slave, for example, who withheld an object
from his master did not possess. This argument, however, though not devoid
of force, is not fully conclusive. The classics often support a decision by a finesounding principle which does not fit without qualification. In the field of
possession in particular, inexactitudes of this kind abound.
Some passages which proclaim the unalterability of facts are concerned,
not with the law as such, but with private transactions. When Celsus
says that "that which is ruled out by the nature of things, rerum natura,
can be established by no lex," the context--both in his original work and in
ad edictum provinciate, I shall consider below, pp. 33ff., in connection with a different series
of texts.

96 So, e.g., KAsER, EIOENTUM UND Basrrz IM ALTEREN R5MISCHEN
(2nd ed., 1956), with strong arguments.
7 HAGERSTROM, 1 DE
R6MISCHE OBLIOATIONSBEGRIFF 197f., 206.
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the Digest-leaves no doubt that the reference is to a testamentary disposition
requesting the impossible.9 8 Another paragraph from the same book of
Celsus's work, which in the Digest directly precedes this one, was quoted
above: contradictory dispositions in a will are void. Labeo and Javolenus
adopt a decision by Ofilius rejecting a legacy of "a hundred pecks of wheat
each of which is to weigh a hundred pounds," since such wheat does not exist,
is not in rerum natura.99 Africanus discusses a legacy of "the ten I have in
my chest" when in reality there are only five. A claim for more than five,
he explains, would not be in accordance with reason, ratio, since as to the
missing five the legacy may be said to refer to something not in existence, not
in rerum natura.1° Pomponius and Gaius note that you may bequeath an
object which, though not yet in rerum natura,is expected to come into existence
-fruits, for example, or the offspring of a slave. 10 1 It is to this complex that
Celsus's utterance belongs.102
But let us go on to an entirely different variety of the problem of what
is a fact.
12. Gaius on Manifest Theft Extended.-According to Gaius, whereas the
XII Tables imposed a twofold penalty on ordinary theft, they laid down
that a manifest thief, a thief caught in flagranti,was to be delivered over into
the hands of his victim. Further, if a man's house was searched for a stolen
object in the presence of witnesses and the object was found, he had to pay a
threefold penalty. And again, if a search of this kind was resisted, a more
ceremonious search was to be resorted to; and should the object turn up now,
the theft, the XII Tables prescribed, would be a manifest one-iubet id lex
furtum manifestum esse, "the statute decrees this to be manifest theft."' 0 3
Elsewhere I have tried to show that this account is trustworthy and that
attempts to disprove it, though common in Romanistic literature, are misconceived.' 0 4 Many authorities, for instance, maintain that the XII Tables
spoke of one search only, the ceremonious one. This is wrong, I think. I
98 DIGEST 50.17.188.1, XVII digestorum. VoiGT, op. cit. supra note 33, at 306, seems
to think of a statute. So perhaps does already BASILICA 2.8.188, translating lex by nomos,
and certainly the Gloss: no law will uphold a promise of something impossible.
99 DIGEST 33.6.7, Javolenus I ex posterioribus Labeonis.
100 DIGEST 30.108.10, Africanus V quaestionum.
101 DIOEST 30.24 pr., Pomponius V ad Sabinum; GAIUs 2.203; INSTITUTES 2.20.7;
GAx EPITOmE 2.5.3.
102 Not surprisingly, the idea recurs in other branches of the law. Compare, e.g.,
DIGEST 50.17.31, Ulpian XLUI ad Sabinum, from a section on pacts and stipulations in
sale. Also from sale comes DIGEST 18.4.1, Pomponius IX ad Sabinum, where sale of the
inheritance of a living or nonexistent person is declared a nullity because the object is
not in rerum natura. On a judge's order or a judgment for the impossible, DIGEST 49.8.3,
Paul XVI responsorum, see supra, pp. 4f.
103 Gmus 3.183ff. See Levy, op. cit. supra note 33, at 9ff.
104 DAUSE, STUDIES IN BIBLICAL LAW

259ff. (1947).
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would emphasize, however, that the argument I am about to develop is not
fundamentally affected, will stand, in the main, even if modem corrections
of Gaius may be deemed plausible. For this reason I shall not make constant reference to slight qualifications of my thesis which acceptance of these
conjectures would entail.
To begin with, then, let me quote Gaius's comment on the code's
regulation: "Because of the fact that the statute decrees the theft in that case
(the ceremonious search) to be manifest, there are some who write that theft
becomes manifest either by statute or by nature: by statute the very theft
we are discussing (where the object is found by the ceremonious search),
by nature that which we expounded above (where the thief is caught in
flagranti). But the better view is that only theft manifest by nature is to be
regarded as manifest. For a statute cannot bring it about that he who is not
a manifest thief should be a manifest one - no more than that he who is not
a thief should be a thief, and that he who is not an adulterer or homicide
should be an adulterer or homicide. That indeed a statute can bring about that a man should be liable to a penalty as if he had committed theft or
1 05
adultery or homicide even though he has committed none of these."
The XII Tables, it will have been realized, meted out the same harsh treatment to a thief caught in flagranti and to him with whom, after he had opposed
a simple search with witnesses, the object was finally discovered in the procedure
lance et licio, "with loincloth and platter." 10 6 However, they dealt with the
latter case in a somewhat indirect way. Instead of directly stating the punishment, instead of saying that a man convicted by this procedure should be
delivered (as was a manifest thief) into the power of plaintiff, they achieved
this effect by simply subsuming the case under the basic category, by simply
declaring it to be manifest theft. Doubtless, the phrasing was furtum manifestum esto, "it shall be manifest theft," just as in other early instances of
105 Gmus 3.194: Propter hoc tamen quod lex ex ea causa manifestum furtum esse iubet,
sunt qui scribunt furtum manifestum fieri aut lege aut natura: lege id ipsum de quo
loquimur, natura illud de quo superius exposuimus. Sed verius est natura tantum manifestum furtum intellegi. Neque enim lex facere potest ut qui manifestus fur non sit manifestus sit, non magis quam qui omnino fur non sit fur sit, et qui adulter aut homicida
non sit adulter vel homicida sit. At illud sane lex facere potest ut proinde aliquis poena
teneatur atque si furtum vel adulterium vel homicidium admisisset, quamziis nihil eorum
admiserit. The Veronese manuscript reads sunt qui scribunt furtum manifestum aut lege aut
natura. At a pinch this could be left unemended. Of the insertions suggested I prefer
Kniep's insertion of fieri after manifestum (GAi INSTITUTIONUM COMMENTARIUS TERTIUS
56 [1917]), to the more popular intellegi after lege; and I do not do so only because the
Veronese MS has furtum mf which, he ingeniously observes, might stand for furtum manifestum fieri, not simply for furtum manifestum. Anyhow he should not be represented as
inserting the fier after lege a slip committed by DAVI, GAI INSTITUTIONES 113 (Editio
Minor, 1964).
10 Thus GAIuS 3.193, but other understandings of the phrase are defensible.
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indirect regulation: a statute ascribed to Numa enjoined that if a man killed
another with malice aforethought, parricidasesto, "he shall be a murderer"
or "it shall be murder." 10 7 In a sense, another provision from the section on
theft in the XII Tables themselves is comparable: if you kill a thief who comes
by night, iure caesus esto, "he shall be lawfully slain."1 0 8
I shall not go into these parallels but concentrate on the paragraph pronouncing it to be manifest theft if the object comes to light in the course of
the ceremonious search. At that time, the resistance from the outset and all
that followed from it made the latter case a desperate matter of life and death,
quite close to the former. It was quite close also in this, that, in the circumstances, there could not be a shadow of doubt as to the accused's guilt. The
code, therefore, in decreeing furtum manifestum esto, did no violence to the
facts, gave furtum manifestum only a slightly extended meaning. Gradually,
however, the search "with loincloth and platter" became obsolete. It had
vanished, say, by the middle of the Republic, and we must not assume subsequent generations to be familiar with its original setting and significance.
Actually, Gellius, a contemporary of Gaius, mentions the remark of a lawyer
friend of his, that only if he had studied the laws of the Fauns and Aborigines
-the mythical forerunners of the Romans--could he be expected to understand institutions of that sort.10 9 No wonder, therefore, that the jurists interested in the XII Tables found the formulation furtum manifestum esto, "it
(the case where the object is found as a result of the ceremonious search)
shall be manifest theft," puzzling. The problem what to make of it evidently
antedates Gaius, who introduces one solution by "there are some who write."
Some hold, he says, that the statute adds to manifest theft natura-where
a thief is caught in flagranti-a manifest theft lege-where an object is discovered by the ceremonious search. The starting point is that there is a given,
"natural" manifest theft, namely, what appears as such to the ordinary man
and in everyday language. The law, however, can create another: in law,
an ass might be a horse. Whether, for the advocates of this doctrine, the
species created by statute has to show a minimum of prima facie affinity with
the genuine one, it is difficult to decide. Probably not. After all, it is precisely
because, to them, the discovery by ceremonious search which the XII Tables
subsume under manifest theft looks distinctly nonmanifest that they felt the
need for an explanation, arriving at the doctrine in question. Moreover, we
shall see presently that the same school of thought seems to have postulated a
usufruct lege which had little to do with "natural" usufruct.
107 Festus (Paulus) 221.
lo XII TABLEs VIII, 12.
109

Gellius 16.10.7f.
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Gaius disagrees: there is only manifest theft natura, since the law has no
power to turn a nonmanifest thief into a manifest one-or, for that matter,
a nonthief into a thief, a nonadulterer into an adulterer, a nonhomicide into
a homicide. The law can only make a man punishable as if he had committed theft, adultery or homicide though in fact he has not. Note a minor
carelessness: at the end Gaius forgets about the very case he is analyzing, he
forgets to mention, what should be the climax of his series of things the law
can do, that the law can impose a penalty as if there had been furtum manifestum though in fact there has been only furtum nec manifestum.
The starting point, as for the other doctrine, is a given, "natural" manifest
theft. Indeed, this is the only species: where the present doctrine parts company with the other is in that the possibility of adding a species by statute is
denied. The statute is, of course, upheld, but reinterpreted as expressing a
fiction, shorthand way. It does not, as one might be led to think at first sight,
make the case where an object is found by ceremonious search into manifest
theft. It merely lays down that the case-which remains different--should be
treated as if it were the same. Even in law, an ass cannot be a horse: we can
only transfer to it the rules relating to a horse as if it were one, too.
If we look for analogies to these two doctrines in the modem debate about
legal personality it is, curiously, the one mentioned first, the one Gaius rejects,
which comes nearest the Fiction theory, with its assumption of a "natural"
personality and one created by the law, a "legal" one. True, the Fiction
theory tends to see in the legal creation something of lesser standing. This
element is foreign to the Roman doctrine which puts manifest theft natura
and manifest theft lege on the same level; of course, the subject of personality
calls forth very special emotions. The doctrine mentioned second, the one
adopted by Gaius, is highly reminiscent of what goes by the name of Symbolist,
Bracket, or Collectivist theory. According to the Symbolist theory, legal personality is nothing but a device to express in an expeditious, brief fashion
complicated relations between natural persons, the only ones existing. There
is no personality lege, created by the law: the law considers only the natural
person; though, for the sake of efficient, compact description of intricate
arrangements, it may speak as if there were another. It is interesting that
fiction thus plays a part in the Symbolist theory. 110 Certainly the nuance is
not quite the same as in the Fiction theory. In a sense, indeed, there is more
of a fiction: while the Fictionists do admit a legal personality though, com-

210 The very term Fiktion is used by Ihering in outlining his theory in 1 GEiST DES
Other words used are "technical
instrument," technisches Intrument, vol. 2, pt. 2 [6th and 7th ed., 1923], p. 366f.; "device,"

Ri5MISCHEN RECHTS 202 n. 99 (7th and 8th ed., 1924).
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pared with the natural person, it is fictitious, the Symobilsts deny any such
thing; it is merely convenient sometimes to talk as if, say, a corporation were
a person. The doctrine Gaius favors is strikingly similar. The only manifest
theft, theft, adultery or homicide is that natura. There is no manifest theft,
theft, adultery or homicide lege. When the law decrees of something else
that it shall be any of these things, all that is meant is that the consequences
shall be as if one of them-the "natural" crime-had been committed.
Which of the two doctrines is the older? I would suspect that it is that
discarded by Gaius: there are two kinds of manifest theft, one natura and one
lege. This doctrine keeps more loyally to the wording-and spirit-of the
provision which, after all, does speak of manifest theft tout court, "it shall be
manifest theft." The doctrine which Gaius prefers--the law cannot make its
own kind of manifest theft; it only treats a different case as if it were manifest
theft-is considerably more daring, independent. Even this, not surprisingly,
contains no trace of the modem, historical view here taken as to the origin
of the difficulty felt about the statute, that it declared the case in question
manifest theft because, at that time, it virtually was whereas later it lost
that character.
The doctrine approved by Gaius, however, is no more his product than
that he rejects. It plainly underlies the exposition of the matter in Gellius:
"Those thefts which were detected by loincloth and platter the decemvirs
punished as if they were manifest."' 1 1 It may be taken that neither did Gellius
use Gaius nor Gaius Gellius, but I cannot here enlarge on the point. Nor can
I go into the question whether they drew on the same source or different ones.
Gellius often relied on information by word of mouth. It is clear that, around
the middle of the second century A.D., this was the fashionable doctrine.
My hunch is that its author is Labeo; it would fit in with his role in the
classification of various modes of theft to which I shall come in a moment.1 1 2
13. Gaius on Theft, Adultery and Homicide Extended.-It is worthwhile
to look at the parallels Gaius adduces: a statute can turn a nonmanifest thief
into a manifest one no more than (1) one who is not a thief at all into a
thief, (2) a nonadulterer into an adulterer or (3) a nonkiller into a killer.
None of the three are chosen at random. In all three cases a problem much
like that created by "it shall be manifest theft" did in fact exist.
Kunstgriff, "artifices," Kunstprodukte, "mechanisms," Mechanismen (6th and 7th ed.
1924), vol. 3, p. 224f.; and "appearance," Schein, in the main discussion, vol. 3, pp. 356ff.
I failed to take account of this in STUDIES IN BIBLICAL LAW, pp. 296, 301, where I
represent Gaius as a Fictionist.
III Gellius 11.18.3: ea quoque furta quae per lancem liciumque concepta essent proinde
ac si manifesta forent vindicaverunt.
112 See infra, pp. 30f.
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(1) The first parallel is the impossibility of decreeing a nonthief to be a
thief. This refers back to a point Gaius discusses only a paragraph before,
in the opening part of his section on theft. 1 13
In the XII Tables we find theft accompanied by four distinguishing attributes: there is manifest theft, where the thief is caught in flagranti; nonmanifest theft, the ordinary case; theft taken hold of, conceptum, where a
man's house is searched in the presence of witnesses and the object turns up;
and theft inflicted, oblatum, where the man in whose house the object turns
up was saddled with it by somebody else-the latter is liable to him. Servius,
a late Republican jurist, in systematizing the law of theft, faithfully took the
code as his guide. As Gaius tells us, he divided theft precisely into these four
classes: manifest, nonmanifest, taken hold of, and inflicted. Sabinus accepted
this classification, but Labeo demurred. He denied that taken hold of and
inflicted were classes of theft on the same level as manifest and nonmanifest,
his principal reason doubtless being that you could fall under these headings
without being guilty of dolus: the man in whose house the object turns up
might be innocent, and so might be the man who brought it to him, in which
case one could not call them thieves. There were, Labeo argued, only the
two classes, manifest theft and nonmanifest theft, whereas taken hold of and
inflicted were merely actions connected with theft. (It might make a practical
difference: for example, on the basis of Labeo's classification, with taken hold
of and inflicted excluded from theft proper, an innocent person convicted
under these heads would presumably not incur the infaming consequences
imposed by the edict on one convicted of theft.) Gaius, though a Sabinian,
openly sides with Labeo ("the better view") ;114 and, in his description of taken
hold of and inflicted, emphasizes both that in these cases the person held
accountable need not be a thief (he is liable quamvis fur non sit) and that it is
a question of the law providing two special actions on top of theft in the full
sense (nam propria actio constituta est with regard to taken hold of, nam
propria constituta est actio with regard to inflicted). 1 15
It is quite possible that Servius and Sabinus spoke of theft taken hold of
and theft inflicted as theft lege, in contrast to theft natura. Whether they did
so or not, the position taken up by Labeo and approved by Gaius is that the
law cannot make a nonthief into a thief, though definitely it may sanction
an action against anyone who is somehow tied up with theft. It is Labeo's role
113 GAIUS 3.183,

186f.

114 GA.us 3.183 at the end.
I's GAIUS 3.186f. That this emphasis is intentional, designed to justify Labeo's theory,
follows from the little clause Gaius adds to his acceptance of that theory, 3.183: it is the
better view, he says, "as will appear below"-namely, from the exposition of taken hold of
and inflicted in 3.186f.
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in this controversy which makes me wonder whether he is not also responsible
1 16
Anyhow, this
for the progressive line concerning "it shall be manifest theft."
fur non
omnino
qui
quam
magis
non
parallel,
first
the
of
is the background
sit fur sit.
I fear I must add a footnote not very flattering to Gaius. By his time, at
least the action furti oblati, "on the ground of theft inflicted"-though probably not yet furti concepti, "on the ground of theft taken hold of"-Iay only
if there was dolus; in fact, it lay only if defendant had quite deliberately got
rid of the object to plaintiff in order that the latter should be incriminated
rather than he himself. This means that, by now, only a thief could be convicted by this action, for whether or not he was the man who had first stolen
the object, this knowing, treacherous palming off clearly involved contrectatio,
that peculiar "illicit, nasty handling" which was the essence of the delict in
classical law. Gaius, therefore, should not have taken over Labeo's view
without modification. He certainly should not have said that this action was
available irrespective of whether the accused was a thief.
This is of course only one of many instances in the Institutes where one
has the impression that the author is in the main writing out a more ancient
17
work, with an occasional reference to newer developments. " In the present
case, however, the impression becomes almost a certainty. The statement that
the person held accountable under theft inflicted need not be a thief, true only
in an earlier period, is made in the very same paragraph where the conflicting
requirement of dolus, of more recent origin, is enunciated: "Theft inflicted is
said to occur where the stolen object has been inflicted on you by somebody
and has been taken hold of on your premises, at any rate if it was given you
with the intention that it should be taken hold of on your premises rather
than on those of the giver." 1 8 This is really explicable only if we assume that
the basic text is simply copied from an older source, copied, indeed, in an
116 See supra, p. 29.
1T See e.g., Daube [Book Review], Schulz, History of Roman Legal Science, in 38 JoURNAL oF ROMAN STUDIES 114 f. (1948).
118 GMus 3.187: Oblatum furtum dicitur cum res furtiva tibi ab aliquo oblata sit
eaque apud te concepta sit, utique si ea mente data tibi fuerit ut apud te potius quam
apud eum dederit conciperetur. I follow DE ZULUETA, 1 THE INSTITUTES OF GMUs

215 (1946), in translating utique si by "at any rate if." The meaning is "though only
if." In two more passages of the INSTITUTES a rule is directly followed by this phrase,
2.76 and 2.78. They deal with the cases where you are in possession of my land and
build on it, plant in it or sow -it (2.76) and where you are in possession of a panel belonging
to me and paint on it (2.78). If I bring an action for recovery of my land or my panel
but refuse to pay your expenses, you can defeat me by an exceptio--utique si, "at any
rate if," "though only if," you were a possessor in good faith. Utique cum has the same
force. It occurs once, in 3.96, where Gaius remarks that, except for the oath binding a
freedman to render his patron certain services, we meet no oath which grounds an obligation-utique cum quaeritur de iure Romanorum, "though only so long as our study is the
Roman law": he goes on to point out that in some foreign laws it is different.
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astonishingly mechanical way: the old-"even if he is not a thief"-remains
untouched next to the new - "provided it was given you with intent." Of
late a few scholars have become anxious lest Gaius may have been judged too
harshly by the moderns; 119 and one all-out attempt in particular has been made
to raise him from the status of a second-rater commonly assigned to him. 1 20
But no ingenuity of argument can bring it about ut qui classicus non sit
dlassicus sit. Let me note that long before Justinian, dolus was required in
the case of theft taken hold of, conceptum, as well as theft inflicted, oblatum;
and both were absorbed by ordinary, nonmanifest theft. 12 1
(2) The second parallel is that a statute cannot change a nonadulterer into
an adulterer. This, I guess, also comes from the older source. Under the lex
Julia de adulteriis of 18 B.C., quite a few cases not strictly adultery were
dealt with pro adulterio, "as adultery" or "as if adultery," the guilty person
was sentenced quasi adulter, "as adulterer" or "as if an adulterer," "under the
heading of an adulterer." For example, a man knowingly marries a woman
convicted of adultery; a husband fails to divorce his wife caught in flagranti;
a spouse makes a profit from the other spouse's adultery.1 2 I have given
alternative renderings, "as" and "as if," because the Latin pro and quasi are
both ambiguous. The idea may be either that these crimes are punishable "as
adultery," the criminal "as an adulterer," i.e., they are adultery, he is an
adulterer, if you like adultery lege and adulterer lege; or that these crimes are
punishable "as if adultery," the criminal "as if an adulterer," i.e., they are not
adultery, he is not an adulterer, it is merely that we are to proceed as if we
had to do with adultery and an adulterer.
Whether the statute itself spoke of pro adulterio and quasi adulter or
whether these expressions are due to its early interpreters may be left open.
(Very likely some such phrase did figure; it may, of course, have been pro
adultero.) What matters is that the cases in question evidently presented the
same jurisprudential difficulty as the subsumption by the XII Tables of a
situation not "naturally" manifest theft under this offense. By contrast with
the latter, antiquated provision, those of the lex Juliawere of acute importance.
We know, indeed, that this entire legislation evoked enormous interest among
lawyers and was much analyzed. There is every reason to believe that the
debate was in full swing in Labeo's lifetime. Here, then, is the setting of the
second parallel, the refusal to recognize any but "natural" adultery.
'19

good.
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DE ZULUETA,
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7 ff., does his best for him, which is too

HoNoRIk, op. cit. supra, note 41.

121 INSTITUTES

4.1.4.

122 DIGEST 4.4.37.1, Tryphoninus III disputationum, pro adulterio;
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48.5.9 pr.,

Marcian II de adulteriis, 48.5.34.2, Marcian I de publicis iudiciis, quasi adulter and

quasi adultera.

DAVID DAUBE
(3) The third parallel-a nonkiller is not a killer-may well be Gaius's contribution. Surely it alludes to Hadrian's rescript which-perhaps more or
less by way of reaffirmation--subjected attempted murder to the same penalties as the completed crime. The person guilty of attempt, the texts say, is
to be sentenced pro homicida or ut homicida; either phrase is ambiguous and
may mean equally "as killer" or "as if a killer." The rescript seems to have
said pro homicida. Ulpian writes: "The words of the rescript-On the one
hand he who has killed a man is normally acquitted, namely, if he did so
without intent to kill, on the other hand he who has not killed but has tried to
1 23
kill is sentenced pro homicida."
14. Gaius on Usufruct Extended.-The doctrine favored by Gaius in
his Institutes recurs in his commentary on the provincial edict, quite possibly
the earlier of the two works.12 4 He is discussing a senatusconsult of the end
of the Republic or the early Empire-under Augustus or Tiberius--enabling a
testator to leave what we call a quasi-usufruct, a right over perishable, consumable goods such as money, wine, oil: the legatee obtained ownership and
by means of a cautio gave security for return, at the expiry of the quasiusufruct, of things of the same quality and quantity. This cautio was a modification of that traditional in ordinary usufruct, over a nonperishable object,
by which return of that object was guaranteed.
From what Gaius says it is obvious that the senate used the indirect
method of regulating the matter that we found in the case of "it shall be
manifest theft," bringing the case to be dealt with under an established category. It did not just set out the detailed rules to apply to such a legacy
(though some detailed rules, e.g., as to cautio, did figure in the senatusconsult).
Nor did it term the right as we do, a quasi-usufruct. What it ordained was
that the right resulting from the legacy was, or should be, a good usufruct.
That some such language was employed is confirmed by other texts. "The
senate decreed," Ulpian tells us, "that a usufruct can be left over every kind
of thing that is agreed to be in any person's patrimony." 12 5 Similarly, in
Institutes 2.4.2 we hear that "the senate decreed that also over those (perishable) things a usufruct could be created." 1'2 6 The latter text is particularly
123 COLLATIO 1.6.2, Ulpian VII de officio proconsulis sub titulo sicariis et veneficis. In
1.6.4, which is comment on the rescript, we find ut homicida. Pro homicida also in
Marcian's report of the rescript, DIGEST 48.8.1.3, XIV institutionum. Ut homicida again
in CoLLATIo 1.7.1 [equals PAULI SENTENTIAE 5.23.3], where the rescript is paraphrased but

not expressly mentioned.
124 Dosr
7.5.2.1., VII ad edictum provinciale. My footnote on this text in STUIES
IN BIBLxcAL LAw, p. 313, is very superficial.
125 DIGEST 7.5.1, Ulpian XVIII ad Sabinum; essentially the translation of MONno, 2
THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 44 (1909). For an alternative interpretation see infra note 131.
The Latin is Senatus censuit, ut omnium rerum, quas in cuiusque patrimonio esse constaret
usus fructus legari possit.
126 Senatus censuit posse etiam earum rerum usum fructum constitui.
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strong evidence since, as we shall see, 12 7 the author would much rather have it
different, would much prefer the senate to have expressed itself more cautiously.
This is how Digest 7.5.2.1 runs: "By this senatusconsult it is not brought
about that there is a usufruct over money properly-for natural reason could
not be overturned by the authority of the senate-but with the introduction
1 28
of a remedy it begins to be treated as if a usufruct."'
One can sympathize with the bogglers at the senatusconsult, the new case
having very little to do with the old, at least as far as its legal-technical structure is concerned. The affinity is chiefly in the socioeconomic function. As is
well known, the senate was faced by bequests of a usufruct bonorum or
omnium bonorum, over a man's goods or entire goods, which would ordinarily
include perishables as well as a house, slaves, or the like. In Cicero's Pro
Caecina, delivered in 69 B.C., a man makes his son heir, leaving his wife a
usufruct over all his property for life to be exercised jointly with the son.1 2 9
Presumably, as the senatusconsult was not yet in existence, this was valid only
in respect of the nonperishable objects in the estate. In the Topica, written
in 44 B.C., we find the following illustration of an argument "from the contrary": "A woman whose husband has bequeathed her a usufruct over his
goods and has left full wine and oil cellars must not believe that these fall
under her right. For use, not consumption, has been bequeathed (usus enim,
non abusus, legatus est)-these are contrary to one another."' 13 0 This passage
surely reflects an interesting point in the development culminating in the senatusconsult-namely, that point when pressure for allowing a usufruct over an
entire estate to cover the perishables in it was mounting, but still resisted.
In the end the senate did validate such gifts, 1 3 1 and soon, if not at once, you
could create a usufruct over perishables separately, i.e., even apart from a
usufruct over your entire assets. In juristic writings, incidentally, the noun
127
128

See infra, pp. 39f.
Quo senatus consulto non id effectum est ut pecuniae usus fructus proprie esset-nec

enim naturalis ratio auctoritate senatus commutari potuit-sed remedio introducto coepit

quasi usus fructus haberi. In ROMANISTISCHE STUDIEN 320, Beseler changed naturalis
ratio into ratio iuris; later, in 5 BEITRXGE 22, he crossed out the entire clause nec enimpotuit, "for natural reason could not be overturned by the authority of the senate." None of
this is plausible: cf. supra, p. 13, on GAuS 1.158, and p. 19, on DIGEST 4.5.8, Gaius IV ad
edictum provinciale. A valuable discussion of DIoEsT 7.5.2.1 as well as Institutes 2.4.2 is
supplied by Grosso, Sul Quasi Usufrutto, 43 BULLETTINO DELL' ISTITUTO DI DIRITTO
ROMANO 248ff. (1935).
129 CiCEo, PRo CAZCINA 4.11.
130 CICERO, Topics 3.17: Non debet mulier cui vir bonorum suorum usum fructum
legavit, cellis vinarlis et oleariis plenis relictis, putare id ad se pertinere; usus enim, non

abusus, legatus est - ea sunt inter se contraria.
131 As the original decree contemplated legacy of the usufruct over a whole inheritance,
it is conceivable that in DIGEST 7.5.1, quoted above, there is preserved a reference to just
this case. If so, we might translate: "The senate decreed that a usufruct can be left over
all things of which it is established that they are in a person's estate," i.e., a usufruct
omnium bonorum includes the perishables too.
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abusus occurs only in three postclassical insertions in Ulpian in the Digest,1 3 2
and one place in the postclassical Ulpiani Regulae;133 in all four passages,
indeed, as in Cicero's Topica, it denotes "consumption" in connection with
usufruct. The classics clearly avoided the term because of its double meaning;
1 34
it might signify "abuse."
However, what was the true effect of giving the legatee ownership and imposing an obligation to return an equal amount? It was something very like
an interest-free loan, 1 3 5 most rules and considerations of regular usufruct being
utterly inapplicable. No wonder the senate's calling this a usufruct provoked
jurisprudential comment. It should be recalled that regular usufruct itself was
not all that old, so the literal meaning of the term would be close to the surface
in any case. But apart from this, to describe the new institution as usufruct,
especially once there could be a separate right over, say, 10,000 sesterces or
50 barrels of Falernian, not just as part of a usufruct over an entire inheritance, was an astounding extension of the term. With some exaggeration one
might imagine a senatusconsult validating consensual conveyance by declaring
it a good societas omnium bonorum13 6-with, indeed, quite different rules
from societas. It is significant how much trouble the senate's method gives to a
modern scholar like Levy, in a chapter where he is concerned to show that
the classics did not mix up usufruct and ownership: "Regardless of the wording of the statute or a bequest, his [the benefidary's] right in re was not
137
ususiructus but proprietas."
If we ask why, despite all this, the senate did assign the case in question
to usufruct, the answer must make reference not only to the social and eco132 DIGEsT 7.5.5.1f., XVIII ad Sabinum; 7.8.12.1, XVII ad Sabinum; 12.2.11.2, XXII
ad edictum; see Kfibler, Exegetische und kritische Bemerkungen zu einigen Digestenstellen,

59 ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIONY-STIFTUNO

569f.

(1939).

The context in 7.8.12.1 is slightly

different from that in the other texts, but even here it is right to excise abusus. A man
who has a usus over land may take wood for daily purposes, apples and so on, water,
non usque ad compendium sed ad usum, scilicet non usque ad abusum, "not to the extent
of profit but of use, that is to say, not to the extent of consumption": the scilicet clause is
an appendix both very inelegant and not really accurate. On 12.2.11.2 I shall say more
below, pp. 41f.
1s5 Why all occurrences are associated with Ulpian is a puzzle.
134 Kilbler, op. cit. supra note 132, denies that abusus in Cicero has anything to do with
"consumption"; it simply means "abuse." But, for one thing, it is difficult to believe that
there should be this discrepancy between .Cicero and all legal texts on exactly the same
subject, and for another, no better setting for Cicero's illustration can be imagined than a
stage on the way to recognition of usufruct over consumable goods. What may be admitted is that the opponents of the recognition made play with the pejorative potential of
the word: that is why the classics dropped it, why it is confined to preclassical and postclassical vocabulary.
135

BUCKLAND,

A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN

LAW 271

(3rd ed. revised by Stein, 1963).

partners become co-owners at the moment of the contract: DIGEST
17.2.1.1, Paul XXXII ad edictum, 17.2.2, Gaius X ad edictum provinciale.
The reference to "statute" is
137 LEvY, WEST ROMAN VULGAR LAw 35 (1951).
explained by the fact that Levy-no doubt rightly-regards the senatusconsult as supplementing a statute of Augustus.
136 Where the
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nomic closeness but also to the machinery for final settlement at the expiry of
the term of enjoyment. I have already mentioned that in ordinary usufruct,
over a nonperishable object, at the beginning of the term, the usufructuary
by means of a cautio guaranteed return of the object at the end. This cautio
was a characteristic and much analyzed element in usufruct. l 3 8 When the
senate decided the time had come to recognize usufruct over perishables, it
prescribed a modified cautio for this case--guaranteeing return of things of
the same quantity and quality. The texts leave no doubt that this common
machinery, the cautio, greatly contributed to the classification of the new case
39
as USUfruct.
From the first moment there must have been controversy as to the construction of the new institution. One party must have construed it as usufruct lege,
which in this case might be the more satisfactory solution. It is relatively easy
to think of a category lege, of usufruct lege, as greatly differing from the basic
category, from ordinary, "natural" usufruct. After all, legal personality greatly
differs from a human person. The line taken by Gaius--in reliance on earlier
authority-is less appropriate to this case than to those inspected above. The
arrangement in question, he holds, is considered as if a usufruct. But this
is not really true. Except for the fact that it is upheld (but so are sale, traditio,
marriage, and countless other dealings) and a very few specific features such
as limitation to the lifetime of the beneficiary and, indeed, the cautio, the
law accords it radically dissimilar treatment.
Gaius says that to make the new case usufruct would be contrary to
naturalis ratio, "natural reason"; that is indeed why the lawgiver cannot do it.
In the remarks on manifest theft and the like, we came across no reference to
naturalis ratio. This may be accidental, but I do not think so. What is and
what is not manifest theft, who is and who is not a thief, an adulterer, a homicide-these appeared to be straight questions concerning the external world,
and a lawgiver transferring the word would simply fly in the face of facts.
What is and what is not a usufruct, I suspect, was felt to be a somewhat more
complicated question, having regard not just to externals but to a legal category. For the classics, a sound legal category, like a fact, had its intrinsic,
unshakable characteristics, 14 0 and you could not arbitrarily transfer its name
to a situation not showing these. Nevertheless, the blunder would be just a
little less obvious than the misdescription of one fact by the name of another.
1-8 See the sections Ut usus fructus nomine caveatur and Usufructuarius quemadmodum

caveat in LENEL, DAS EDmITUM PERPETUUM 368f. and 538f. (3rd ed., 1927).
139 DIGEST 7.5.2, Gaius VII ad edicturn provinciale; 7.5.4, Paul I ad Neratium;
INSTITUTES 2.4.2.
140 See Levy, op. cit. supra note 33, at 8ff.

Compare also MASOHI, op.

cit.

note 186a, on "manifest theft."

He does not, however, make my distinction.
supra note 92, at 258. But see also infra, p. 43 and p. 49
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It would be a blunder as to the order of things rather than the things themselves-a violation of naturalis ratio.
Let me add that the thrust of the statement is rather different also from
that in the texts considered earlier, which insist on the unabolishability of
naturalia Jura, "natural rights." With the exception of Institutes 1.2.11, those
texts are all concerned with rights grounded in family ties. Their object is less
the preservation of clarity about the various legal categories than the assertion
of the unlosability of certain positions in the family; they are more ethical.
Neither could Digest 7.5.2.1 be reformulated with the help of the term Jura
naturalia nor those texts with the help of naturalis ratio: the direction of
thought would be radically falsified.
The final portion of 7.5.2.1, sed remedio introducto coepit quasi usus
fructus haberi, has been attacked by Segre.14 1 He proceeds from the orthodox
interpretation to which, I must now confess, my translation does not conformThe current interpretation is that Gaius is here working with the notion of a
quasi-usufruct: "But with the introduction of a remedy the arrangement came
to be held a quasi-usufruct." 1 4 2 Segr feels, not unreasonably, that this
notion was not yet reached in classical law. Moreover, he argues, the clause
is illogical; as a logical conclusion Gaius should have stated, not that as a
result of the remedy a quasi-usufruct came about, but that in this way effects
analogous to usufruct were achieved.
However, this is precisely what Gaius does state. 143 Only we must not, in
rendering the passage, let ourselves be misled by Institutes 2.4.2, where quasiusufruct does figure, or very nearly. 14 4 The proper rendering is: "But with
the introduction of a remedy, the arrangement begins to be considered as if
a usufruct"---exactly what Segr wants Gains to say. The notion of a quasiusufruct is not yet there. The doctrine corresponds to the Gaian attitude in
all the cases already presented. It is carried a step or two further in Institutes
2.4.2 which, we shall see, comes from the Res Cottidianae. It would be rash
in the extreme to dispute the authenticity of the sed clause.

141 Segri,

Sul Deposito Irregolare in Diritto Romano, 19 BULLETTINO

DnlrrTo ROMANO 197 (1907).
142 In this sense MONRO op. cit. supra note 125, at 44:

DELL'ISTrrUTO DI

"there came to be something
analogous to usufruct."
the legal143 As pointed out above, pp. 34f., it is not even strictly true that the effects technical ones - were analogous to usufruct. But within the framework of Gaius's doctrine,
it is indeed the logical upshot.
I" A fortiori we must not be influenced by DIGEST 43.18.1.6, Ulpian LXX ad edictum.
The meaning of et quasi uum fructum sive usum quendam eius is quite obscure and in
any case the text is spurious. See BESELER, BEITRXGE, VOL. 1 (1910), 106, P.ROZZI, 1
IsTrruzom Di DnRTTO ROMANO 789 (2nd ed., 1928), KAsER, 1 DAs RomisoH
PRIVATRECHT 380 (1955).
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Segri has found a large following.1 4 5 But even those who oppose him do
so on the wrong basis, trying to prove that the concept quasi-usufruct could
be classical. Bonfante cites a letter by the younger Pliny14 6 where Pliny, enlarging on his affection for his slaves, writes: "I allow my slaves so to speak to
make testaments and observe these as if they were legal," permitto
servis quoque quasi testamenta facere eaque ut legitima custodio.14 7 Surely,
Pliny is not speaking of quasi-testaments; he is not allowing his slaves to
make a particular kind of testament; the quasi qualifies the whole phrase
testamenta facere; he is allowing them, in a sense, to make wills. Even,
however, if Pliny did here jokingly introduce a quasi-testament, it would
have little bearing on the senatusconsult we are discussing. I am not denying that the formation of a term such as quasi-usufruct would have been
possible. The classics just did not form it. There are more cases of a late
quasi-something being read back into earlier layers in which all that is claimed
is that a set of facts is treated as if it were that something. But I forbear from
48
going on with this.1
Beseler attributes remedio introducto to the compilers.' 49 I am reluctant
to assent even to this modest excision, for three reasons. First, why ever should
they have inserted the idea? Secondly, we shall find words to the same effect,
per cautionem, "by means of a cautio," in Institutes 4.2.4 going back to the
Res Cottidianae. Thirdly, it will be remembered that Gaius follows Labeo in
holding that furtum conceptum and furtum oblatum, theft taken hold of and
theft inflicted, are not types of theft; they are called furta simply because they
are actions made available in connection with this delict. The idea behind
remedio introducto is much the same: this new institution is not usufruct; the
senate calls it that because a remedy is provided-the cautio-connected with
usufruct, indeed, typical of it, a remedy on the strength of which the case is
looked on, dealt with, as if it were usufruct. That the term remedium is rare
145 E.g., Grosso, op. cit. supra note 128, PEROZZI, op. cit. supra note 144, Albertario,
Il possesso dell'usufrutto, dell'uso, della habitatatio, 2 STUD 328 (1941)
(he is far too
indiscriminate in his treatment of quasi).
146 BONFANTE, CORSO Di DnsrrTo ROMANO, Vol. 3, Dnuro REALE 86 '(1933). It is
presumably on the strength of his argument that the concept quasi-usufruct is accepted
as classical in works like J6Rs-KUNKEL-WNOER, ROMIScHES RECHT 146 (3rd ed.,
1949), KASER, 1 DAS R6MiSCHE PRIVATRECHT 380 (1955).
147 PLINY, LETTERS 8.16.1. For what this meant in actual fact see BIONDI, SuccEssioNE
TESTAMENTARIA E DoNAZIONI 84 (2nd ed., 1955). He does not deal with the problem here
under notice. Translators mostly get the nuance wrong; e.g., GUILLEMIN, 3 PLINE LE
JEUNE, LETTRES (Collection des Universitis de France) 74 (2nd ed., 1959): h faire de
quasi-testaments.
148 Quasi-delict, Stein has pointed out, appears first in BASILICA 60.4.1: hosanei hamartema; see The Nature of quasi-delictal Obligations in Roman Law, 5 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DES DROITS DE L'ANTIQUITi, 3rd ser. (1958), p. 563.
149 BESELER, 2 BEITRXGE 121 (1911).
For further intrusions alleged by him see supra,
note 128.
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in classical sources should not put us off. We have before us a semiphilosophical
disquisition and, besides, remedium is the appropriate word. Actio, used in the
explanation of furtum conceptum and oblatum, would have been far too narrow: the effectiveness of the new arrangement was ensured by taking over
from usufruct-with adjustments--a special machinery, the main component
of which was the cautio.
15. Justinian's Institutes on Usufruct Extended.-We come to Institutes
2.4.2, which Ferrini regards as descending from the Res Cottidianae.1 50
Usufruct, we learn, is possible over everything except perishable, consumable
goods. "For these are susceptible of usufruct neither by natural nor by civil
law reason." The same (the text goes on) applies to money. "However, for the
sake of expediency, the senate decreed that also over those things a usufruct
could be created, so, however, that the heir be given an adequate. security."
After some details as to machinery, the paragraph concludes: "hence the
senate has not called into existence a usufruct over those things, for it could
not do that, but by means of a cautio it has established a quasi-usufruct." 1'5

I suppose that, though gramatically the phrase "neither by natural nor
by civil law reason" coordinates, puts on the same level, the two sources of
law, what is meant is that, as perishables do not admit of usufruct by virtue
of natural reason, neither will they admit of it in the strength of the civil law:
the latter cannot go against the former. 152 This is, of course, consistent with
the principle enunciated in several passages from Gaius or dependent on him.
Why, in the present case, there is mention of naturalis ratio I have just tried
to explain in connection with Digest 7.5.2.1.115 In fact Institutes 2.4.2. makes
it even dearer that it is a question of the sound order of things: the structure
of usufruct, we are informed, is intrinsically averse to the inclusion of

perishables.
The senate's awkwardly formulated regulation - awkward from the point
of view of its commentators at least - was enacted utilitatis causa, "for the
sake of expediency," that is to say, in order to assist urgent, decent needs
and to prevent unfair results. This excuses some irregularity. Even so, the
deamc did not make the arrangement a usufruct, not even lege: the senate
could not turn a nonusufruct into a usufruct. What it did was to introduce
machinery from usufruct, a remedium in the language of Digest 7.5.2.1:
"so, however, that the heir be given an adequate security," "by means of a
150 Fwasm, 2 OPiax 361 [13 BULLETTINO 150f.].
151 Namn eae neque naturali ratione neque civili recipiunt usum fructur. . . Sed utilitatis
causa seawtus censuit posse etiam earum rerum usum fructum constitui, ut tamen . . . heredi
uazei
caveatur. . . . Ergo senatus non fecit quidem earum reurn usum fructum, nec
enin poterat, sad per cautionse
quasi usum fructurn constituit.
152 Coanpare DwRST 3.5.38, Gaius III de verborurn obligationibus.
153 VII ad edictum provinciale; supra, pp. 36f.
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cautio." Just so, for the advocates of this line of argument, theft taken hold
of and theft inflicted were species actionis furto cohaerentes rather than
genera furtorum.
In one respect the author of the text goes considerably beyond Digest
7.5.2.1 where the arrangement "is considered as if a usufruct": in Institutes
2.4.2 the senate, by upholding it, "has established a quasi-usufruct." Read
on its own, the clause quasi usum fructum constituit could mean "it has, so
to speak, established a usufruct"; but after the preceding ergo non fecit usum
fructum, "hence it has not called into existence a usufruct," this meaning is
out of the question, and a translation like "it has established a quasi-usufruct"
is unavoidable. Theophilus at any rate in his Greek paraphrase takes it this
way: "By the device of the cautio the senate contrived an imitation of
1 54

usufruct."

A few more points in his paraphrase may be noted. He replaces the brief
motivation in the Latin original "for the sake of expediency" by "since, then,
it is said that there is no room for usufruct over those things." On the other
hand, for the proviso "so, however, that the heir be given adequate security"
he substitutes the short phrase "by a certain. device'U5 5 : "a senatusconsult
was enacted laying down that also over those things by a certain device
a usufruct was to exist." In the course of explaining details, he stresses far
more than the original the radical independence of the new case. The legatee
receives ownership "contrary to the nature of usufruct, for usufruct is over
another man's property; but as there exists no usufruct according to the laws
over these things, fittingly the principles of usufruct are transgressed in their
11 56
respect."
If, as is most likely, the classics did not arrive at the concept of a quasiusufruct, Institutes 2.4.2 furnishes an argument for the postclassical origin
of the Res Cottidianae. Segr6, regarding the concept as postclassical, draws
the inference that Institutes 2.4.2 comes not, as Ferrini asserts, from the Res
Cottidianaebut from Digest 7.5.2.1. The inference is wrong. For one thing,
as we have seen, Digest 7.5.2.1 does not contain the notion quasi-usufruct:
this is only read back into it from Institutes 2.4.2. For another, the vocabulary
isabout as unlike as it could be - sed remedio introducto coepit quasi usus
fructus haberi over against sed per cautionem usum fructum constituit - a
154 Dia tes methodou tes cautionos mim.esin epenoesen usufructu. Ferrini, Institutionum
etc., 126, completely disregards the mention of methodos, "device, ....stratagem," as he
also removes the nuance of purposeful planning or scheming from the verb epinoeo. He
translates: per cautionem vero quasi usum/ructum introduxit.
155 Dia methodou tinos. Ferrini's quadam ratione, op. cit. supra, n. 49, is not pregnant
enough.
150 Very similar to Levy, quoted supra note 137. Para ten physin tou usufructu, ho gar

usufructos kata allotrias despoteias estin; all' epeide ou synesteke epi touton kato nomous

ho usufructos, eikotos kai hoi kanones epi auton parabainontaitou usufructu.
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fact Segr notices but is unable to account for. The point is that, in his day,
the possibility of the Res Cottidianaebeing postclassical did not yet occur,
hence, he was practically driven to his mistaken conclusion.
We might, indeed, consider the possibility that Justinian altered the text
of the Res Cottidianaein the points here of relevance. A possibility, to be
sure, but an exceedingly remote one. Or again, it might even be argued that
quasi-usufruct was invented by Gaius between his commentary on the provincial edict and his (genuine) Res Cottidianae. I am not the Jew Apella.
16. Paul and Ulpian on Usufruct Extended. - In both the provinces
of theft and usufruct, Labeo's doctrine prevailed: the law cannot turn facts
which do not constitute such and such an offense or transaction into that
offense or transaction, it cannot add a "legal" class to the "natural" one.
Gaius, Gellius, Justinian, Theophilus - they all follow this doctrine. For
usufruct, Paul and, perhaps, Ulpian may be included in the list of witnesses.
Usufruct was lost by nonuse, for one year in the case of movables, for
two years in that of land. (Justinian extended these times.) But this mode
of extinction did not apply to quasi-usufruct' 5 7 - obviously, it would have
made no sense, the quasi-usufructuary becoming owner of the objects, the
wine, oil, money. Paul puts the matter thus: "Also if a usufruct over money
is bequeathed it does not end by nonuse for a year, because it is not usufruct
and the ownership of the money is with the usufructuary, not with the heir."' 8
The particle quoque connects up with the preceding remark to the effect that,
in contradistinction to usufruct (ordinary usufruct) already in existence, the
action by which you may claim to have it created is not lost by nonuse. This
leads on to quasi-usufruct not lost by nonuse. "It is not usufruct," Paul
declares: this is in accordance with what we found in Gaius. Like Theophilus,
Paul names the usufructuary's ownership of the objects as the fundamental
deviation; for Theophilus, we have seen, quasi-usufruct is "contrary to the
nature of usufruct, for usufruct is over another man's property."
In the course of discussing the oath which, given certain conditions, settles
a right, Ulpian observes: "But if he swears that he has, or that there is
owing to him, a usufruct over things over which because of consumption a
usufruct cannot be created, I opine that the effectiveness of the oath should be
157 INSTITUTES 2.4.2, FRAOMENTA VATICANA 46, to be discussed presently, DIGEST 7.5.9,
Paul I ad Neratium, 7.5.10 pr. [equals 7.9.7.1], Ulpian LXXIX ad edictum. In fact, nearly
all modes of extinction of usufruct proper were inapplicable.
158 FRAGMENTA VATICAIrjA 46, Paul I Manualium: Pecuniae quoque usus fructus legatus
per annum non utendo non perit, quia nec usus fructus est et pecuniae dominium fructuarii,
non heredis, est. The words non perit are supplied by HUSCHKE IURISPUDENTIAE
ANTEIUSTINIANAE QUAE SUPERSUNT 691 (3rd ed., 1874), and certainly give the right
sense. I do not see some of the difficulties Grosso, op. cit. supra note 128, at 264 ff., has
with the text.
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accepted and therefore I believe that even then he should be considered to have
correctly sworn and he can on the strength of the oath claim the usufruct
on offering the security."' 59
To begin by taking the text as it stands, the question is whether to recognize
an oath in which a quasi-usufruct is described as a usufruct. The very question implies a firm insistence on the view that it is not usufruct, be it natura
or be it lege. The decision, it is true, prefers a sane and fair result to rigorous
logic and, with some hesitation (arbitror, puto, "I opine," "I believe") the
oath is upheld.
Beseler reconstructs the decision as follows: "I opine that the oath has
no effect." 1 60 If he is right, Ulpian carried the exclusion of quasi-usufruct
from usufruct to extremes - perhaps not impossible where it is a question
of interpretation of an oath.
I agree with Beseler that the text is doctored, 16 1 but I should seek to
restore it along different lines. The clue seems to me to lie in the switch
from the first person in the first half of the paragraph, not here quoted, item
si iuravero, "if I swear," to the third person in the second half, the half we
are concerned with, sed si iuraverit, "but if he swears." Beseler puts it right
by inserting quis into the latter case, sed si quis iuraverit, "but if somebody
swears." This, I think, is too simple. I think that, in the original Ulpian,
between the first half and the second there was a discussion which the compilers found inconvenient and dropped. The first half deals with extinction
of usufruct proper. The bit dropped may have continued this theme. And
even the second half, here under notice, may originally have had to do with
it, pointing out - as does Fragmenta Vaticana 46 - differences in the case
of quasi-usufruct.
If so, there is no knowing the exact question Ulpian had in mind; but
it was most probably not the description of a quasi-usufruct as a usufruct.16 2
That this is the problem now would be the doing of the compilers.
17. Gaius on Adoptive Relations and Ulpian on Conventional Infamy;
an Excursus on In-laws. - An argument from silence is apt to be precarious.
159 DIosr 12.2.11.2, Ulpian XXII ad edictum: Sed si rerum in quibus usus fructus
propter abusum constitui non potest iuraverit usum fructum se habere vel sibi deberi,
efletum iurisiurandisequendum arbitror ideoque tunc quoque videri eum recte iurasse
fputo et ex eo iurciurandoposse petere usum fructum cautione oblata. See Grosso, op. cit.
supra note 128, at 266ff., with whose results I am not in full agreement; my principal
argument is not much affected.
160 Et (atque) ideo, et (atque) idcirco, ideoque, idcircoque, Beseler, 45 ZErrscHiuFT

(1925) (Roman section) 462: nullum esse effectum iurisiurandi
arbitror.
111 That propter abusum is not classical was noted above, p. 35. Beseler cuts it out. It
may, however, be an abbreviation of something like quia usu consumuntur, "because they
DER SAVIGNY-STIFTUNO

are consumed by use."
102 Compare, infra, pp. 45f., for Ulpian's attitude to a comparable problem from "infamy."
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Still, from our sources it does look as if the Roman jurists had embarked on
an ex professo inquiry into an extension of a category only in connection with
these two cases: the manifest theft if an object is found by ceremonious search
"with loincloth and platter," and the usufruct over perishables. It is only
here, it appears, that they set forth, gave explicit shape to, their theoriesthe category lege on the one hand, the explanation by means of "as if" or
quasi on the other. Why should that be so? There would have been many
other opportunities, the whole, vast field of interpretation, for example. The
very term "manifest theft," as Gaius himself points out, 1 6 2 a was far from
unambiguous, construed in a narrow sense by some jurists (the thief must
be caught in the act, on the spot), less rigorously by others (he must be caught
before having carried the object to safety).
The answer is that, in these two cases, there was legislation - known
legislation- declaring a set of facts to be what prima facie it was not: "it
shall be manifest theft," "it is a good usufruct." These provisions had to be
made sense of and thus, in a time greatly interested in definition and classification, the discussion of principle was sparked off. In the course of it, or
rather in the course of discussing "with loincloth and platter," three other
cases were drawn in: theft as such, adultery, and homicide. Theft as such,
because of the long-standing allied problem which had cropped up in
endeavors to work out various types of theft, with theft taken hold of and
theft inflicted becoming increasingly difficult to fit in; and adultery and
homicide, because as to both there was also extending legislation - though
these extensions were more carefully worded, with the aid of pro, quasi, ut.
Needless to say, if the ex professo ventilation of the problem is confined
to a very few contexts, adumbrations and echoes abound throughout the
system. Above I quoted Institutes 3.1.11 on adoption, 1 63 and it is instructive
to pay attention to the way adoptive relationships axe described there and
elsewhere. A few sketchy remarks must here suffice. In his Institutes Gaius,
who rejects manifest theft lege and usufruct lege, freely speaks of "adoptive
son" or "adoptive father," fiius or pater adoptivus.1 64 (The use of liberi in
this area is not determined by absolutely the same factors since, though the
word mostly signifies "children," its wider, basic meaning "free persons" and
then "free subjects of a paterfamilias" is not without some influence.) Some65
times he represents them as occupying "the place of" natural relations,'
ld21 GAIUS 3.184. Mr. Colin Turpin, of Clare College, Cambridge, has kindly drawn
my attention to this remarkable fact. Cf. supra, note 140, and infra, note 186a.

See supra, pp. 10ff.
1.137a, 2.136, 137, 147, 3.40, 41, 46, 49, 83, 84.
1.59, eamque mihi per adoptionem filiae loco esse coeperit, "a woman who
through adoption begins to be in the position of a daughter to me," 2.136, adoptivi filii
naturalium loco sunt, "adoptive sons are in the place of natural ones."
163

'"6 GAsus
165 GAZus
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which chimes with his thesis in regard to extensions in other fields. But he is
far from consistent, as when he says: "If a woman through adoption begins
to be a sister to me." 16 6 In Institutes 3.1.11, from the Res Cottidianae, the
thesis seems to be carried to greater lengths: adoptive children have "the
mere legal title of son or daughter," ius nomenque. The late classic Modestinus in his Regulae is not unsubtle, considering that in this kind of work a
terse statement is called for: "Not only nature but also adoptions make sons
of families." 16 7 He says not that adoptions make sons but that they make "sons
of families." The latter is a more technical notion, more directly referring to
the quality of the persons concerned as subjects of the heads of fanilies.
Whether adopted sons merely acquire the place of natural sons or become sons
lege he does not decide.
Of adrogatio,the adoption of one paterfamilias by another, we know the
formula designed for it by Q. Mucius Scaevola around 100 B.C. The popular
assembly was asked: "Do you wish and ordain that Lucius Valerius be a son
to Lucius Titius by law and statute just as if he were born of that father and
his wife, and that to Titius be power of life and death over Valerius as is to
a father over a son?"' 168 The archaic formula is not yet dominated by a
t 69
definite, consciously held theory. Mucius's academic grandson Servius
would find here ammunition for his category lege - the person arrogated is
iure legeque filius - but equally the "as if" school might derive comfort from
"just as if he were born," tam siet quam si esset. I suppose that in both adoption in the narrow sense and arrogation, at all stages, the way the new relationship was thought of would depend a little on whether, in any given case,
attention focused on the power-subjection aspect, the filiusfamilias as comparable to the paterfamilias's ordinary property, or whether it focused on
the more elementary characteristics of fatherhood, sonship, brotherhood, sisterhood and so on. In the former case, the difference between a true and an
adoptive relation would be less conspicuous than in the latter; which means
108 GMus 1.61: si qua per adoptionem soror mihi esse coeperit.
167 DIGEST 1.7.1 pr., II regularum; filiosfamilias non solum natura, verum et adoptiones

faciunt. MONRO, I THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 31 (1904), under the influence of passages
with "in place of," translates: "The position of filiusfamilias is acquired not only by nature
but by adoption."
18 Gellius 5.19.9: Velitis iubeatis uti L. Valerius L. Titio tam jure legeque filius siet
quam si ex go patre matreque familias eius natus esset, utique gi vitae necisque in eum

potestas siet uti patri endo filio
est. A MS. of the thirteenth century reads "become son"
and "to Titius become power," fierinstead of siet; see Aulus Gellius, NOCTIUM ATTICARUM
usmu XX, book 1, 321 (ed. by Hertz, 1883). In the script of the period, f and s were
very close. Nevertheless it is probable that the copyist did find siet a difficult thought: at
this moment the sonship is not yet created. But siet is, of course, correct. The falling
together of assertion and creation of a right is known, for instance, from mancipation; and
at any rate, siet, occurring as it does in a question to the assembly, may well look forward
to a legislative esto.
169 Mucius taught Aquilius Gallus and Lucilius Balbus, who in turn taught Servius.

DAVID DAUBE
that the concept "father, son, brother, sister lege or iure" would present itself
more readily in the former, that "in the place of a father, son, brother, sister"
in the latter.
To give one more example from a remoter branch of the law. "Infamy"
was not uncommonly incurred by a man who could hardly be considered a
scoundrel; for instance, by a tutor whose negligence - negligence, not fraud
- was found to have caused his ward some loss. The praetorian edict attached
the same disabilities to condemnation in actio tutelae as to condemnation,
say, in an action on the ground of theft and only slightly fewer than to condemnation in a capital trial; and in the lex Julia municipalis the three cases
attract the same disabilities.' 70 Ulpian comments: "Some kinds of opprobrium
are dishonorable by nature, some by the civil law and so to speak by the
usage of the State; for example theft or adultery is dishonorable by nature,
whereas to be condemned in the actio tutelae, that is not an opprobrium by
nature but by the usage of the State. For that which can befall even a worthy
man is not an opprobrium by nature."'' 1
A jurist opposed to manifest theft lege or usufruct lege ought perhaps
not to have recognized the dishonorable or opprobrium more ciuitatis; the
logical view would have been that condemnation because of negligence is
treated as if it fell under those attributes. Apart from the fact, however, that
the jurists were not always logical, I argued above, in discussing quasi-usufruct,
that we do not really know where Ulpian stood in that controversy.r 2 To
judge by the present fragment, he did not in fact follow the main trend. But
to attain anything approaching certainty, a much more thorough investigation
would be needed.
The fragment comes from Ulpian's chapter on iniuriae, attacks on the
person, and Lenel seems to think that it was concerned to explain precisely
what aspersions constituted actionable slander: you would be liable if you
spoke of a man as found guilty of theft or adultery, dishonorable by nature,
but not if you spoke of him as found guilty in an actio tutelae, an opprobrium
only by usage of the State.' 7 3 This is a perfectly possible context, but I incline to assume a different one. Ulpian may well have been exercised by
the fact which has very understandably exercised modem authorities such
170 GREENIDGE, INFAMIA 121ff. (1894); MOMMSEN, RbMISCHES STRAFRECET 805f.,
993f. (1899); Watson, Some Cases of Distortion by the Past in Classical Roman Law,
31 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RECHTSoESCHIEDEls 76ff. (1963).
171 DIGEST 50.16.42, LVII ad edictum: Probra quaedam natura turpia sunt, quaedam
civiliter et quasi more civitatis, ut puta furtum, adulterium natura turpe est, enimvero
tutelae damnari hoc non natura probrum est sed nttore civitatis. Nec eni natura probrum
est quod potest etiam in hominem idoneum incidere.
172

See supra, p. 42.

173 Palingenesia, vol. 2, 777, Edictum, 397, adducing DIzsT 47.10.15.13, from the
same book by Ulpian.
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as Mommsen and Watson 1 4

-

that condemnation in the actio iniuriarum

involved infamy though, in many cases, this would appear quite unjustifiable.
It was this criticism he answered by the distinction between "natural" disgrace and "conventional" disgrace, and the actio tutelae came in as a further
illustration: here, too, .to understand the law one had to resort to this distinction.
Beseler considered Lenel's suggestion implausible and labelled the fragment as spurious. 17 5 Why it should be necessary to deny Ulpian's authorship if the context suggested by Lenel does not convince I fail to see. I am
conjecturing a different context; yet Lend may be right, or neither of usno reason here for condemning the fragment. Kaser tries to reinforce Beseler's
excision by the strangest argument. 176 It contains the following steps. (1)
Mos civitatis "can here signify only the feelings, views, judgment of the Roman
people," kann hier nur die r6mische Volksanschauung bedeuten. (2) The
main distinction in the field of infamy, however, is between cases
where infamy results automatically from certain conduct (from working as a gladiator, for example - so-called "immediate" infamy) and cases
where it results only from judicial conviction (the three cases in the present
text all fall under this "mediate" infamy, you become infamous not when
you steal, commit adultery, or are remiss in your job as tutor, but only by
being convicted of theft, of adultery, or in an actio tutelae); and with this
main distinction the one made in the present text between "natural" infamy
and infamy in accordance with the r6mische Volksanschauung has no detectable connection. (3) The connection is not rendered any clearer by the
final clause, nec enim, etc., "for that which can befall," etc., which is in any
case naive. To these arguments one may reply: (1) There is nothing to
justify the interpretation of mos civitatis as die r6mische Volksanschauung.
It has its usual sense, "usage, established tradition, custom, of the State."
This is contrasted with natura just as lex is in the discussion of "loincloth
and platter." (2) Ulpian is plainly not concerned with the distinction between "immediate" and "mediate" infamy (a distinction which, though most
useful, was worked out by Savigny). 77 All his three illustrations are cases
of "mediate" infamy; there is no vestige of another. So no objection can be
based on the fact that a connection with that distinction is not detectable.
(3) Nor can we expect the final clause to elucidate this connection, which
See supra note 170.

174
175 BESELER,

5 BEITJOE 75. The words civiliter et quasi, already questioned by
Albertario, are probably an intrusion.
176 Kaser, Mores maiorum und Gewohnheitsrecht, 59 ZETSCHIuFT DER SAVIGNYSTIFTUNG (1939) (Rorm Abt.), 93.
177 GREENMGE, op. cit. supra note 170, at 38f.
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is not there. As for the naivet6 of this clause, that criticism has some weight
so long as we translate idoneus by "suitable," "fit for the job." Then it would
indeed be a little naive to say that what can befall a man suitable for the
office of tutor cannot be disgraceful by nature. But idoneus shades off into
"worthy," "honest,' 1'78 and though in the legal sources this nuance is rare,
a discussion of infamy is the place for it.
May I be permitted an excursus on father-in-law, brother-in-law and so
on? At first sight we seem to have before us a father lege or lure, a brother
lege or iure, that is to say, a father or brother the law has added to the genuine
one. The New English Dictionary does take this line. It explains that "in-law"
means "in canon law." The contrast is with father or brother in blood, by
nature. The terms with "in-law" imply that, as regards intermarriage, these
persons fall under the same prohibitions as a true father, brother, and so on;
179
they are, for this purpose, a father, brother, and so on created by the law.
I am highly skeptical about what would be an amazingly early - tnirteenth century - appearance in common English parlance of so sophisti.ated
a concept. What increases my doubts is the idea that these relations should

have received their designations from the forbidden degrees - especially as
in some important cases a designation so based would make nonsense. My
wife's brother is my brother-in-law: 18 0 because he is forbidden to me like

my true brother? Again, stepfather and stepmother, who would best suit
the category of a father and mother created by law, are not called fatherin-law or mother-in-law before the sixeenth century, and the designation
never quite stuck to them. 181 Last but not least, the earliest instance - about

1250 - of the use of "in-law" is wife-in-law, signifying a lawfully married
woman. It antedates the other uses by at least half a century. It might perhaps be argued that this is an accident of transmission. The fact remains
that wife-in-law is very ancient, and that the explanation of the New English
Dictionary does not fit at all. A wife-in-law, a lawfully married woman, is
not a wife added by the law to a wife in blood or by nature. She is the one
wife.

1 82

178 E.g., CICERO, DE OFFICCIS 2.62; Quintilian, 2.15.31,

DECLARATIONES 376 at the

beginning.
"79 This account is given under "brother-in-law" (first in alphabetical order), NEW
ENGLISH DICTIONARY VOL. 1, p. 1133 (ed. by Murray 1888). For the remaining in-laws,

and also under the heading of "in-law," vol. 5, p. 306 (ed. by M~urray 1901), we are
referred back to this basic entry.
180 Brother-in-law is among the early in-laws: A.D. 1300. See NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY
at "brother-in-law."
181 NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY vol. 4, p. 99 (ed. by Bradley, 1901); vol. 6, pt. 2, p. 694

(ed. by Bradley, 1908).
'" Actually, we might see indirect attestation of wife-in-law as early as about 1230,
in
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Women weak enough to marry are here called such as "are in the law of wedlock."

At
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The correct solution seems to be this. The term wife-in-law does in fact
stand at the beginning. The noun wife at that time might denote any woman
married or unmarried - as Weib still does in German. Therefore, where
her status as legitimate spouse was to be stressed, she was described as wifein-law, i.e., wife (woman) taken in the law of wedlock. Father-in-law,
brother-in-law, and so on were formed by way of extension, the attribute
"in-law" referring to the area of wedlock: father-in-law, brother-in-law meant
father, brother, in the area of wedlock, father, brother, of the woman who
is my lawful spouse - not father, brother, added by the law to father, brother,
by nature. Gradually the noun wife became narrowed down to married
woman, and wife-in-law dropped out. It was from then onwards that fatherin-law and so on could be and sometimes were in joke or earnest represented
as father by virtue of law as opposed to the natural.
In Monstrelet's Chronicles, written in the fifteenth century, there occurs
the expression pare en la loi de marriage: Jean Petit in his defense of John
the Fearless in 1408 mentions that the latter was made the Dauphin's father
in the law of marriage. 18 3 This fully chimes with my view that father-in
law originally means not a father lege or lure but a father in the area of
wedlock, the lawfully wedded spouse's father. In the recently published
Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology' 8 4 the English "in-law" is said to be
coined "after AN. [Anglo-Norman] en ley, OF. [Old French] en
loi (de mariage)." I have not been able to trace any evidence for en ley,
and the only evidence for en loi known to me is the passage from Monstrelet
just adverted to.' 8 5 Admittedly, even should there be in fact no further
evidence, the possibility of a Norman-French provenance of "in-law" cannot be
ruled out; it makes no difference to my main point. But it could also be that
it is the English, well attested from the thirteenth century, which comes first
and is responsible for the French. Jean Petit, incidentally, was a native of
Normandy. Let me add that, if my explanation is correct, the English (or
Norman-French) development is basically much closer to the German than
has so far been assumed: Schwiegervater, Schwiegersohn mean father, son in
the area of Schwigerschaft, of affinity through wedlock.
18. Extension by Interpreters and Moralists; the Praetor.- It would be
least this passage provides additional justification for questioning the derivation of "in-law"
from the forbidden degrees.
193 Book 1, ch. 39 towards the beginning.
184 Ed. by Onions with the assistance of Friedrichsen and Burchfield (1966) 476.
I15 It is cited by GODEFROY, DICTIONNAIRE DE L'ANCIENNE LANGUE FRANCAISE vOl. 5
(1888), 17, and, from there, by the NEw ENGLISH DICTIONARY vol. 6, I.c. In the latter
entry, the phrase is attributed to the sixteenth century, presumably because Godefroy refers
to a 1516 edition of Monstrelet. But it is already in the fifteenth-century copies and
may actually go back to Jean Petit's address.
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interesting to see whether, and how far, the Roman jurists deemed their reflections on statutory extension of a category applicable to extension of a category
by way of interpretation. Interpretation can at times assume a near-legislative stance - Wer ein Arier ist, bestimme ich, said Goring 1 86 - in which
event the problem might become quite similar. However, this is too big a
1 86
field for this discussion. 1
A fortiori the field of morality, though inviting comparison, is too big.
In general, in the sphere of morality, with no trial in prospect, considerable
freedom is taken with the wrongs known to the law: they are apt to be more
expansively conceived. La propridt6, c'est le vol, says Proudhon, "property
is theft," Eigentum ist Raub. It is noteworthy, however, that in the moral
writings of the Romans, there is relatively little -of this. Probably the most
familiar ancient illustrations are from Rabbinic and New Testament literature. Here, the moralist will frequently oppose his wider notion to the lawyer's
narrower one. Take these extensions of adultery and murder: "Thou shalt
not commit adultery (Exodus 20.14, Deuteronomy 5.17) - not even with the
eye, not even in the heart"; 1 8 7 "'The eye of the adulterer waiteth for the
twilight (Job 24.15)-lest you should think that only he who commits adultery
with his body is called an adulterer by Scripture: he also who commits adultery
with his eye is called an adulterer by Scripture";188 "Whoever looks at (or,
thinks about) a woman with desire is as if he had cohabited with her"; 189 "Ye
have heard thou shalt not commit adultery, but I say unto you that whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her
already in his heart";1 90 "He who puts his fellow to shame in public is like
a shedder of blood" ;191 "He who hates his fellow belongs to the shedders of
blood";129 "Ye have heard thou shalt not kill and whosoever shall kill shall
be in danger of the judgment, but I say unto you that whosoever is angry
with his brother without cause shall be in danger of the judgment."' 193 Anyone guilty of the essential, wicked element of the crime is included. It may
well be significant, however, that in none of these quotations do we meet a
simple pronouncement "He who desires another man's wife is an adulterer,"
"He who hates his fellow is a murderer." There are little reservations: "is
186 Following in the footsteps of Karl Lueger; see Keller, The City Behind the Charm
(book review), Sunday Times of June 12, 1966, p. 28.
1861 See supra, p. 43, for a reference to the various interpretations of "manifest theft."
187 Mekhilta de-Rabbi Shimeon Ill.
188 Leviticus Rabba 23, Resh Laqish.
189 Kalla 1.
190 Matthew 5.27f. On the half-interpretative, half-autonomous form of this saying,
as well as 5.21f. to be quoted presently, see DAUBE, THE NEW TESTAMENT AND RABBINIC
JUDAISM 55ff. (1956).
1g1 Babylonian Baba Metsia 58b.
192 Derekh Erets 10, R. Eliezer ben Hyrcanus.
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called such and such," "is as if, ....
has done so and so in his heart," "is like,"
"belongs to those who." Enough - I just wanted to remind readers of this
province.

Yet another inquiry I skip. I might at this juncture compare the praetor's
inability (in classical law) to change the civil law directly: "the praetor
cannot make heirs," says Gaius, "though when he gives persons possession
of the estate, they are established in the position of heirs."' 194 But let me
pass on to a very different theme.
IV.

INTERFERENCE WITH THE PAST

19. Nineteen-eighty-four. - The desire to reshape the past occurs in all
spheres of life; I mean actually to reshape it - not merely to feign it different
or to set it to rights now and for the future, but to interfere with yesterday,
to make things that did not happen to have happened and vice versa. Rationally we know that what is done cannot be undone, 1 95 quod factum est
infectum fieri non potest, ce qui est fait ne peut tre difait, man kann das
Geschehene nicht ungeschehen machen. But the very existence of this
proverb in many languages testifies to the strength and ubiquity of the impossible hope: Lady Macbeth desperately wished it were otherwise. 19 6
The Rabbis discourage a prayer such as that a sound of lamentation you
hear from afar may not be over one dear to you, or that the child your wife
is expecting may be male. The prayer is "vain": the victim over whom they
lament is already in being, as is the sex of the child conceived, and even God
cannot or will not undo or remake the past.' 9 7 This (apparent) restriction
on God is an old theological conundrum. 1 98 Yet people do pray in this way,
"Let it not have happened," "Let me be the prize-winner" (on going up to
the notice board). It is precisely in the religious world that time is often
felt to be conquerable. Renewal of the pristine creation, rebirth in conversion, are examples. "Behold, I create new heavens and a new earth, and the
194 GAXUs

3.32.

195 But see Davy, Time May Go Back in Faustian Universe (reporting

an article by

Stannard in

NATURE), Observer of August 14, 1966, p. 1.
196 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, Act V, scene 1, line 75.
197 Mishnah Berakoth 9.3; the Hebrew for "vain" is shav'.

Opinions diverging in
varying degrees are recorded in Palestinian Berakoth 14a, Genesis Rabba 72 on Genesis
30.21; none of them, however, reckons with a retroactive intervention on the part of God.
This is not the place to raise the question whether, on a rigorously mechanistic-causal view
of nature, one could ever pray for anything but a miracle.
198 E.g., ABRAHAM

TUCKER (Edward Search), LIGHT OF NATURE VOl. 2 (1768), pt. 1,

196f., in a chapter on Omnipotence discusses "absolute impossibilities which appear such
even to Omnipotence itself, such as . . . annihilating time and space, undoing past events
or producing contrary ones." His explanation is that "those things imply contradictions, and
contradictions are generally held to be no objects of power as their possibility would infer
a defect rather than an enlargement of power."

DAVID DAUBE
9
former shall not be remembered," says the prophet. 19 "Though your sins
200
- the promise here is of more
be as scarlet, they shall be white as snow"
than a writing off, they will never have been; "I will allure her into the
2 01
this
wilderness and she shall sing there as in the days of her youth"
means a new beginning, with all that ever clouded the marriage anni20 2
longs for. just this
hilated; and the prayer "renew our days as of old"
miracle. (Our "to wipe the slate clean" tends in the same direction.) A
convert to Judaism becomes a newborn child in so real a sense that his previous bloodrelations are no longer related to him: this affects the law of
inheritance and he may also, for instance, enter into what would otherwise

be an incestuous marriage 2 0 3 The Greeks made a person returning from
abroad after being reputed dead undergo a rebirth, a custom modem treatises
2 04 Plutarch, who menon Greek law assign to the section about fictions.
20 5 but one may wonder whether
tions the rite, would presumably have agreed,
it was not once looked on as, let us say, three-quarters real.
In history, we call an aetiological myth one that is invented ex post facto
in explanation and, frequently, in support of an existing situation. To some
extent the story of Jacob's struggle with the angel is of this type - explaining
20 6
Often such
why the Israelites abstain from certain portions of an animal.
myths support a right. We may think of the various biblical tales showing
why, though of the twins Esau and Jacob the former was the firstborn, the
latter's descendants must be superior to his: an oracle before they were born,
an extraordinary occurrence at birth, Esau's sale of his birthright, Jacob's
success in obtaining their father's blessing. 2 07 Genealogies furnish prominent
instances of aetiology. "To return to our wethers," says Rabelais, "I say, that

by the sovereign gift of heaven, the antiquity and genealogy of Gargantua
hath been reserved for our use more full and perfect than any other except
that of the Messias, whereof I mean not to speak; for it belongs not to my
purpose, and the devils, that is to say, the false accusers and dissembled gos20
pelers, will therein oppose me." s
199 Isaiah 65.17, taken up in Revelation 21.1.
200 Isaiah 1.18.
201

Hosea 2.14f.

Lamentations 5.21.
E.g., Babylonian Yebamoth 22a, 97b f., Palestinian Yebamoth 12a. For certain
modifications laid down in order that he should not think Judaism was lax in questions of
incest, see DAUBE, THE NEw TESTAMENT AND RABBINIC JUDAISM 113. From the middle
of the third century the principle began to be undermined: this is behind the view R.
Johanan opposes to that of Resh Laqish, Babylonian Yebamoth 62a.
204 J. WALTER JONES, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY OF THE GREEKS 306 (1956).
202

203

205 PLUTARCH, ROMAN QUESTIONS 5, 264E ff.; compare Lucullus
208 Genesis 32.32.
207

Genesis 25.23, 25.26, 25.33, 27.1ff.
Book 1, ch. 1, in Urquhart's translation.

208 RABELAIS, GAROANTUA,

18.1.
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Exactly what was the attitude - or better, were the attitudes, or still better,
were and are the attitudes - of aetiologists to the past? It would be naive to
think that the phenomenon is confined to antiquity. And what the Ministry
of Truth will do in 1984, we know: "Who controls the past, controls the
future, who controls the present, controls the past. Oceania was at war with
Eurasia, therefore Oceania had always been at war with Eurasia. As short
a time ago as February, the Ministry of Plenty had issued a promise that there
would be no reduction of the chocolate ration during 1984; the chocolate
ration was to be reduced; all that was needed was to substitute for the original
promise a warning that it would probably be necessary to reduce the ration
at some time in April." This will be "reality-control," when previous descrip' 20 9
tions and predictions will not be "altered" but "rectified.
Insofar as interpretation or reinterpretation of laws purports to conform
to their true meaning, the problem is closely related. As early as under the
legis actio, the Roman experts were prepared to let a man whose vines, vites,
had been cut down cash in a fine the XII Tables imposed on the cutting
down of trees, arbares2 1 0 There is no study on interpretation that does not
revel in the presentation of judgments attributing incredible meanings to the
authoritative text. The Talmud has a scene where Moses visits R. Aqiba's
academy (he died under Hadrian) and cannot follow the discussion; he is
satisfied, however, when assured that their decisions do go back to his revelation at Sinai.2 11 Irrebuttable evidence, irreversible judgments - in particular,
annulments of acts gone through or ratifications of collusive litigation - may
all produce remodellings of the heretofore; as when Catherine of Aragon
"was divorced and the late marriage made of none effect." '2 12
In the commoner legal disputes, the urge to intervene in the past normally
aims at a negative- to undo what did happen rather than to put up what
did not: people quarrel or go to law when they are dissatisfied with the
course things have taken. (I am not pronouncing on how far the distinction
is one of substance and not merely of aspect.) An expression like restitutio
in integrum, "restoration to the untouched position," is significant: the praetor
might grant it where a person's rights had been adversely affected by some
event. 2 13 Similarly, if a Roman returned from captivity, he recovered pristina
Jura, "his pristine rights.' 21 4 A man suspected of trying to get out of a
200

GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN-EIGHTY-FOUR

37ff. (1949).

210 GATus 4.11.

In the case recorded by Gaius plaintiff lost because he rested his claim
on a statute speaking of vites - there was no such statute.
.,1 Babylonian Menahoth 29b. On some aspects of the question, see my Texts and Interpretation in Roman and Jewish Law, 3 JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 3ff. (1961).
212 SHAKESPEARE, HENRY VIII, Act 4, Scene 1.
213 See BUCKLAND, op. cit. supra note 135, at 719.

214 By the special regulation of postliminium: G/Aus 1.129.
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bargain by denying it is rebuked: "You hope to be able by dissimulation.
to render this unmade," speras potesse dissimulando infectum hoc reddere.21 5
The parties to a sale might from the start agree that if the price is not paid
by a certain date, the object should be inempta, "unbought." 2 16 From the
international field, there is the peace treaty concluded in 321 B.C. by the
generals of the Roman army with the Samnites who hbld them blocked in
the narrow Caudine pass. When the army was safely back at Rome, the
senate repudiated the treaty as unauthorized. The Samnites pleaded that
such repudiation was fair only if Rome "restored those legions into the defile
where they were surrounded": "let everything be as if it had not happened"
iestituat legiones, omnia pro infecto sint.217 There were indeed some
Romans who took this view: the treaty could not be shaken off "unless all
was restored to the Samnites just as it had been at Caudium," nisi omnia
Samnitis qualia apud Caudium fuissent restituerentur.21 8 Naturally, expediency prevailed over scruples.
In none of these cases, however, does the law step outside the boundaries
of the rational. Though the desire may be for direct alteration of the past,
fulfilment is a different matter. The limitations of the latter are clearly
realized. One method by which effect was given to a restitutio in integrum
was an actio rescissoria, advising the judge to deliver his verdict as if the
damaging event had not occurred - an open admission of it.219 A returned
prisoner did not, for example, automatically recover possession and marriage,
at least not in classical law, when these were regarded as primarily factual
relations; Justinian, to whom marriage meant more, introduced some reform2. 0 An object which had become "unbought" might still have to be
retransferred into the vendor's ownership.2 1
20. "And His Place Shall Know Him no More."--Especially in the political domain, the irrational may triumph. Let us look at what we might call
abolitio memoriae, "abolition of a person's memory." (The ancient sources
contain only the verbal form abolere memoriam, "to abolish a memory"; the
215 PLAUTus, MOSTELLARIA 1017.
216 Lex commissoria, DIGEST 18.3.
217

Livy 9.11.3f.

218 Livy 9.8.14.
219 BUCKLAND, op. cit.
220 Id. at 67.
221 Id.
at 497. Where

supra note 135, at 723.
the contract fell to the ground under a lox commissoria, the

Sabinians gave actio empti or venditi to settle matters, the Proculians only an actio in

factum. This controversy, however, does not represent a rational attitude to the past on the
part of the Sabinians versus an irrational one on that of the Proculians. The latter simply
argue that according to the agreed, retroactive, resolutive condition no sale has come about,
whereas the former give contractual actions as soon as the orbit of sale is entered. See my
essay on Certainty of Price, in STUDIMS IN THE ROMAN LAW OF SALE 32f. (ed. by Daube,

1959).
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step to the category "abolition of a memory" is not yet taken. 222 ) We may
begin with a modern episode. In 1933, the Oxford Union passed a resolution "in no circumstances to fight for King and country." Randolph Churchill,
disgusted, moved, not another resolution to revoke this one, but a private
business measure - to expunge the offending resolution from the records.
Evidently, he tried to cause it not to have happened. Before his proposal
could be debated (when it finally was, it was defeated), wilder men sharing
his feelings tore the page from the minute-book and burnt it at the Martyr'
Memorial. 223
At Rome, the elimination of a ruler might be followed by a rescission of
his decrees and the overthrow of his statutes. (There is ample discussion in
modern literature of rescissio actorum, 22 4 but, again, the sources contain only
the verbal rescindere acta.) So far so good: these are actions to reject and
improve upon the past, not to influence it directly. The cutting out of the
hated man's name from inscriptions goes further; and in some cases he was
removed even from the fasti, the official calendar showing, for example, the
years when he had occupied the consulate.. He had never been, or at least
never been in those positions of honor. The first case for which this extreme
measure is evidenced is that of Marc Antony in 30 B.C. It is interesting that
Hirschfeld, writing in the second half of the nineteenth century, found it difficult to accept that a sober chronological State register could be treated thus,
getting a hole torn into it.225
Already Cicero in 56 B.C., in his speech Pro Sestio, said of the consuls of
two years before: "those consuls, if they are to be called consuls who
there is nobody but thinks should be torn out not only from human memory but also from the fasti.' ' 226 Translators are apt to tone it down,
rendering, for example, "whose names" instead of "who" ought to be torn
222 It is curious that Vittinghoff, while aware that damnatio memoriae is modernthe
sources speaking only of damnare memoriam - does not seem to notice that the same is
true of abolitio memoriae. There is much to be said, however, for his contention that
damnare memoriam refers not to the condemnation, abolition, of a person's memory but to
the posthumous sentencing of a person guilty of perduellio: DER STAATSPEIND IN DER
ROMISCHEN KAISERzErr 12f., 47, 64ff. (1936).
223 HOLLIS, THE OXFORD UNION 187 (1965). I asked some experts in Union affairs what
would have happened if the page had not been illegally torn out and Churchill's proposal
had been approved. They think that probably the page would have been not torn out, but
crossed out with two huge strokes, though a tearing out would not be inconceivable.
224 E.g., VITTINoHOrr, op. cit. supra note 222, at 91ff.
225 HIRSCnFELD, Die Kapitolinischen Fasten, 9 HERMES 93 (1875): Die Kapitolinischen
Consularfasten sind keine Ehrendenkmaler, sondern ein historisches Dokument: wollte man
eine vollstandige Eponymenliste herstelien, so mussten auch diejenigen Manner, die geachtet
waren, darin sine Stelle finden. On p. 93 he does consider the conceivability (denkbar)
of omission. Compare Mommsen's reply in the same volume, Die Capitolinischen Magistraturtafein, 273ff.
22 CICEFRo, PRo SEsro 14.33: eidemque consules, si appellandi sunt consules quos
nemo est quin non modo ex memoria sed etiam ex fastis evellendos putet.
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out.22 7 Mommsen remarks that this remained a frommer Wunsch, a "pious
wish.1 22 8 This is true but it is not all. Three things may be deduced. First,

as early as then, a quarter of a century before the suppression of Marc Antony,
the possibility of such a procedure was at least in people's minds, whether
or not it was in that epoch ever carried into practice. 22 9 Secondly, it was
clearly realized that expunction from the fasti went beyond expunction from
memory: "torn out not only from memory but also from the fasti." Indeed,
this way of putting it suggests that the more radical idea was rather novel
at the time. Thirdly, the Orwellian effect of such reality control did not
escape Cicero. On erasure, these men would never have held their rank:
' 23 0
"if they are to be called consuls who should be torn out from the fasti."
One is strongly reminded of the rewriting in 1984 of a piece in praise of
Comrade Withers after he has become an "unperson." 2 3s 1 Mommsen, incidentally, did perceive that men might want to make an impact on the past.
In discussing the rescission of decrees, which can rarely be carried out in full,
he observes: "It is simply impossible to make what has happened unhappened; and if political passion refuses to recognize this, the practical conduct
of affairs will bring it back to it with absolute inevitability." '23 2 (I do not
know whether anybody has made a study of how much and which portions
of Hitler's, Mussolini's, Stalin's new order survived the author's disgrace.. I
daresay the - very substantial - remnants might be divided into three kinds:
such as it is practically impossible to get rid of- Mommsen's case; such as
one has to concede are worth preserving; and such as, though unworthy,
there is not the will to get rid of.)
It would be instructive to investigate Cicero's handlings of unpleasant
occurrences in generaL For instance, he regrets that a good man's downfall
cannot be dismissed from memory; 2 3 3 he is sure -in the lifetime of Marc
Antony - that even if the senate revoked all decrees and judgments against
him, the memory of his crimes would live on; 2 3 4 he proposes to a friend that
t Gmma,
CcRao, PRo SEsIo AND IN VATINIUM 77 (Loeb Classical Library, 1958).
2a R6msczs STAATSRECHT vol. 3, pt. 2 (1888), 1191.
-2" VirrNHOFP, op. cit. supra note 222, at 24, suspects that it was; I incline to think
it was not.
230 Even at an earlier point in the speech, 7.17, Cicero pretends to hesitation to call them
consuls, this time because of their treasonable activities - which are, of course, the reason
they ought to vanish from the tasti

231 ORwwL, op. cit. supra note 209. I have seen a painting of a congress with a head
which had once been there taken off: that man was not at the congress.
ta2MOMmSRa, R6mscnss STAATSRECHT vol. 2, pt. 2 (3rd ed., 1887) 1132: Gesche-

henes ungescehen zu machen ist eben nicht maglich; und wenn die politische Leidenschaft
dies nicht gelten Lesson will, fihrt die praktische Handhabung der Geschafte sie mit zwin-

gender Notweudigkeit darau urrck.
Ccano, PNo PlNcto 70.
2
234 Cxcmuo, PHmnPxcs 12.5.12f.
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23 5
certain misunderstandings be wiped. out from all their .memory and lives;
and he declares that the sad time When he was on hostile terms with Caesar,
though he cannot erase it from rerum natura, the realm of reality, yet he will
erase it from his animus, heart. 23 6 Doubtless he knew that one. can only approximate an enemy's retrospective degradation or annihilation, not achieve it.
His language in regard to expunction from the fasti is all the more remarkable.
I am convinced that Hellenistic-Oriental influences are responsible for
the removal of names from inscriptions and fasti. In the East this kind of
thing went on from very early times. 23 7 The book, or book-of remembrance, in
which, according to the Old Testament,: God inscribes those acceptable and
from which he blots out those unacceptable may well be conceived in analogy
to customs at earthly courts. 238 (Commentators seem to think of this book

as quite in vacuo. Moreover they fail to appreciate its full significance; to be
blotted out, for example, means no more - -they assume -athan
to be
prevented from reaching the normal span of life.)

23 9

The destruction of a

person's or group's memory is common: "I will utterly -put out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven."' 240 (A modem specimen of a
wish for the abolition of a person's memory - the wisher's own - is met in
C.P. Snow's The Light and The Dark:" 'I hate myself,' said Roy. 'I've brought
unhappiness to everyone I've known. It would have been better if I'd never
lived.- I should be wiped out so that, everyone could forget me.' ,,)241 The
Oriental inspiration of the actions following Marc Antony's death is confirmed by the fact that even the names of other members of his clan were
erased, a collective annihilation unique in Roman history but familiar in the
East.2 42 Considering that his association with an'Egyptian woman was a
major cause of'the resentment against him, it is ironical that here for the
first time at Rome (or at least pretty much the first time) the authorities
resorted to punitive steps ultimately, it looks, deriving from Egypt.: Augustus
had the excisions from the fasti restored, and indeed both he and Tiberius
made it clear that there should be no meddling with the fasti.243

Maybe

235 CICERo, EPISTULAE AD FAMILIARES 5.8.3.
236 CiCERO, DE PROVINCInS CONSULARIBUS 18.43.

..forgetting is as intricate as importan.

The relation between forgiving and
Two propositions for debate: women forgive but

don't forget; old men forget but don't forgive.
237 Examples are cited by VITTINGHOFF, Op. cit. supra'note 222, at l'f. He leaves the
question of influence open: 25. How far these Oriental excisions were designed to interfere

with the past I shall not 'here examine.
238 Exodus 32.32f., Isaiah 4.3, Malachi 3.16, Psalms 69.28, Daniel 12.1.
239 E.g., Coert Rylaardsdam, The Book of Exodus, in I THE INTERPRETER'S BIBLE 1069f.
(1952); NOTH, EXODUS 251 (trans. by Bowden, 1962).
240 Exodus 17.1.
241 Penguin edition, 243 (III The Last Attempt, 28 Self-Hatred).
242 See Mommsen, 9 HERMES 276; VITTINOHOFF op. Cit. supra note 222, at 21ff.
24 Vittinghoff, loc. cit. supra, n. 242.
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their motive was not only clemency or a conciliatory purpose or consideration
for the practical use of the fasti, but also disapprobation of irrational foreign
ideas.
21. Recognition of Freeborn Citizen Wrongfully Kept Down.-In the Republic you could free a slave, but there was no one who could make him freeborn. To be sure, already in that period, there was room for circumventing
the limitation. It happened that a person, though in truth free, was mistakenly treated as a slave, a bona fide seruiens; say, he was kidnapped and
sold. The comedies of Plautus are full of men and, above all, women in this
condition. In such a case there might be litigation, when the judge would
decide that the person was free and indeed freeborn; and let us note that
even if the person was already "manumitted" by his supposed master, he
might want a verdict recognizing his status - he was not a freedman, with
all the disabilities that that implied, he was freeborn. 24 4 So far so good. But
suppose now that it was a question of a person in reality a slave or a freedman,
yet the judge was misled or even deliberately found in favor of his freebornship. We know of collusive procedure in this field in later times; 2 ' 5 it is quite
conceivable that it took place from very early. Here, evidently, so long as the
fraud remained undetected, a person not freeborn would nevertheless achieve
that rank.
However, the analysis of the situation would be perfectly rational, with
no denial of the past: the jurists saw the facts in much the same light as they
are seen today. The late classic Ulpian remarks in this or a similar context
that "a matter judged is accepted as the truth," res iudicata pro veritate accipitur. He does not say that it is the truth; it counts as such for purposes
2 46
of the law.
The Empire brought changes, though they were extremely gradual. From
the outset, the "golden rings," symbol of knighthood, might be bestowed on
a freedman, who thereby acquired in public life the rights of a freeborn
citizen. 24 7 It is important to realize, however, that he was not on this account
looked on as literally freeborn: ut ingenuus habetur, "he is treated as freeborn," 2 48 ingenuus intellegitur, "he is considered as freeborn," that is to
244 Compare INSTITUTES 1.41; THEOPHILUS 1.4.1; CODEx 7.14.4, Diocletian and Maximian, A.D. 293.
245 See Mayer-Maly, Collusio im Zivilprozess, 71 ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIONY-STIFTIUNO
(1954) (Roman section) 264ff., Daube, Zur Palingenesie einiger Klassikertragrmente, 76
ZEITSCHRIFT

246 DIGEST

(1959)

254f.

1.5.25, 50.17.207, 1 ad legem Julian et Papiam. Compare his sober observa-

tion on a judgment concerning paternity in DIGEST 25.3.1.16, 3 pr.,. XXXIV ad edictut.
27 MOmmsEN, RdMISCHES STAATSR-CHT vol. 2, pt. 2 (3rd ed., 1887) 892ff., vol. 3, pt1, 3rd ed., 1887, 517ff., DUFF, FREEDMEN IN THE EARLY ROMAN EMPmE (1928) 86ff.,
214ff. On the whole I follow Duff, but on several points I differ from him as well as from
Momnmsen.

248 DIGEST 40.10.5, Paul IX

ad legem Juliam et Papuam.
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say, for certain purpoSe
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that is all. Actually, in private life his posi-

tion remained legally inferior: his former master retained all privileges of a
patron, and above all some hold on the inheritance. (I am disregarding
voluntary arrangements by which a patron could give up his claims.) Vivit
quasi ingentuus, moritur quasi libertus, "he lives as one freeborn, he dies as a
freedman." 25 0 Until the reign of CoMmodus 2 5 1 it is still true to say that it
was not possible to turn one not freeborn into one freeborn with such effect
2 52
that ingenuus fit, "he becomes freeborn."
Let us look at some relevant incidents. Augustus admitted only freeborn
guests to formal dinners - with the exception, Suetonius tells us, of Menas,
a Greek, who had once been a freedman admiral of Sextus Pompey's, but
had gone over to Augustus. Even he, Suetonius adds, was invited only after a
judgment that he was freeborn. 2 53 Asserere in ingenuitatem, "to assert into
freebornship," is technical of the appropriate trial,254 and it is quite wrong to
treat this term as implying an imperial grant.2 5 5 Maybe the evidence was
not scrutinized too carefully. But we must not rule out the chance 2 56 that
he was really freeborn and had been carried off and sold by gangsters or
pirates. The risk of such capture is a recurrent theme in the historians of
the early Empire; 257 and the fact that stories of this sort figure prominently
249 DIGEST 40.10.6, Ulpian I ad legem Juliam et Papiam, with reference to a rescript
by Hadrian.
250 DIGEST 38.2.3, Ulpian XI ad edictum. Mommsen thinks that this was not always so.
But his evidence is weak. He refers to PLINY, EPISTLES 8.6.4, where the senate is reported
as voting that Pallas, a freedman of Claudius, should be not only entreated but compelled
to wear "the golden rings." Mommsen argues that Pallas refused "the rings" in order to
keep Claudius as patron - ergo he would have lost him had he accepted them. The text,
however, contains no hint at this specific motivation; Pallas is depicted as of a general fake
humility - he also refused money voted to him by the senate. In fact, whereas in the end
he did accept "the rings," he never took the money (EPISTLEs
7.29.1, 8.6.1, 8ff.). Mommsen is probably influenced by TACITUS, ANNALS 12.53.3, where the senate thanks Pallas for
consenting to remain among the ministri, "servants," of Claudius. The splendid thing Pallas
does, however, is to continue in the public offices (usui publico, "for the welfare of the
State") reserved for freedmen. The matter of a patron's private rights is certainly not in
the senators' minds. Not to mention the fact that this passage is quite unconnected with
Pallas's refusal of "the rings": it contemplates a judicial recognition of freebornship he
might have gained - see infra, p. 60. Admittedly, if it were recognized that he had never
been a slave, only believed to be one, he would have no patron; but this has nothing to do
with ."the rings."
251 Or possibly the close of that of Marcus Aurelius: see infra, note 294, on DIGEST
40.11.3, Scaevola VI responsorum.
252 See in!ra, p. 68, on DIGEST 40.11.2, Marcian 1 institutionum.
SUETONIUS, AUGUSTUS 74.
254 Compare infra, p. 61, on SuEToNIuS, VESPASIAN 3; also SUETONsUs,
253

TIBERIUS 2.2,
referring to the wicked decemvir who attempted "to assert a freeborn virgin into slavery,"
virginem ingenuam in seruitutem asserere.
255 This is done by DUFF, op. cit. supra note 247, at 87.
256 As is done by MoMMsEN, op. cit. supra note 247, vol. 2, pt. 2, at 893, vol. 3, pt. 1,
at 519.
27 E.g., SUETONIUS, AUGUSTUS

32; TIBERIUS 8.
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in the fraudulent claims to freebornship retailed in the sources25 8 is additional
proof that the thing did occur - otherwise it would have been no use as a
story. In his treatise On Grammarians Suetonius has a chapter on Gnipho,
whom Cicero is said to have respected: he was born, we learn, in Gaul of free
parents, ingenuus natus, but cast out, expositus, though his foster father set
2 59
him free, a nutritore manumissus.
Dio's comment on the elevation of Menas is different: Augustus gave him
2 60
"the golden rings," thus lifting him above the condition of a freedman.
That Menas received "the rings" is not unlikely. But in confining himself to
the mention of this distinction Dio is influenced by the less rigorous notions
prevalent in his era. For Augustus, that would not have been enough; if
it had been, there would be no point in the notice that he entertained only
freeborn guests - he could simply have conferred "the rings" on anyone he
fancied. Suetonius, who on this occasion names his source, Valerius Messala
Corvinus, a contemporary of the events in question, is clearly right: the decisive factor in Menas's inclusion among the freeborn was the finding of the
judge, honest or dishonest, that he was in fact entitled to it.
Appian, though simplifying somewhat, furnishes corroboration: Augustus
26 1
"declared Menodorus (Menas) free (freeborn) from being a freedman."
This basically coincides with Suetonius: in accordance with the Emperor's
wishes it was established that Menas was freeborn. White's rendering, Augustus
"made" him freeborn, may be good English but is not exact.2 62 To "make"
a freedman freeborn was not - not yet - feasible. The Greek is apephenen,
"declared," in the sense of "had him declared," or "found," freeborn.
Nero had a hand in two dubious promotions to freebornship. A favorite
actor of his, who had been a slave of his aunt Domitia and had bought his
freedom from her, with the help of the Emperor's influence succeeded in
recovering the money - on the ground that he had been a bona fide serviens,
a free person erroneously kept as a slave. 2 6 3 Whether, as is generally assumed, 264 there were two trials, the first to get his status recognized and the
second to recover the money, or whether, as is also thinkable, there was only
one, about the money, which implicitly settled the question of status as well,
25S See Mayer-Maly, op. cit. supra note 245.
259 SUETONIUS, DE GRAMNATICIS 7. This may

again be invention; even as such it would
indicate the range of what might occur.
260 DIo 48.45.7ff.
261. BELLA CIVILIA 5.80. Appian, like Suetonius, used the work of Valerius Messala
Corvinus:

see

HANSLIK,

PAULYS

REALENCYCLOPXDIE

DER

CLASSISCHEN

ALTERTUMS-

WISSENSCHAFT Vo. VIIA '(1955), 156.
262 APPIAN'S ROMAN HISTORY 513 (Loeb. Classical Library, vol. 4 [1961]).
268 TACITUS, ANNALS 13.19, 27; DIGEST 12.4.3.5, Ulpian XXVI ad edictum.
264 ANNALS 13.27 favors this alternative. See, e.g., Boy6, Pro Petronia Justa, MILANGES
LivY-BRUHL 32 (1959).
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is immaterial here. In either case it was the verdict of a court which, with
whatever degree of partiality, established his free birth. A conferment of
"the rings" would not have served. It did not make a freedman freeborn;
it left the former master's position intact, and Domitia could have kept her
money.
Then there was Acte, whom Nero for a time thought of marrying, in
full matrimonium iustum. According to Suetonius she was just an Asian
freedwoman, but Nero bribed high dignitaries to swear that she was regio
genere orta, "offspring of a royal house."' 2 65 That is to say, she or, say, her
mother had been abducted and illegally reduced to a servile condition. This
account, then, with the oath of witnesses purchased, clearly makes Nero
procure a judicial pronouncement concerning her status. Claudius's freedman
Pallas, in the view of the flattering senate, could also have obtained a judgment establishing his free birth: he too was (gave himself out as) of old
royal descent. Only he was so selfless as to prefer to remain an imperial
2 66
freedman and perform the functions appropriate to this rank.
Dio says that esechthe into the house of AttalUs. 2 67 This is capable of
various interpretations. It may mean that "she was assigned" to that royal
house, in the sense in which Suetonius represents Nero as foisting her on it,
by means of a fraudulent trial. Some authorities, however, translate "she
was adopted." '2 68 That would have been a different method, not a judgment
confirming her noble provenance, but a covering up of her servile birth by
incorporating her in a great family. It is possible that Nero considered or
even resorted to both devices, adoption as well as a trial concerning her
status. 2 6 9 At all events, neither Suetonius nor Dio is speaking of a grant of
freebornship.
Of Vespasian's wife Suetonius tells us 2 70 that, prior to her marriage, she
was found freeborn and a Roman citizen by a court. As for her citizenship,
she was a native of Ferentum, hence a Latin by birth. Her father, however,
265

SUETONius,

266 TACITUS,
267

NERo 28.1.
12.53.3; see supra, note 250.

ANNALS

DIo 61.7.1.

268 E.g., CARY, Dio's ROMAN HISTORY 41 (Loeb Classical Library, vol. 8 [1961]).

29 Far be it from me to enter into the problems arising if we think of adoption. The
first question is whether there was a suitable Attalid around to adopt -her; Ronald Syme
assures me that there was. But then, as it was presumably a case of arrogation, could a
woman be arrogated? 'Could a freedman (freedwoman) be arrogated with all the legal
effects Nero desired? I shall not say a word - except this, that the violent statement of
Sabinus transmitted by GELLIUS 5.19.12 may have been directed against precisely this
scheme of Nero's: "But this is neither permitted nor ever to be permitted, that persons
of the condition of freedmen should invade the rights of the freeborn." If this is an antiNeronian utterance, it was hardly made under Nero. We know that Sabinus lived to comment on the senatusconsult Neronianum of 64 B.C. Nero died in 68. Sabinus could still
have lived.
270
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was elected to some municipal office, which apparently in the court's view
entitled him and his descendents to Roman citizenship. 2 7 ' To be sure, from
Suetonius's language it may be gathered that the particular office he occupied
was not normally sufficient to ground Roman citizenship. A municipal
quaestor would be high enough, 2 72 but her father, Suetonius says, "was nothing more than a quaestor's clerk." Whether the court let it go at that or
whether it assumed (rightly or wrongly) that he had risen higher it is impossible to decide.
Now we come to the part of the verdict recognizing her as freeborn.
Why had this fact to be confirmed? Maybe the form of a trial to establish
citizenship routinewise included the question of ingenuitas; or maybe Vespasian
wished it confirmed from general caution. But I could also think of a more
specific reason. The lady had been another man's delicata. Such a position
was often held by a slave or freedwoman. It may, therefore, have been advisable to prevent any untoward suspicions. It is noteworthy that it was her
father who performed the requisite asserere, "asserting," in the trial: 27 3 that
would show that there was nothing to hide. The relevant deduction is that
the story contains no vestige of a grant of freebornship: a person actually
27 4
freeborn has the fact established by a judgment.
27 5
A letter of the younger Pliny to Trajan has been seriously misconstrued.
Pliny was administering Bithynia as Trajan's legate, through ordinarily this
province would have been under a proconsul; and in view of a certain senatusconsult he was doubtful whether, not being a proconsul, he had the right to
sit de agnoscendis liberis restituendisque natalibus, "in cases concerning children to be acknowledged and birth to be restored." This means litigation
about paternity and freebornship - litigation, that is, as to whether or not,
in certain circumstances, a man has to acknowledge a child as his, 2 7 6 or as
to whether or not a man, hitherto considered a slave or a freedman, may have
his free birth established. Literally, it is "birth" without "free," or even more
literally, "native conditions": natales. The point is that only free birth is
birth, a slave has no birth, no native conditions -a
bit as, in English,
271 See, e.g., G~Aus 1.96.
272 E.g., STRA.Bo 4.1.12.186f.
273 See supra, p. 58.
274 Very misleading, therefore, is the account of Stein, Flavia Domitilla, PAULyS REALENCYCLOPXDIE vol. 6 (1909) 2731, who writes that Roman citizenship was zuerkannt, "aa-

signed," to her after her trial. Not to mention his description of the trial as a Freiheitsprozess, as if it had been a question of her freedom. SCHMIDLIN, DAS REKUPERATORENVERFAHREN 90f. (1963), like Stein, expresses himself as if the procedure had been one
by which she became a citizen (Biirgerrechtsverleihung,sie sollte r~mische Vollbirgerin
werden). At least, however, he clearly represents her as of free Latin birth. Fortunately,
the error has no bearing on the main propositions of his book.
275 PUNY, EPISTLES 10.72; Trajan's reply in 10.73.
276 See title 25.3 of the DIGEST.
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only a gentleman has a gens, a family.27 7 The addition of mei, tui, sui to natales, incidentally, is not uncommon: 2 78 it is a question of the birth, the
2 79
native conditions, of the individual concerned, "my," ''your," "his" birth.

The current interpretation is that Pliny is thinking of a grant of freebornship to persons of servile birth.28 0 This is an anachronism; as already indicated, it was not before Commodus, some seventy-five years after Trajan,
that a man of servile birth might be directly, openly turned into one of free
birth. And it was in consequence of this innovation that natales suos restituere,
"to restore an individual's free birth," came to denote "to confer free birth
on one not freeborn." I shall of course say more about this.
That Pliny has in mind, not a grant of freebornship, but a judicial pronouncement on a man's status at birth is obvious. First, there is the pairing
off of this procedure with that concerning paternity - surely not a grant of
paternity (in most cases the man does not want to be the father) but a lawsuit to end in a finding.2 8 l In fact there is a definite link between the two
procedures: the result of that concerning paternity is likely to bear on a later
one concerning status. Secondly, Pliny asks whether he might cognoscere,
in these matters: "find," not "make grants." 28 2 Thirdly, when, considerably
later, the grant of freebornship to persons of servile birth became customary,
it always remained the prerogative of the Emperor; it was never within a
proconsul's competence. Yet Pliny reports to Trajan that people press him
to deal with these cases secundum exempla proconsulum, "according to the
practice of proconsuls."
The picture resulting from the interpretation here combated is indeed
astonishing - proconsuls regularly receiving requests from slaves or freedmen
to endow them with freebornship and making or declining the grant. One
asks oneself what makes modern commentators thus fasten on the secondary
sense of natales suos restituere. I suppose one factor is that the original, literal

sense in which Pliny still employs the expression is not mentioned by
Mommsen. 2 83 The initial error has produced some major consequential ones;
277 MARTIAL 10.27.4 tells the freedman Diodorus that, notwithstanding his sumptuous
birthday celebration, nemo tamen natum te putat, "nobody believes you born"; see DUFF,
op. cit. supra note 247, at 68 and 86f.
278 E.g., de natalibus suis restituendis in Trajan's reply, PLIY 10.73, natales tui in
CODEX 4.19.10, Diocletian and Maximian, A.D. 293.
279 See, however, infra, p. 69, on DIGEST 40.11.2, Marcian I institutionum.
280 E.g., MELMOTH, PLINY, LETTERS 372 (Loeb Classical Library, vol. 2, [1963]).
281 The term agnoscere, incidentally, "to acknowledge," conspicuous in connection with
paternity, is also applied to the "acknowledgment" of an apparent freedman's true, free
origin: DIGEST 40.14.3 pr., Pomponius V senatus consultorum (for the understanding of
which passage it is useful to consult CODEX 7.14.1. Alexander, between A.D. 222 and 235).
282 The term recurs in Trajan's reply, 10.73.
283 MOMMSEN, R6miscHEs STAATSREcHT vol. 2, pt. 2, 894 (3rd ed., 1887). In fact he
does not quote the letter at all - nor does Duff. For another factor making for confusion,
see in/ra, p. 72.
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as when Hardy explains that "the phrase was based on the theory that the
original condition of men was one of freedom."' 2 84 This is to turn things upside down. At its inception, the phrase was quite pedestrian, referring to the
trial by which a freeborn man whose status was denied him regained - or
more precisely, had reconfirmed - what was his by virtue of his origin. From
Commodus, it signified more and more, though even then never exclusively, 28 5
the Emperor's grant of freebornship to a man not freeborn. It was this usage
which, we shall see, at the end of the classical era, was brought into relation
with, supported by, the doctrine of universal freedom in the golden age. To
place the doctrine at the beginning is to credit the rulers of the first and
second centuries A.D. with a magnanimous visionary policy of which they
2 86
were plainly innocent.
22. Creation of a Freeborn Citizen by the Emperor. - Under Marcus
Aurelius there was a crisis. Difficulties of proof in trials about freebornship
were felt to be so awkward that the Emperor ordered registration of freeborn
children in both Rome and the provinces.28 7 In the meantime, no doubt,
benevolent as he was, he often as a judge pronounced in favor of free birth
where the evidence was less than conclusive. It is from the reign of his
successor Commodus onwards 288 that we come across in the texts a grant of
28 9
freebomship by the Emperor to persons avowedly born in slavery.
The term natales suos restituere henceforth signifies two things. On the
one hand, it continues in its original meaning, "to restore a person's free birth,
free native conditions," on the other, it now can mean "to confer free birth,
free native conditions, on a person of servile birth." If the latter meaning is
the more frequent in our sources, that may be simply because it raises more
problems, is of greater interest to legal writers, not necessarily because it
predominated in actual life. At any rate, the former sense is met, and indeed,
the lawyers are fully alive to the difference between the two functions. Naturally, once there was the grant in addition to the judicial finding, the latter,
whenever proceeding from the Emperor, must assume some of the former's
coloring. Even so, Ulpian transmits the decision that if a person is "restored
to his free birth" by the Emperor on the strength of a false affirmation of free
Quoted by MELMOTH, op. cit. supra note 280, at 372.
285 See, e.g., infra, 63f., on DIGEST 40.11.1, Ulpian Il responsorum.
288 Leist, Dos r~mische Patronatsrecht,pt. 2, in GLUCK, AUSFUHRLICHE ERLKUTERUNO
DER PANDECTEN, Serie der Bilcher 37/8 pt. 5 (1879) 311f., comes nearer the correct evolution of the meanings of the phrase.
287 Julius Capitolinus, Marcus Antoninus (HisroRiA AUGUSTA) 9.7ff.
284

288

Conceivably from the end of that of Marcus Aurelius himself: see infra note 294.

289 How this innovation is connected with the change in the "right of the golden rings,"

which (if MOMMSEN is right, op. cit. supra note 283, at 893f.) from Commodus no longer
implied a knighthood, I shall not here investigate; see, however, infra, p. 71, note 315.
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birth, the act is vitiated. 2 90 This is plainly a "restoring" in the sense of
judicial or quasi-judicial establishment of the status to which, if he is telling

the truth, the man is entitled.2 9 1 By contrast, the new natales suos restituere
by way of a grant is designed precisely for a man whose servile birth is admitted.

2 92

How was this grant construed? How was this correction of a man's origin
by means of imperial privilege viewed? Inevitably a large element of fiction,
of "as if," of conscious treatment of x as y, always remained. But in quite a
few texts we can discern also something of an assumption that, supernaturally,
the man was indeed changed. In some cases of legal personality, however
different the historical background, we might come across parallels, but I

shall not enlarge on them. One ought to remember, however, the enormous
claims of certain Emperors, Commodus among them, who thought of Rome
29 3

as his foundation, colonia Commodiana.

The earliest comment we have is from Scaevola.2 9 4 He is relatively cautious. Consulted as to whether a man whom the Emperor "has restored to
his free birth" enjoys ingenuitatisius, "the right of freebornship," he lays down
290 DIGEST 40.11.1, Ulpian 11 responsorum. Instead of "to restore an individual's free
birth," natales suos rastituere, it is not unusual to say "to restore an individual to his
free birth," natalibus suis restituere; e.g., DIGEST 40.11.3, Scaevola VI responsorum, with
reference to a grant of freebornship. The passive designation "restored to free birth" recurs
in CODEX 6.8.2, Diocletian and Maximian, A.D. 294, also concerned with a grant. The
nominal phrase natalium restitutio, "restoration of free birth," does not seem to be in use
before Justinian: see infra, p. 72.
291 In CODE.X TEOPOSIANUS 15.14.4, Constantine, A.D. 326, the senate is to judge about
the reinstatement of such as contend that they were arbitrarily degraded by Constantine's
rival Licinius and wish natalibus suis restitui, "to be restored to their native conditions." In
CODEX THEoomsANus

5.8.1, Constantine, A.D. 314, natalibus suis restituere signifies the

factual, extrajudicial restoring of a person to his position of a freeborn citizen of which he
was wrongfully deprived under Constantine's rival Maxentius.
292

Natales redere, "to return free birth," is synonymous

with natales restituere. The

passive designation natalibus redditus, "returned to free birth," implies a grant of freebornship in DIGEST 39.2.3.1, Ulpian XII ad edictum. In a much later text, CODEX 8.50.13,
Diocletian and Maximian, A.D. 294, natales pristinos reddere, "to return the pristine free
birth," means the recognition of a true free birth. So does ingenuitati suae reddere, "to
return somebody to his freebornship," in CODEX 7.14.4, Diocletian and Maximian, A.D.
293. In the Interpretatio ad CoDEx THEODOSIANus 5.8.1 '(see the preceding footnote) ing.enuitati reddere signifies the extrajudicial handing back of a man to his freeborn position.
In Novella Majoriani 7.5, A.D. 458, natalibus suis reddere signifies the extrajudicial handing
back of a decurion's (municipal councillor's) daughter to the oppressive native dignity.
ms Aelius Lampridius, Commodus Antonius '(HISTOUA AuGUSTA) 8.6ff., DIo 72.15.2;
compare Pharaoh's boast "Mine is the Nile and I have made it," Ezechiel 29.3,9.
294 DIGEST 40.11.3, VI responsorum. If Scaevola was no longer alive or active under
Commodus, this opinion must go back to the previous reign; I prefer a date under Coinmodus, but there is no evidence. Respondit: quaeris an ingenuitatis iure utatur is quem
sanctissimus et nobilissimus imperator natalibus suis restituit. sed ea res nec dubitationem
habet nec umquam habuit, quin exploratum sit ad omnem ingenuitatis statum restitui eum
qui isto beneficio principis utatur. "He replied: You ask whether he whom the most sacred
and noble Emperor has restored to his native conditions enjoys the right of freebornship.
But this point neither suffers nor has ever suffered any doubt, that it is established that he
who enjoys that imperial privilege is restored to the complete status of freebornship."
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that the recipient of this beneficium, "privilege," ad omnem ingenuitatisstatum
restitui eum, "is indeed restored to the complete status of freebomship." The
consultation itself shows that natales restituere by way of a privilege, beneficium, is a novelty at this moment, with effects not yet universally familiar.
Scaevola's construction is just within the boundaries of the rational: "the complete status of freebornship" need imply no more than treatment by the law
of a person not freeborn as one freeborn, full concession to an outsider of the
legal position normally reserved for a group. Where Scaevola exaggerates is
in maintaining that the extent of the grantee's rights is so obvious that the
questioner need not have asked at all: "But 2 9 5 this point neither suffers nor
has ever suffered any doubt, that it is established that he is restored to the
complete status of freebomship." Such overemphasis is common precisely where
serious doubts did or do exist but cannot be admitted; that is to say, it is not
enough to refute them or declare them groundless, their very existence must
be denied. Gais uses the same method when he asserts: "nor has it ever
2
been doubted that a decree of the Emperor has the force of a statute." "
In Stalin's last years, it was not doubted, nor had there ever been any doubt,
that he was the man by whom Lenin wanted to be succeeded. The Preamble to
the Constitution of Ghana, 1960, says: "We the People of Ghana... in exercise of our undoubted right to appoint for ourselves the means whereby we
shall be governed ..
Schulz declares 40.11.3 "a text assuredly postclassical both in form and
substance": it does not show Scaevola's usual division into facts, question and
reply, it is theoretical instead of dealing with a specific practical case, and
question and reply are both unintelligible. 2 9 7 I admit that the original is
shortened, probably in. order to achieve what Schulz calls "theory," generalization. With this reservation, the responsum fits the state of law in Scaevola's
later years better than any other period. As for unintelligibility, I hope I have
removed that.
According to Ulpian, a freedman who receives "the golden rings" still
owes reverence to his patron though he may occupy omnia ingenuitatis munia,
"all public offices of freebomship"; but if he is "restored to free birth, free
native conditions," the duty is gone since princeps ingenuum facit, "the

This 'sbut" itself characterizes the question as unnecessary.
GAIus 1.5: nec umquam dubitatum est quin id (constitutio principis) legis vicem
optineat. I wish HONORf were right in suggesting (op. cit. supra note 41, at 118ff.) that
Gaius is here ironical.
297 Schulz, Cberlieferungsgeschichte der Responsa des Ceruidius Scaevola, in SymBOLAE
FRIBURoENSES IN HONOREM OTTONIs LENEL 159f., 169 (1933).
Levy seems to concur:
295
296

Libertas und Civitas, 78 ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIrNY-STIFTUNG

170.

(1961)

(Roman section),
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Emperor makes a freeborn man." 298 That this opinion has regard, not to

the judicial recognition of a true ingenuus, but to the privilege discussed by
Scaevola, the grant of ingenuitas to one not in truth freeborn, is certain: the
whole problem can arise only in the latter case. (The same consideration applies to the further texts I am going to inspect.) Ulpian, however, goes beyond
Scaevola's "complete status of freebomship": the beneficiary now becomes
freeborn.
A freak formulation? The further development shows that it is not that.
Towards the end of the third century A.D. the Emperors Diocletian and
Maximian distinguish: whereas "the golden rings" confer on the grantees
libertinitatis quoad vivunt imaginem, non statum ingenuitatis, "while they
live, the appearance of freedmanship, not the status of freebornship" (i.e.,
when they die their patrons have claims to the estate),299 natalibus antiquis

restituti liberti ingenui constituuntur, "those freedmen who are restored to
past free birth are created freeborn citizens." 3 0 0 The "status of freebormship"
here means that the person has been made freeborn.
A much-favored emendation of a statement by Modestinus now turns out
to be unwarranted. Modestinus, a pupil of Ulpian's, writes as follows: "A
freedman who is restored to free birth is considered as if, being made freeborn,
he had not in the meantime suffered the blemish of slavery." 3 01 He accepts
the notion that the person is made freeborn, and he concludes that the degrading life in slavery is regarded as not having occurred. Fullest consistency
would perhaps have required the denial of any medium tempus, "meantime,"
between birth and now. In strictness, that is, since the person is made freeborn, there is no "as if" at all, the blemish should not only be regarded as
not having been, it just has not been. I have already remarked, however, that
298 DiGEST 2.4.10.3, Ulpian V ad edictum (compare 6.4.3, Justinian, A.D. 529). Sed si
ius anulorum accepit, Puto eum reverentiam patrono exhibere debere quamvis omnia ingenuitatis munia habet. Aliud si natalibus sit restitutus: nam princeps ingenuum facit.
"But if he receives the right of the rings, I believe he must display reverence to his patron
though he has all the offices of freebornship. It is different if he is restored to free birth,
for the Emperor makes a freeborn citizen."
299 Compare DxGEST 38.2.3, Ulpian XLI ad edietum, quoted supra, p. 58: "He lives as
one freeborn, he dies as a freedman."
00 Conax 6.8.2, A.D. 294. Aureorum usus anulorum beneficio principali tributus liberti-

nitatis quoad vivunt imaginem non statur ingenuitatis praestat, natalibus autem antiquis
restituti liberti ingenui nostro beneficio constituuntur. "The enjoyment of the golden rings
assigned by imperial privilege confers while they (the beneficiaries) live the appearance of
freedmanship, not the status of freebornship; those freedmen, however, who are restored to
past free birth are created freeborn citizens by our privilege." There is much to be said
for the emendation by Cujas of libertinitatis into libertinis: "the enjoyment of the golden
rings confers on freedmen while they live the appearance, not the status, of freebornship."
This would conform to FRAGMENTA VATICANA 266, Papinian XI questionum, and CODEX
9.21.1 pr., Diocletian and Maximian, A.D. 300, with reference to the lex Visellia. My thesis
is not affected.
301 DiGEST 40.11.5.1, VII regularum. Libertinus qui natalibus restitutus est perinde habetur atque si ingenuus factus medio tempore maculam servitutis non sustinuisset.

DAVID DAUBE
in a construction like that before us, which refashions the past, traces of
fiction inevitably remain. For Modestinus, the man is made freebornno fiction here; though, with a slight degree of incongruity, he does represent
as a fiction the absence from the man's life of any blemish of slavery.
Haloander, the great sixteenth-century editor of the Corpus Juris, did
not appreciate the force of "being made freeborn"; no doubt he also boggled
at the lack of logic, the vagueness of medium tempus. His emendation of
ingenuus factus into ingenuus natus is recommended by modern editors,
Kriegel and Mommsen. We ought to read, then: "A freedman who is restored to free birth is considered as if, being born free, he had not in the
meantime suffered the blemish of slavery." One reason modern authorities
like the emendation is presumably that they find it easier, on this basis, to
make Modestinus adhere to the fictitious character of the free birth: the
grantee (they interpret) "is considered as if he were born free and had not in

the meantime suffered the blemish of slavery." 3 0 2 But rational as this is,
it is not what Modestinus says nor what, considering the other texts, we should
3 03
impute to him.
In the Eastern half of the Empire, it seems, the consequence was drawn
that even a child born to a grantee prior to the grant retrospectively gained the
higher status. A constitution by Diocletian and Maximian rejects this view. 30 4
A highly significant piece of evidence from outside the juristic discussion
802 Haloander's idea seems to have been somewhat different. He certainly kept out the
supernatural creation of a freeborn man, but he did so by a more complicated route, namely,
by assuming that the text concerns a person in truth freeborn, in truth ingenuus natus. (This
was a widespread understanding - misunderstanding - of the text, still shared by Leist,
op. cit. supra note 286, at 311, and, who knows, perhaps leading a shadowy life even
today.) More precisely, the freedman in question had really been born free, had then fallen
into real slavery (say, he was a foreign prisoner of war at Rome or a Roman criminal condemned into the mines), had then been manumitted by his master (not "manumitted" from
a supposed slavery but really manumitted) and was now receiving the privilege of free
birth. This man "is considered as if, being (in fact) born free, he had not in the meantime
(when subsequently enslaved) suffered the blemish of slavery." The grant thus does not
make a man not freeborn into one freeborn, it simply produces the fiction that a freeborn
man continued free throughout his life. It must be conceded that this interpretation relieves
the medium ternpus of all difficulty. But there are decisive objections; the grant of natales
restituere nowhere else has regard to a person really freeborn. It is incredible that, if this
text were an exception, we should be left to read the whole, immense story into it. I would
also point out that, if a grant of natales restituere to persons really freeborn and then
enslaved had been known, it would have had to be quoted in CODEX 5.4.23.1, Justinian
A.D. 520-523, as the closest approximation to the measure proposed in this law; but we
find only the usual grant to those of servile provenance. See infra, pp. 75ff.
303 On the fiction "as if he were born free" in DIoEsT 40.11.2, Marcian I institutionum,
and CODEX 5.4.23.1, just adverted to (see the preceding footnote), I shall say something
presently.
804 CODEx 6.55.6, A.D. 294: the probability of an Eastern addressee emerges from
Mommsen, Zeitfolge der Verordnungen Diocletians und seiner Mitregenten, Abhandlungen
.der Kgl. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, (1860) 419ff. [GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTE'N,
vol. 2 (Juristische Schriften), 1905, 265ff.]. Ex libera conceptus et servo velut spurius
habetur nec ut decurionis filius, quamvis pater eius naturalis manumissus et natalibus suis
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is here to be adduced: the tomb inscriptions of freedmen elevated to freebornship. As pointed out by Mommsen,3 0 5 these inscriptions suppress the deceased's quality as a freedman. More than that. In the enumeration of the
successive public offices held by the deceased they suppress those indicative
of that quality, those normally bestowed on freedmen. This history writing
1 la 1984 seems to have been resorted to even in the case of freedmen who
merely received "the golden rings" (though, as Mommsen notes, there is no
concealment of the servile origin of the tutor of the Emperor Verus). Anyhow, there is here striking confinnation that those references by lawyers to
what is not far from a supernatural creation of a citizen of free birth must
be taken seriously. On the inscriptions in question, the "meantime," the
life of blemish, has simply never been.
23.
Creation of a Freeborn Citizen and the Natural Law of the Beginning. - Towards the end of the classical era, the development led to a
brilliant theory, sponsored by Marcian, a slightly older contemporary of

Modestinus. It aims at rationalization yet introduces a miraculous note of
its own. "At times," he explains, "even persons bom as slaves are made freeborn ex post facto through intervention of the law, as when a freedman has
been restored to his native conditions by the Emperor. For he is restored to
those native conditions in which at the beginning all men were, not to those
in which he himself is born, since he was born a slave. For such a one is

treated with regard to the entire law as if he had been born free, and his patron
can lay no claim to his estate. Therefore in general the Emperors do not
'a0
readily restore anyone to native conditions without his patron's consent.'
Marcian starts by adopting the by then prevalent concept: the grant makes
the freedman freeborn, his freebornship is ex post facto effected by the law.
But then he goes on to give the matter a new twist. It is not the grantee's
own native conditions which are restored to him, but the native conditions
of the golden age, before slavery had made its appearance.
This doctrine has considerable advantages. We have seen that, linguistically, the term natales restituere, "to restore native conditions, birth, free
birth," goes back to the trial by which a man in truth freeborn but somehow
restitutus hunc fuit adeptus honorem, defendi potest. "A child conceived by a free woman
with a slave is treated as spurious and it cannot be pleaded that he is a decurion's son, even
though his natural. father, manumitted and restored to his native conditions, has attained
this honor."
0 MOMMSEN, R6MISCHES STAATSRECHT vol. 3, pt. 1, 518f.
306 DIGEST 40.11.2, I institutionum. Interdum et servi nati ex post facto iuris interventu
ingevui fiunt, ut ecce si libertinus a principe natalibus suis restitutus fuerit. illis enim
utique natalibus restituitur in quibus initio omnes homines fuerunt, non in quibus ipse
nascitur cum servus natus esset. hic enim quantum ad totum ius pertinet perinde habetur
atque si ingenuus natus esset, nec Patronus eius potest ad successionem venire. ideoque
imperatores non facile solent quemquam natalibus restituere nisi consentiente patrono.
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kept out of his rights recovers them. In the latter half of the second century
A.D. there was introduced the bestowal of freebornship on persons admittedly
not in truth freebom. The term "to restore native conditions" was extended
to this case, which, manifestly, it does not fit. There is here no restoration;
there is creation, a grant. Marcian's theory does away with this awkwardness.
According to him, there is indeed restoration - namely, of the ideal, primeval
state of things, the position the person would have held but for the degeneration of mankind. Where he or other exponents of this doctrine still speak
of a restoring of natales sui, "his native conditions, his free birth," instead of
simply natales, "native conditions, free birth," we should paraphrase not "his
individual free birth," but "the free birth ideally his as a member of the
'30 7
pure human race."
A further, substantive merit of the doctrine is that it removes the need
to deny the facts. The servile birth of the individual concerned can be conceded, and Marcian stresses the point: "since he was born a slave." It can
be conceded seeing that what is granted is not a free birth of his own but the
abstract free birth which once belonged to all men. He is freeborn in the
sense of being elevated above the unnatural division of mankind. As for his
servile origin in this divided society, that, in consequence of his elevation,
ceases to count. But, as just remarked, it is not suppressed. Marcian at this
point definitely assumes a fiction: the person, he says, "is treated as if he were
born free."
While these are advances in the direction of a rational definition, the
supernatural element is far from eliminated. This privileged placing of the
beneficiary into the order of an uncorrupted world is also a conquest of time,
though perhaps less crude than endowment with a new, personal free birth.
He is still, as already observed, actually turned into a freeborn citizen: "persons born as slaves are made freeborn." Only he is made freeborn not so as
to be born free in this life, but so as to participate in the universal free nativity
of the golden age. As for this life, the law, in pursuance of his restitution
to the pristine, ideal world, feigns him to be of free birth. That restitution
is real; the Emperor even in this doctrine has power ex post facto to elevate
the man's past.
The original, free state of all under natural law is repeatedly affirmed
by the later classics. 3 08 A passage in Justinian's Institutes is reminiscent of
Marcian's wording: "For by natural law, at the beginning, all men were
307 Cf. supra, p. 62.
308 DIGEST 1.1.4, Ulpian I institutionum, 1.5.4.1, FlorentinusIX

institutionum, 12.6.64,
Tryphoninus VII disputationum, 50.17.32, Ulpian XLIII ad Sabinum; see Levy, op. cit.
supra note 33, at 12ff.
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born free." 3 0 9 According to Voigt and Kalb 310 it is indeed taken from
3 11
I inMarcian, while Ferrini doubtfully suggests Florentinus as its source.
cline to the former alternative: Marcian was an institutional writer whose new

3 12
ideas greatly appealed to Justinian.
There is, however, a possibility which, remote though it is, should not be
passed over - that the linking of the grant with the golden age transmitted
under the name of Marcian is an interpolation, maybe by the compilers
themselves. Albertario and Beseler thought so.3 13 I believe it most unlikely.
Still, the theory propounded by the fragment would lose none of its interest.

24. Creation of a FreebornCitizen and Legitimation by Rescript. - What
is certain is that Justinian was greatly attracted by this theory. In A.D. 538
he introduced a fresh mode of legitimation, to wit, by imperial rescript;
and he expressly represented this innovation as modelled on the creation of a
freeborn citizen: "For just as there is a mode invented by those before us
which leads freedmen to freebornship, first cleansing them by another act
and giving them the right of the golden rings, then restoring them to nature
itself which at the beginning did not distinguish slave and free but made the
'3 14
offspring of man free, so we too intend the same for the matter in hand.
He goes on to say that originally there was no division into legitimate and
bastard children; there were only legitimate ones. Wars produced slavery;
excessive desire, bastardy. The passions involved in both are the same; hence
the remedy should be the same: what his predecessors thought out to deal
with slavery, a grant from the Emperor, he is now extending to bastardy.
That the grant of freebornship is here conceived in supernatural terms
is evident, if only from the reference to purification. According to Justinian,
prior to the grant, the candidate is cleansed by means of the "golden rings,"
INSTITUTES 1.2.2, jure enim naturali ab initio omnes homines liberi nascebantur.
310 VoIGT, DiE LEHRE VOM JUS NATURALE, VOL. 1 (1856) 332, 566ff.; Kalb quoted by
309

Ferrini: see the following footnote.
311 FERRNI, 2 OPERE 331f. [13 BULLETTINO 123f.]
812 Buckland, Marcian, STUD! RiCCOBONO, vol. 1, 1936, 277ff. This is not to maintain
that the whole of INSTITUTEs 1.2.2 rests on Marcian.
313 Albertario, Concetto Classico e Definizioni Postclassiche del lus Naturale, STUD!, vol.
5 (1937) 288 [equals 57 RENDICONTI DEL REALE ISTITUTO LOMBARDO DI SCIENZE E LET178]; Beseler, Unklassische Wtrter, 56 ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIGNY-STIFTUNG
TERE (1924)
(1936) Rom. Abt., 66. The offending word which the latter is presenting in this section of
his article is ecce. He reconstructs the text as follows: [-] si libertinus a principe natalibus
perinde habetur atque si ingenuus natus esset nec patronus
suis restitutus luerit [-],
"If a free man has
bonorumve eius possessionem accipere> potest [-.
eius <heres lieri
been restored to his conditions by the Emperor, he is treated as if he had been born free,
and his patron cannot become his heir or take his goods by way of bonorum possessio."
314 NOVELLA 74.1: hosper gar este tis tois pro hemon exeuremenos tropos hos tous
apeleutherous eiseugeneian agei, prokathairon men autous heterai tini praxei kai didous
autois to ton chryson daktylion dikaion, hysteron de eis auten epanagon ten physin ten
doulon te kai eleutheron ex arches me diakrinasan all' eleutheron ten anthropou poiesamenen gonen, houto de kai hemeis touton de ton tropon epinooumen toi pragmati.

DAVID DAUBE
cleansed, that is, from the blemish of his servile origin. Justinian speaks of
this procedure as coming down to him from his predecessors, and we have
no reason to doubt his word on this poinL3 5 The grant reestablishes man's
natural birthright, and that is also the object of the new grant of legitimation.
The idiom of the model grant of freebornship is transferred to the grant of
legitimation, the latter like the former being a natales restituere: the father
of bastards, Justinian ordains, shall be allowed to invoke the Emperor and
3 16
thus "to restore his children to nature."
A year later, in a consolidating statute regarding bastards, the tenet of
the primeval, universal freedom and legitimacy appears twice, first towards
the beginnng, in a somewhat general survey,3 17 then again in the chapter setting forth the method of legitimation by rescript. Here Justinian almost word
for word repeats the explanation given on the earlier occasion-that this method is analogous to the grant of freebornship; that once, under the exclusive
reign of natural law, all men were born free and legitimate, slavery and
bastardy being the result of war and concupiscence; and that the same passions call for the same remedy, his predecessors having found it for slavery and
he applying it to bastardy.3 1 8 What does not recur is the reference to purification by means of "the golden rings" preceding the grant of freebornship. No
wonder seeing that this preliminary measure has no correspondence in the
legitimation by imperial rescript introduced by Justinian.
Also in 539, Justinian decisively enlarged the circle of those obtaining
freebornship. He enacted that henceforth, on manumission, a slave would
automatically have "the right of the golden rings and of restoration to free
birth," no special grant being needed. 3 19 To be sure, he safeguarded to some
extent the patron's position: in particular, reverence and gratitude were still
to be shown him. Essentially, though, any freedman was now freeborn, a
further approximation to the ideal state of the world. In the Preface to the
statute Justinian proclaims that, as all goods given him by God are perfect,
315 It may be as early as Commodus. As mentioned supra note 289, from Commodus onwards the "golden rings" no longer implied a knighthood (Mommsen). This puzzling
development might be explicable by the fact that a main function of this privilege was now
to be the preliminary step to natales restituere. The double procedure is presupposed in
Novella 18.11, of A.D. 536, where a man who has children from a slave woman manumits
mother and children and then petitions on their behalf "both the right of the golden rings
and restoration of native conditions." The law uses palingenesia for "restoration of free
birth": see infra, pp. 72f.
316 NOVELLA 74.7, 2 pr. The fullest version is in 2 pr.: tous nothous autou paidas apokatastasai tei physei kai tei anothen eugeneiai te kai gnesioteti, "to restore his bastard children
to nature and to pristine ingenuitas and legitimacy." Eugeneia, ingenuitas, here signifies, not
freebornship, but as, e.g., in CODEX 11.68.4, Valentinian, Valens and Gratian, A.D. 367 (?),
the status of a free Roman in a family governed by the civil law.
3" NOVELLA 89.1 pr.
518 NOVELLA 89.9 pr.
319 NOVELLA 78.

NATURAL LAW FORUM
so he holds that the freedom given to a slave should be made pure, incorrupt,
and perfect. Already ten years before, in 529, he had decreed that if a patron
renounced his hold over a freedman, the latter was to be more or less in the
'320
position of one having obtained "restoration of free birth."
Two terminological features underline Justinian's particular interest in
the conferment of freebornship. First, it is he who, to the traditional natales
restituere, "to restore free birth," adds the nominal phrase natalium restitutio,
"restoration of free birth"; it is found in the statute of 529 about a patron's
renunciation of his privileges. 3 21 This coinage reflects increased systematic
thinking about the institution, also a feeling of respect for it. Modem writers
without exception use the nominal phrase even when concerned with earlier
centuries. I have little doubt that this antedating of the weighty-sounding
designation has contributed to the antedating of the imperial grant. 322 If Pliny
asked Trajan about natalium restitutio,32 3 the temptation to think of the discretionary elevation of a man of no origin is far greater than if he asked (as
he did) more modestly whether he might sit de natalibus restituendis.
Secondly, in Justinian's Greek legislation, both on legitimation and on
manumission, several times "restoration of free birth, native conditions" is
represented by dikaion paliggenesias, literally, "the right of palingenesia, regeneration, rebirth." 32 4 I have already quoted instances of the belief, not
uncommon in antiquity, that a man might undergo a second, supernatural
birth. 32 5 Admittedly, as a glance at the dictionaries will show, the word
320

CODEX 6.4.3.3:

the patron lost his right to the succession though he did remain

entitled to reverence which, at that time, i.e., prior to NOVELLA 78, was not due after
"restoration to free birth" proper. On what the reform introduced in CODEx 6.4.3 did to

the legislation on price in the contract of sale, see Daube, Generalisationsin Digest 18.1, 1
STuDm ARANoio-RuXz 192ff. (1952), and Zur Palingenesie, 76 ZEITSGHRIFT DER SAVIGNYSTIFTUNO (1959) (Roman section) 177ff.

322 CoDEx 6.4.3.1, 2.
322 Cf. supra, pp. 57ff., especially p. 62.
323 See supra note 290.
324 NOVELLA 18.11 of A.D. 536, 78 rubric, 1, 3, 5, of A.D. 539. This does not entail the
extrusion of "to restore to nature": 78.5.
325 Supra, p. 51. At this juncture I may add that rebirth plays a remarkably small
part in adoption, except for adoption by God. Professor Thomas L. Shaffer of Notre Dame
Law School kindly draws my attention to the law of Indiana. He writes:
Today, in reading the Indiana statutes on adoption, I noted a provision dealing
with the issuance of new birth certificates in cases where the adoption petitioner asks
for a change in the child's name. One section of the most recent amendment to that
statute may interest you; this is part of Sec. 2, Acts of 1957, General Assembly of
Indiana, ch. 47, which is codified in Indiana Statutes Annotated Sec. 3-125: "When
a new certificate of birth is established following adoption, it shall replace the original
registration of birth, which shall be filed with the evidence of adoption, and withheld from inspection except by order of a court of competent jurisdiction. The new
certificate shall show the actual place and date of birth, except the court may, if
requested in the petition duly filed, decree the birthplace of the child as the place of
residence of the adopting mother at the time of such child's birth, or at the time of
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palingenesia is not confined to this event. It has many shades of meaning,
from distinctly theological ones to such as are hardly weighted that way - it
can signify any major fresh start. (Cicero, incidently, in an otherwise Latin
letter, uses it of his own "renaissance," his reinstallment after exile.) 3 2 6
However, in view of what we have just noticed - and, indeed, of what we
shall yet notice - concerning Justinian's attitude to bestowal of freebornship,
it is safe to say that his introduction of this term is not a casual matter. It
indeed joins with the concept of attainment of a personal free birth rather than
3 27
that of participation in the abstract free birth of the ideal law of nature.
There is no reason why Justinan should narrowly adhere to one construction
of natales restituere: after all, he admits both into the Digest.
Before going on to the source of his fascination with bestowal of freebornship, it is useful to dispose of an episode from Plutarch's Life of Lucullus,
which, at first sight, might look like alluding to the contrast between freedmanship and the primeval pure freedom of all men but, in fact, does nothing
of the sort. 328 When Lucullus in 71 B.C. captured Amisus, the grammarian
Tyrannio (the Elder) was among the prisoners. Murena, then serving as
legate, asked to have him as his prize and, having got him, manumitted him.
Lucullus considered this procedure mean: such a scholar, he held, ought
not to have been enslaved and manumitted since "the gift of seeming freedom
' 32 9
was a taking away of the original one."
The proper interpretation of the passage is as follows. It would have been
open to Murena not to treat Tyrannio as a slave at all. Lucullus, Plutarch
informs us, of a nobler disposition than his legate, simply allowed such citizens
of Amisus as wished to live on there to do so, and to many Greeks among
them he even gave clothes and money. He could have made slaves of all
of them, and freedmen tied to him by subsequently releasing them, but he
the filing of the petition, provided such child was born within the continental limits
of the United States and is less than six years of age at the time of said petition."
This provision replaced ch. 146, Acts of 1941, Sec. 11, which provided on this point:
"At any time after such recording of said certificate of adoption a certificate of birth
shall be issued, upon request, bearing the new name of the child as shown in the
certificate of adoption, the names of the foster parents of said child ....
and there
shall be no difference or distinction by way of color, size, or general substance of
birth registration cards or birth certificates, whether the child be legitimate or
illegitimate, adopted or of natural parentage." The old statute provided that the
original birth registration remain a public record, but seems clearly to have contemplated also a sort of new birth by court decree; the new statute contemplates a
new birthplace by court decree; it is not clear to me whether the adopted status
of the child appears on the record under the new statute.
36 Ccaao, AD ATricuM 6.6.4.
32T Significantly, in NoVE-LA
18 and 78, with the more personal palingenesia, we
find no lengthy description of primeval equality.
328 Pl.trrAcH, LucuLLus 19.7.
39 Aphairesis gar en tes hyparchouses he tes dokouses eleutherias dosis.
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refrained. 330 Murena ought to have treated Tyrannio in the same way,
simply leaving him free. Instead of which he made him his slave, so that,
on manumission, he became his patron. Tyrannio was now free indeed, but
this "seeming," factitious freedom was not his "original," genuine, unencumbered one; it was merely freedmanship. Manifestly, this has nothing
to do with the doctrine of equality in the golden age. The contrast is between
Tyrannio's natales, his freedom from birth, and the status Murena's meanness
substituted for it, a status "seeming," "considered" to be freedom by virtue
of a legal transaction, a manufactured, lesser freedom, freedmanship.
25. Creation of a Freeborn Citizen and Rehabilitation of an Actress by
Rescript. - In a way, a strange way, natales restituere reaches its climax
some six years before Justinian's accession to the throne, in Codex 5.4.23,
enacted between 520 and 523 at Justinian's instance by his uncle Justin,
then sole Emperor, in order to enable Justinian to marry Theodora, a penitent
actress. (Justinian was then getting on to forty.) In this law the principle of
natales restituere is carried outside its original province in a far bolder manner
than in the later Novel, considered above, where it is transferred to legitimation. It is here extended from problems of descent to the moral sphere
and the status of man as determined by his chosen way of life. While the
influence of Marcian's construction is strong, the thought of recovery of the
individual's own unspoilt past is also unmistakably present. The whole law
is very theological and has received too little attention on the part of historians
of Christian doctrine: it would surely throw light, for instance, on some controversial questions regarding sixth-century ideas on penitence. I must con3
fine myself to points of direct interest. 30a
Prior to this law, a citizen of senatorial rank was not allowed to marry an
33 2
actress. 3 3 1 Theodora had been one, and once an actress always an actress.
330 PLUTaCH, op. cit. supra note 328, at 19.6. A commander had a good deal of discretion in these matters. A story commemorating Scipio's (Scipio Africanus Major) generous
behavior after the capture of New Carthage in 209 B.C. is told in Livy 26.50, Gellius
7.8.3ff. and Polybius 10.19. For details of the law, see Vogel, Zur rechtlichen Behandlung
der r6mischen Kriegsgewinne, 66 ZErrSCHRIFT DER SAVIONY-STIFTUNG

(1948)

Rom.Abt.,

398f.
3s0a For further details see now my Pope John Lecture, delivered in Spring, 1967, at
the Columbus School of Law of the Catholic University of America at Washington, D.C.

and published in 16 CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY oF, AMERICA LAW REVIEw 380 (1967).
331 CODEX THEODOSIANUS 4.6.3 [= CODEX 5.27.7] Constantine, A.D. 336, NOVELLA

MARCIANI 4.3 [= CODEX 5.7.2] Valentinian and Marcian, 454.
832 E.g., DIGEST 23.2.44, Paul I ad legem Juliam et Papiam: a member of a senatorial
family may not marry, the statute prescribes, "one who herself or whose father or mother
practices or has practiced stagecraft," quae ipsa cuiusve pater materve arter ludicram
facit fecerit. This permanency of the label, however, while applying wherever social status
is in question, is not absolute. I shall not go into this complicated business, except to give
an illustration relating to prostitutes. To them, too, the label once acquired stuck for good

(e.g., DIGEST 22.5.3.5, Callistratus IV de cognitionibus, 23.2.43.4, Ulpian I ad legem
Juliam et Papiam; compare Tabula Heraclsensis 122f.), but again only in matters having to

DAVID DAUBE

Justin (the hand is the uncle's, but the voice is the nephew's) in an introductory paragraph explains that these women should not be left without
hope, an inducement to give up their objectionable profession. In this way,
the Emperor can imitate the clemency of God, always willing to accept the
penitent sinner and "lead him back to a better state," ad meiorem statum
reducere. If the Emperor fails to act thus, he himself will not be worthy of
divine forgiveness.3 3 3 So far the motivation concentrates on forgiveness and,
with it, on the forgiven person's reinstatement (reducere) in his former, guiltless condition.
In the next paragraph Justin brings in, drags in, the rules of natales
restituere. A far-fetched comparison indeed. It would be wrong, he argues,
if a freedman could be helped but not a penitent actress -quite
forgetting
that the former is innocent whereas the latter is guilty: "As it is unjust that
slaves to whom freedom has been given can by imperial relief be restored to
their native conditions and, after receiving such an imperial grant, live as if
they had never served as slaves but had been born free, whereas women who,
though they have concerned themselves with stage plays, yet later, spurning
this evil condition, have turned to better intention and escaped from their
dishonorable profession, have no hope of an imperial grant which would lead
them back to that state in which, had there been no sinning, they could have
3 34
remained."
Here we have before us a blend of theories concerning a rise in status.
On the one hand, as far as a freedman's promotion is concerned, Marcian's
teaching is adopted, just as it is, we saw above, in several later statutes of
do with social status, not, say, for the purpose of the tax on the profession. When Caligula
wished to tax even ex-prostitutes, a special clause had to be appended to the statute, a
clause which Suetonius condemns (G~Aus CALIGULA 40). As often, there is a serious problem at the bottom of a vulgar joke. Elderly lady: "Mr. Smith, you should talk to your
wife, she has called me a ." Mr. Smith: "No use talking to her, that's her way. I've
been out of the army for thirty years and she still calls me Colonel."
333 The Emperor holds that one should by no means eis spem melioris condicionis adimere, ut ad earn respicientes improvidam et minus honestam electionem facilius derelinquant; nam ita credimus dei benevolentiam et circa genus humanum nimiam clementiam
quantum nostrae naturae possibile est imitari, qui cottidianis hominum peccatis semper
ignoscere dignatur et paenitentiam suscipere nostram et ad meliorem statur reducere; quod
si circa nostro subiectos imperio nos etiam facere differamus, nulla venia digni esse videbimur, "deprive them of hope for a better condition, in order that, looking to it, they may
more readily give up their ill-considered and dishonorable choice; for thus we believe that
we are imitating God's benevolence and his measureless clemency towards mankind as far as
is possible to our nature, seeing that he ever deigns to pardon the daily sins of men and to
receive our penitence and lead us back to a better state; which if we fail to do too to those
subject to our power, we shall appear worthy of no pardon."
s34 Cum iniustum sit servos quidem libertate donatos posse per divinam indulgentiam
natalibus suis restitui postque huiusmodi principale beneficium ita degere quasi numquam
deservissent sed ingenui nati essent, mulieres autem quae scaenicis quidem sese ludis immiscuerunt, postea vero spreta mala condicione ad meliorem migravere sententiam et inhonestam professionem effugerunt, nullam spem principalis habere beneficii quod eas ad ilium
statum reduceret in quo, si nihil peccatum esset, commorari potuerint.
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Justinian: the personal free birth of a freedman "restored to his native conditions" is a fiction; he is looked on, the text says, "as if he had been born
free." On the other hand, the grant envisaged for a penitent actress will mean
her actual reinstallment in her previous, sinless position (ad ilium statum reducere in quo commorari potuerint), in analogy to what happens when God
forgives. There is less of a discrepancy than might appear at first sight. Marcian's fiction, it will be recalled, flows from an effect of the grant which is regarded as real-the turning of the grantee into a man freeborn under the ideal
dispensation valid for all. In the case of forgiveness, restoration of the sinner
to his own, personal state prior to the sin and restoration of the sinner to the
state of innocence in the golden age more or less coincide; the former is tantamount to the latter.
The Emperor goes on to proclaim that henceforth penitent actresses may
apply for an imperial ordinance granting full marriage rights. Upon such a
privilege, the husbands "may be confident that the marriage will be as valid
as if they had taken them to wives with no earlier dishonorable life." 33 5 How
far this implies a fiction, how far the past is thought of as just nonexistent,
is difficult to say: the particle quasi, here translated by "as if," is so ambiguous.
It is the immediate continuation which takes up from the opening argument the association with natales restituere, or rather the synonymous natales
reddere.33 6 "For, all blemish being utterly wiped out, and these women being,
so to speak, handed back to their native conditions, we wish that neither shall
a dishonorable designation henceforth attach to them nor shall they be any
'33 7
different from those who have committed no such sin."
The comparison with natales restituere is here pushed to its limit. In the
motivation, we have seen, Justinian claims that it would be an injustice to
offer a route to the heights to freedmen and none to penitent actresses. Here,
a penitent actress rehabilitated is said to be, in a sense (quasi, "so to speak"),
like a freedman who has been granted freebornship; she is, in a sense, "returned to her native conditions." From the context it is probable that, at this
point, the lawgiver is harking back to that doctrine which assumes that a
freedman granted freebornship is actually born free, is (in the words of
Modestinus) "as if, being made freeborn, he had not in the meantime suffered the blemish of slavery." 338 Just so, a penitent actress accepted by the
Emperor is actually re-created, recovers the untainted life that was hers at
M Ita validum huiusmodi permanere matrimonium confidentibus quasi nulla praecedente
inhonesta vita uxores eas duxerint.
331 See supra note 292.
337 Nam omni macula penitus direpta et quasi suis natalibus huiusmodi mulieribus redditis, neque vocabulum inhonestum eis inhaerere de cetero volumus neque differentiam
aliquam eas habere cum his quae nihil simile Peccaverunt.
3 See supra, pp. 66f., on DIGEST 40.11.5.1, Modestinus VII regularum.
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birth. It will be noted that, in her case, the notion restituere (or reddere)
natales, "to restore (hand back) the native conditions," fits whether we think
of her as reinstated in the primeval, universal sinlessness of mankind or in
her own, personal sinlessness before she became an actress. In the case of a
freedman, where it is a question not of a moral lapse but of descent, the phrase
fully suits only reinstatement in the abstract, primeval undividedness of rank;
there is no personal free birth to reinstate him in. As pointed out above,33 9 this
may indeed have been among the considerations Which led to the understanding (by Marcian) of the grant of freebornship as the man's restoration to
the original, ideal world.
A rehabilitated actress may no longer be called an actress, a scaenica:
this predicate is meant, of course, by the "dishonorable designation" from
which the statute releases her. Indeed, there shall be no difference between
her and any respectable woman. The formulation is not absolutely clear,
but apparently the label is removed only for the future; it could still be said
that she was once a scaenica. Complete annulment of the past is simply not
attainable. Maybe she is thought of as having sinned in a different life.
In one respect, however, the language is as unambiguous as can be: "all
blemish is utterly wiped out." The best MSS. have direpta, "torn up."
Mommsen suggests dirempta, "eliminated." Direpta is certainly unusual, and
the fact that an important MS. (Casinas 49) has direptam also speaks in
his favor. Yet a very forceful, striking expression may have been deliberately
chosen. I have translated neutrally with "wiped out."' 4 0 In a parallel clause
further on in the law the verb is abolire, "to abolish." There is no doubt as to
the sense: as a result of the imperial ordinance, the woman is absolutely pure.
As already remarked, it is a strange undertaking to present the case as
an extension of the principle underlying the conferment of freebornship. But
we can now see the point. That institution was the nearest model of an
imperial grant with a direct effect on a person's past, the nearest legal model
that would render plausible the.- prima facie extraordinary - denial of any
blemish in a rehabilitated actress. (The term macula for "blemish" is well
chosen: it is traditionally associated with the servile status as well as misdeeds
reflecting on a person's character. It occurs in the passage just cited - "as
if he had not suffered the blemish of slavery.") 34 Justinian, through his uncle,
339 See supra, p. 69.
340 It would be interesting to find out what is the history behind the interchangeability of
dirimere and diripere assumed in a late medieval glossary on a work by Balderic of Bourgueil: see Du CANOE, 3 GLOSSARIUM MEDIAE ET INFIMAE LATINITATIS 126 (1883-7).
In CODax
£41 Compare also, e.g., CODEX 7.16.9, Diocletian and Maximian, A.D. 293.
CoDEx 5.27.1 pr.] Constantine, A.D. 336, a senator who enters a
THEODOSIANUS 4.6.3. [forbidden marriage is declared subject to the macula infamiae, "the blemish of infamy."
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is here at work for his great love. She must be flawless -

hence this tour de

force.
I have the impression that some scholars believe that Justin, in the clause
mentioning natales, is according freebomship to rehabilitated actresses who
are freedwomen. Earlier legislation prohibited marriage between a man of
senatorial rank and a freedwoman. In the opinion of these scholars, Justin
here legalizes such a union where the freedwoman is a penitent actress whose
blemish has been removed. 34 2 But this is an error. The law contemplates
only freeborn women; Theodora's free birth was never in doubt. The extension to freedwomen came only some twelve years later, under Justinian. 343
Let me reiterate: what the clause mentioning natales does is to liken the reinstatement of penitent (freeborn) actresses to the bestowal of freebornship on
persons of servile origin: a reinstated actress, like a freedman made freeborn,
is - up to a point - a new creature, her degradation a bad drean.
Bury is skeptical about Procopius's statement that the law was needed for

Justinian's marriage; he points out that, as is reported by Procopius himself,
Theodora had been made a patrician some time before - and a patrician,
Bury argues, even if she had once been on the stage, was marriageable by a
senator.3 4 4 Assunta Nagl says that Bury gives no reason for his doubts.34 5
But surely, this elevation to the patriciate is a reason, though, as we shall soon
see, a bad one. Miss Nagl's comment is all the stranger as she does accept
Bury's - erroneous - view that from the moment Theodora became a patician, her profession was no longer an obstacle in the way of a marriage with
Justinian. Vasiliev is remarkably confused. 34 6 He adopts Bury's position: having become a patrician prior to this law, Theodora no longer needed it; she
was already fit for a senatorial marriage. As proof that, as a patrician, she
could marry a senator, he cites Codex 5.4.23.4, which indeed provides that
an actress receiving a high dignity is equal to one who, penitent, is granted
an imperial rescript; but-the provision is part of the very law we are discussing, the law enacted by Justin. There is nothing to suggest that it applied at an
earlier date, when Theodora was first honored.
Here lies the fallacy of Bury's argument. What he and those dependent
on him fail to appreciate is that, when Theodora became a patrician, though
842 VASILMV,

JusTIN THE FIRST 393 (1950):

"the latter (penitent actresses) shall be

regarded as free women"; KASER, 2 DAS R6MISCHE PRIVATRECHT 113 (1959):

"marriage

with former actresses, freeborn or manumitted."
343 CoDEx 1.4.33.2, A.D. 533. It would lead too far afield to discuss this interesting
statute.
8" BURY, 2 HISTORY OF THE LATER ROMAN EMPIRE 29 (1923), referring to B. PANCHENKO, 0 TAINOI ISTORII PROKOPIIA 74 (1897).
The reference is to PRocoPius, ANECDOTA 9.30.
345 "Theodora" in PAULYS REALENCYCLOPXDIE, 2nd ser., vol. 5 (1934)
1778.
3"8 VASILIEV, op. cit. supra note 342, at 100ff, 389, 392ff.

DAVID DAUBE
the dignity was no doubt recognized as eliminating the blemish of servile
provenance (which she, however, did not bear), it did not yet eliminate a
blemish like that of the stage; at least there was no definite ruling to that
effect - the question, I guess, had never become acute. It is the very law
here under review which, in a special paragraph, lays down that women
receiving a dignity from the Emperor are to be equal to those who obtain
a rescript. Indeed, the conferment of such a dignity is to remove also any
blemish other than a theatrical career (say, the recipient had kept a tavern)
normally an impediment to a senatorial marriage. 347 (The radical nature of
the suppression of any other blemish is brought out by the term used, penitus
abolere, just as in the case of the blemish of the stage.) 3 48 Legislation, then,
was needed.
Two questions arise. First, why did Justin - or Justinian - bother about
penitent actresses, instead of simply legislating that a woman promoted to
the patriciate is cleared of her past? That would have done for the immediate purpose of the proposed union. The answer is that the lawgiver was
inspired by genuine religious and moral fervor. Theodora's rise from the
depths was not to be covered up; on the contrary, others were to be encouraged to emulate her. The legislation was ad hoc in the sense that Justinian's
match was the occasion for it. But it was genuinely desired that the example
should be followed. This is not mere speculation: the subsequent legislative
policy of Justinian bears out what I am saying.
The second question flows from the answer to the first. Why, once it
was decided to make available this wide access to senatorial marriage, a request
to the Emperor acknowledged by a rescript, did Justin nevertheless add the
paragraph providing elevation to high dignity - the patriciate, for instance
with the same effect? Surely, this was, above all, a gallant gesture to
Theodora. She was to be spared the procedure of having to apply for a favor
and obtaining no more than what she asked for. Her patriciate had been
given her, the Emperor indicates, as a free manifestation of his goodwill; at
least this is what I think he is conveying when he speaks of women "who,

347 Similes vero tale merentibus ab imperatore beneficium mulieribus ilas etiam esse
volumus quae dignitaten aliquam, etsi non serenissimo principi supplicaverunt, ultronea
tamen donatione, ante matrimonium meruerint, ex qua dignitate aliam etiam omnem
maculam per quam certis hominibus legitime coniungi mulieres prohibentur aboleri penitus
oportet. "To the women being rewarded by the Emperor with this privilege [the rescript
to help them from their past as actresses] we wish to equate those who, though they did not
supplicate to the Most Serene Emperor, have been rewarded with some dignity by an unsolicited gift before marriage; by which gift it is meet that also any other blemish on account
of which women are prohibited from being united with certain men, be utterly abolished."
348 1 do not know why VAsrIiEv, op. cit. supra note 342, at 394 represents the statute as
using stigma at this point instead of macula. No MS. has stigma. Not that it matters much.
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without supplicating to the Most Serene Emperor, have nevertheless been
rewarded with some dignity by a spontaneous gift." By adding this paragraph
which declares recipients of an imperial honor suitable partners for senators,
Justin succeeded in combining his general religious-moral aim with personal
considerateness. It should be observed that this provision concerning women
dignitaries is distinctly subsidiary to that concerning women petitioners. It
is the latter whose fitness for senatorial unions is established in the principal
part of the statute; and it is the former who, in a relatively short paragraph,
are equated to them. It is not the latter who are equated to the former.
It is just conceivable, however, that there is a little more to this subsidiary rule. Elevation to a dignity wipes out, we have just found, not only
the blemish of the stage but also any other blemish obstructing a noble marriage. The rescript cures only the blemish of the theater; elevation to a dignity can do more. It is just conceivable that the lawgiver, while unwilling
to make blemishes other than the theater generally venial, and therefore keeping them out of the rescript, did deem it wise to ensure that Theodora at least
should be eligible for a noble marriage even should the stage not have been
her only sin. In the concluding chapter I shall have occasion to say something
about reports depicting her as a prostitute. Justin would never admit such
a charge; at the same time it may have been considered wise to have a clause
which would legalize the marriage whatever view one took.
We have seen that a rehabilitated actress is no longer an actress, is in fact
no different from a woman who never lapsed. It is only logical that the law
should enjoin that "daughters of such women, if they are born after the
cleansing of their mother's former life, are not considered daughters of actresses. '3 4 9 Among marriages forbidden to senators had been also that with
an actress's daughter. From now a daughter born after the mother's rehabilitation is automatically excluded from the ban.
The provision is admirably placed at such a point in the statute as to make
it quite clear that it covers rehabilitation by means of a dignity like the
patriciate as well as rehabilitation by means of a rescript. The expression by
which rehabilitation is referred to is also very general, covering both methods:
"cleansing of the former life." Very likely this paragraph was put in with a
view to any female offspring that might ensue from Theodora's marriage
with Justinian. We know that they hoped for children, though in vain.3 5 0
The term expurgatio, incidentally, "cleansing," occurs nowhere else in the
Roman legal sources - but it will be remembered that we found Justinian
349 Filiae huiuscemodi mulierum, si quidem post expurgationem prioris vitae matris suae
natae sint, non videantur scaenicarum esse filiae.
"0 Nagl, op. cit. supra note 345, at 1782.
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speaking in Greek of a prokathairein,a "purifying beforehand," of freedmen
through "the golden rings."' 3 5 1
Daughters born before rehabilitation, the law adds, need an imperial
rescript, which will be granted them if the mother is either rehabilitated or
dead, and which will give them marriage capacity "as if they were not the
daughters of an actress mother."3 5 2 So with regard to them, a fiction will
result. 35 3 The only daughter, it follows, who remains debarred from a firstclass marriage is one whose mother is alive and unredeemed. The lawgiver
knew what he was doing: in this case, the husband would acquire undesirable
connections. Theodora's illegitimate daughter from her earlier life, if a noble
marriage were intended, would need and be entitled to a rescript. That this
daughter was the fruit of her mother's premarital affair with Justinian is
claimed by Bury,354 but seems incredible to me. The argument from silence
alone is overwhelming: there is no testimony lending the slightest support to
his conjecture. The question does not affect my conclusions.
26. The Rehabilitation of Theodora: Eros and Agape. - I should like
to append some further comments on this statute though they are not required
by my subject. The unwarranted dismissal of Procopius's notice that the
statute was designed to enable Justinian to marry Theodora leads to a good
deal of more basic misrepresentation. For Vasiliev, "the law was merely one
step in the progress of the emancipation of women, which goes back to the
fourth and fifth centuries and was in accordance with Christian sentiments." 3 5 5
This is an exaggeration. Certainly the law marks a stage in a more or less
steady advance. But that such advance was not its immediate central purpose
comes out in many ways. Why were no other female sinners considered
worthy of a chance? Why no female sufferers with far better claims and far
more comparable to slaves or freedmen? Daughters of women keeping taverns,
for example, were included only in a Novel of A.D. 542.356
Ex-prostitutes were perhaps never under Justinian entitled to rehabilitation
(except if promoted to high dignity, a contingency which, after Theodora,
would hardly ever again be of more than academic interest). In the Digest
they are still definitely interdicted to the senatorial class,3 5 7 and it is ex-

351

NOVELLA 74.1, supra, pp. 70f.

35

Quasi non sint scaenicae matris filiae.

353 Rigorous insistence on retroactivity of rehabilitation might -

though it need not -

lead to the conclusion that even in this case the mother is in fact no actress; compare
supra, p. 67, as to a rejected view about retroactivity of the grant of freebornship.
354 Bu y, op. cit. supra note 344, at 27.
355 VAsILIEv, op. cit. supra note 342, at 395.
356 NOVELLA 117.6.
357 DIGEST 23.2.43.4, Ulpian I ad legem Juliam et Papiam.
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tremely doubtful whether, as seems universally held, 3 5 8 the interdiction was
lifted by Novel 117 of the year 542.35 9 Procopius both in his official and
secret writings tells us about the seclusion offshore of ex-prostitutes in Jus3
tinian's reign. 60
Beyond question Theodora had led a dissolute life; if we distrust Procopius's secret history, the fact is confirmed by John of Ephesus, a Monophysite
who cannot enjoy transmitting anything unfavorable to a benefactress of his
party. In law, it would make all the difference whether she had been a prostitute or only come near being one. I believe that she was free with her favors
and not averse to earning money that way, but that she was not technically
a prostitute. 36 1 'At any rate, the long, principal portion of Codex 5.4.23 is
evidently meant to convey the impression that she was guilty of acting only,
and the comparative lightness of this lapse is cleverly insinuated by the phraseology. 3 62 Moreover, the continued harshness of the legal order in respect of
prostitutes may be partly owing to the determination to avoid confusion:
Theodora had never been that low. Doubtless in practice this distinction
between actress and prostitute was sometimes blurred, especially between a
3 63
variety or circus actress and a prostitute slightly better than "infantry."
But the law differentiates most definitely, and the principal part of Justin's
statute is emphatically - overemphatically - about actresses only. I argued
above that, conceivably, in the clause concerning the rehabilitation of a
patrician, the removal of all blemishes indiscriminately - not only of that
caused by acting - may be intended inconspicuously to legalize Theodora's
358 BUCKLAND, TExTBooK OF ROMAN LAW 115 '(3rd ed. by Stein [1963]); KAsEit, op.
cit. supra note 146, at 113.
359 NOVELLA 117.6 allows the women defined as "abject" in CODEX THODOSIANUS 4.6.3
[= CODEX 7.27.1 pr.] Constantine, A.D. 336; NOVELLA MARCIAN 4.3 [= CODEX 5.5.7.2],
Valentinian and Maximian, 454. But these are freedwomen, tavern keepers, the daughters
of tavern keepers and the like - not prostitutes.
360 The difference between the official account in PRocopius, KTISMATA 1.9.lff. and
the secret one in PROCOPIUS, ANECDOTA 17.5f. is priceless.
561 For a legal definition see DIGEST 23.2.43pr.ff., Ulpian I ad legem Juliam et Papiam.
362 Indigna honore conversatio, "company incompatible with honor"; improvida et minus
honesta electio, "ill-considered and dishonorable (less honorable) choice"; scaenicis sese
ludis immiscere, "to involve oneself with the stage"; mala condicio, "evil condition"; inhonesta professio "dishonorable profession"; mala et inhonesta conversatio, "evil and dishonorable company"; inhonesta vita, "dishonorable life" - none of these expressions are
very harsh, especially when we consider what scathing language the laws can use. The
women are said to be impelled by sexus imbecillitas, "the weakness of their sex." The term
recurs only in DIGEST 16.1.2.2, Ulpian XXIX ad edictum, in connection with a senatusconsult forbidding women to undertake liability for others. Justin may well be intending to
evoke the idea that women become actresses under pressure from selfish men. Compare,
e.g., CODEX 1.4.33, Justinian, A.D. 534, or also, with regard to prostitutes, PocoPIus,
KTISMATA 1.9.2f. DIGEST 16.1.2.2 is often held interpolated (e.g., BESELER, BEITPXOE, Vol.
2, 1911, 106, vol. 3, 1913, 106, VOOT, STUDIEN ZUM SENATUSCONSULTUM VELLEIANUM
(1952), 8) without good reason, I think, but it does not matter.
363 Peze in Greek: PlocoPIus, ANECDOTA 9.11; see translation by DEWING, PROCOPIUS

105 (Loeb Classical Library, vol. 6 [1954]).
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marriage even should she be deemed guilty of worse than acting. Procopius,
who surely knew Codex 5.4.23 well and understood its religious-moral component, is very nasty in stating that this law made possible the marriage between men of senatorial rank and prostitutes; 3 64 though, if my suspicion about
that paragraph concerning women dignitaries is justified, it is not surprising he

was alive to that aspect and made the most of it.
Whether or not Biondi subscribes to Bury's suggestion that Justinian did
not need the law for his marriage is not clear; at all events, he gives no hint
at the possibility of any selfish motive. In his book on Justinian as a Catholic
ruler, he confines himself to the affirmation that, contrary to Procopius's malicious report, the law is "a veritable hymn to the redemption of women and
the benevolence of God, whom the lawgiver seeks to imitate" ;365 and again,
in his magnum opus on the Christian law of Rome, though he quotes the
statute more than half a dozen times, he never once makes mention of its
ad hoc object-it is just an example of Christian pity for the sinner and
3 66
facilitation of repentance.
He cites the words, "We hold that their lapses should be remedied by a
suitable means, and we ought not to deprive them of the hope for a better
condition, in order that, looking forward to this, they may more readily give
up their ill-considered and shameful choice," 3 6 7 and he adds, "Who does not
see in these phrases the distant echo of the gospel episode of the adulterous
woman (John 8.3-11 ) ?1368 Aristotle in his Art of Rhetoric counsels that, unless the answer desired to your rhetorical question is 100% obvious, you should
at once state it yourself.3 6 9 Biondi disregards this advice, to his cost. I do
not see it, or at least 'I find there is room for doubt: the passage from John
deals with an adulteress caught in flagranti, and furthermore, there is no
significant verbal affinity whatever between it (i.e., its Latin versions) and
Justin's law. (The words mulier and peccare are common to both, but they
are too unspecific to be relevant. For the rest, the dominant notions in John
are accusareand condemnare, "to accuse" and "to condemn," 3 7 0 and these are
absent from the statute.) Biondi continues: "Towards those women the
364 Pocoius, ANECDOTA 9.51.
865 BIONDO BIONDI, GIUSTINIANO

PrIMO PRINCIPE

a

LEGISLATORE

CATTOLICO

62f.

(1936).
866 BIONDO BIONDI, IL Drrro
ROMANO CRISTIANO, VOL. 1 (1952) 138, vol. 2 (1952)
164, 166, 168, vol. 3 (1954) 86, 326, 427, 437.
367 Cum competenti moderatione sublevandos (lapsus) esse censemus mimimeque eis
spem melioris condicionis adimere, ut ad earn rem respicientes improvidam et minus honestam electionem facilius derelinquant.
368 BIONDI, op. cit. supra note 366, at vol. 2, 166.
369 3.18. I am aware that Aristotle has in mind a speech to an audience that can
intervene not a piece of writing.
370 Ubi sunt qui te accusabant? nemo te condemnavit? Nec te condemnabo.

NATURAL LAW FORUM
lawgiver feels not contempt but humane understanding calculated to bring
about penitence and redemption." Ambiguous language, "those women,"
quelle donne, since, as a matter of fact, the kinds of women contemplated in
8 71'
the pericope de adultera and this law are quite different.
A similar rhetorical question is put a little further on. He writes that
the law provides for the rehabilitation of actresses who - he quotes - "spurning their evil condition have turned to a better intent and have fled their
dishonorable profession, have embraced a worthier life and have turned to
decency." 3 7 2 "Who does not hear," he asks, "in these provisions the echo
of the gospel warnings concerning prostitutes who convert (Matthew
21.32)? ' '373 When we look up Matthew, we find that publicans and prostitutes believed the Baptist; the Pharisees, though offered more evidence, showed
no repentance: Venit enim ad vos loannes in via justitiae, et non credidistis
ei, publicani autem et meretrices crediderunt ei, vos autem videntes nec
poenitentiam habuistis postea, ut crederetis ei. I cannot hear the echo.
The law under notice is permeated by the spirit of Christianity and rich
in categories deriving from the New Testament, directly or indirectly.3 74 Yet
overidealization ultimately enhances neither the stature of Justin or Justinian
nor the value of their legislation as an exemplum, as a stimulus and guide not to mention what it does to the gospel. What is most moving about the
law is the peculiar fusion of self-interest and generosity. (Nero had proceeded
very differently when he planned marriage with a freedwoman - and even
that association is not devoid of deeply touching features.3 7 5 ) The primary
impulse comes from Justinian's passionate resolve to marry Theodora; a
splendid resolve, nothing wrong in it, but still a personal cause. He has, however, thought profoundly about their relation, about why they find themselves
confronted by such difficulties, and about why it is right to remove them. The
law makes use of what he has learnt; and while assisting him, it extends relief
to many sufferers and, indeed, propagates sentiments of a kind that must
inevitably lead to further progress. No point in dehumanizing this measure.
Some fifteen years later, at the age of fifty-five, in the Novel which introduces
legitimation by rescript, he avowed: "For we know, though we are lovers of
chastity, that nothing is more vehement than the fury of love."' 3 76
371 Biondi himself offers a detailed exposition of the sanctions on adultery. Op. cit. supra
note 366, at vol. 3, 473ff.
372 Spreta mala condicione ad meliorem migravere sententiam et inhonestam professionem
efugerunt . . . commodiorem vitam amplexae fuerint et honestati se dederint.

373 BiONDI, op. cit. supra note 366, at vol. 2, 168.
374 Though compare also sentiments like SENECA, DE CLEMENTIA 1.7.1f.
375 SuETONIUS, NERO 50: "His nurses Egloge and Alexandria, with his concubine Acte,

deposited his remains."
37s Ismen gar, ei kai sophrosynes esmen erastai . . . ouden einai manias erotikes
sphodroteron.

